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ABSTRACT 
This research PDNHV D FRQWULEXWLRQ WR NQRZOHGJH E\ WHVWLQJ *UDQRYHWWHU¶V (1973) 
theory of the strength of weak ties in microfinance based on an empirical study in 
India. Specifically, it looks to test if the addition of weak bridging ties to the 
networks of microfinance clients who own businesses will improve their businesses 
and help to reduce their poverty. This research also investigates %XUW¶VWKHRULHVRQ
structural holes (1992), brokerage and closure (2005) and network spillover (2010) 
can assist with the building of weak bridging ties.  
Microfinance is the delivery of financial services to the poor which includes credit, 
savings, insurance and remittances. The original goal of microfinance is to do 
financially sustainable poverty reduction.  
The key issue for microfinance is that it has not achieved levels of poverty reduction 
envisioned when the modern microfinance started. One reason for this is that 
microfinance clients start businesses with low barriers to entry which makes them 
very susceptible to competition. Also, the poor tend to inhabit fragmented social 
networks with few ties outside it that would bring needed information on markets, 
finance, suppliers, customers and the competition that would help to improve their 
businesses.  
Network analysis provides, with theory of the strength of weak ties, an approach 
that will give poor people access to information need by them to improve their 
businesses.  
India is one of the largest microfinance markets in the world which also has a 
unique form of microfinance. In addition to individual lending and joint liability 
groups, India has self-help groups which are essentially microbanks owned and 
operated by its members. Sari sellers, who happen to be members of self-help 
groups, are good example of a low barrier to entry business.  
Using a variation of the method developed by Kahn and Antonucci (1980), sari 
sellers were asked to identify the people they were connected to for supplies, 
finance, market information and customers. These are placed on a target diagram 
indicating how close these are to the sari seller who is at the centre of the target. 
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Lines connecting the alters who know each other are drawn. In addition, a network 
intervention was conducted in attempt to introduce weak bridging ties into the social 
networks of the sari sellers. A simple method of providing sari sellers in the 
treatment group a list of other sari sellers they could contact for help while those in 
the control group did not receive the list. 
Several interesting findings came out of this research. $QDO\VLVRI WKHVDULVHOOHUV¶
ego networks shows that there is a reliance on strong ties which confirms 
*UDQRYHWWHU¶VDUJXPHQWThe analysis of the ego networks also show the sari 
sellers do have access to structural holes but do not take advantage of these. When 
the ego networks are combined using their contacts with the microfinance 
LQVWLWXWLRQ¶VVWDIIDQDO\VLVVKRZVWKDWWKHUHVXOWLQJQHWZRUNKDVDSDUHQW-subsidiary 
structure which reflects the hierarchical nature of Indian society. Finally, the 
analysis also shows that this network is fragmentary and fragile. Weak bridging ties 
would make the full network less fragile and allow the sari sellers to take advantage 
of the structural holes they find. This is what the intervention is attempting to do.  
While the intervention did not go as planned, evidence was found to support the 
hypothesis that addition of weak bridging ties to the social networks of sari sellers 
improved their businesses. A group of 15 disparate sari sellers created weak 
bridging ties WR WDNH DGYDQWDJH RI RQH RI WKH VDUL VHOOHU¶V FRQWDFWV WR EX\ VDULV LQ
bulk. Another sari seller saw a significant increase in sales for Diwali 2011 because 
a new member of her social network created a weak bridging tie which introduced 
her to many new customers.  
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1 Chapter One Ȃ Introduction 
1.1 Chapter Summary 
Microfinance which provides financial services to poor people has the goal of 
providing financially sustainable ways to reduce poverty which means it is able to 
consistently meet its own costs. However, the amount of poverty reduction 
produced has been disappointing (see Comim, 2007; Rutherford, 2009; Duvendack, 
2010; Duvendack and Palmer-Jones, 2011; Roodman and Morduch, 2009). One of 
the key problems is that microfinance clients have a tendency to start low growth, 
low entry barrier businesses that do not help to reduce poverty. This chapter will 
outline the thesis that will show how this research makes a theoretical contribution 
to microfinance by applying social network theory, VSHFLILFDOO\ *UDQRYHWWHU¶V
(1973) strength of weak ties argument, to address the problem of how to grow these 
low growth, low barrier to entry businesses tended to be started by microfinance 
clients by introducing weak bridging ties to their social networks.    
1.2 Background 
In 1974, Professor Muhammad Yunus, teaching economics at Chittagong 
University in Bangladesh, led a field trip to Jobra, a poor village next to the 
university. There he interviewed a woman who made bamboo stools and found out 
that she needed to borrow 15 pence from a moneylender to buy bamboo for each 
stool made. The moneylender charged up to 10% interest a week and as a result she 
was left with only 1 pence profit. If she had been able to borrow at lower rates she 
could have increased her profit and raise herself above subsistence level. Being 
shocked by this, Yunus decided to find out how many in Jobra village were 
borrowing from the moneylenders. There were 42 and Yunus decided to lend £17 to 
them. Yunus found that this small amount of money not only helped them to survive 
but helped create the initiative and enterprise needed to pull them out of poverty. 
This was to be the start of what was to become Grameen Bank (Yunus, 1998, pages 
3 -12).  He was pleasantly surprised to see 98 percent of the borrowers pay their 
loans back (Yunus, 1998, pages 81). 
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This story presented the ideal of microfinance. That microfinance could be a 
financially sustainable method of reducing poverty. Give a loan to a poor person to 
invest in their microenterprise and the investment will help the business grow and as 
DUHVXOWWKHORDQLVUHSDLGDQGWKHSRRUSHUVRQ¶VSRYHUW\LVUHGXFHG 
 
This story of Yunus and Grameen inspired another focus for microfinance in the 
years to come: the one on women. Yunus found that giving credit to women brought 
about changes faster than given it to men. This was because he believed that women 
experience hunger and poverty in a much more intense way than men in 
Bangladesh. When a woman is given the smallest opportunity, she will struggle 
extra hard to get out of poverty. He found that women adapted better to the self-help 
process than men. He said that money going through a woman in a household 
brought more benefits to the family than money entering the household through a 
man (Yunus, 1998, page 88). ,Q WKH PLG ¶V <XQXV VWDUWHG WR SURPRWH
microfinance as a panacea for poverty reduction (Hulme, 2009). Ledgerwood (1999, 
page 7) countered that microfinance is not a panacea for poverty alleviation and that 
poorly designed microfinance can make things worse by disrupting informal 
markets that have reliably provided financial services to poor households over the 
centuries.  
 
The drive to achieve financial sustainability in microfinance has led WRWKH³ILQDQFLDO
V\VWHPV´ DSSURDFK WR PLFURILQance. Ledgerwood (1999, pages 2-3) describes the 
beliefs of this approach:  
x Subsidised credit undermines development 
x Poor people can pay the interest rates that are high enough to cover the 
transaction costs 
x Sustainability is the key to institutional permanence and to making them more 
focused and efficient. 
x Because loans to poor people are small, MFIs must achieve sufficient scale to 
become sustainable 
x Measurable enterprise growth and poverty impact cannot be demonstrated easily 
or accurately. Outreach and repayment rates can be used as proxies for impact. 
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The three largest microfinance institutions (MFI) in Bangladesh, ASA, BRAC and 
Grameen Bank DOO QRZ IROORZ WKH ³ILQDQFLDO V\VWHPV´ DSSURDFK (Hulme, 2009; 
Rutherford et al, 2006; Rutherford, 2009; Mannan, 2009). The impressive growth of 
these three MFIs alone helps explain why Bangladesh has one of the largest 
penetrations of microfinance into the population. Bangladesh has a population of 
around 162.2 million people (UN, 2009). At the end of 2003, ASA had 2.3 million 
members, BRAC had 3.9 million members and Grameen Bank had 3.1 million 
members. At the end of 2007, ASA had 5.4 million members, BRAC had 7.4 
million members and Grameen Bank had 7.4 million members (Armendáriz and 
Morduch, 2010, page 3). In addition to these three large MFIs, there are a number of 
other MFIs in Bangladesh also.  
 
However, all of this microfinance in Bangladesh raises a very important question. If 
microfinance reduces poverty and so many Bangladeshis are microfinance clients, 
why does Bangladesh still suffer so much poverty? Exactly where are all these 
empowered women and their successful microenterprises? (Rutherford, 2009, 
Chapter 9, page 2). These questions are extremely pertinent if, as Yunus had said, 
microfinance was a panacea for reducing poverty.  
 
Microfinance impact studies have been done to answer this question in Bangladesh 
and other countries where microfinance is practised. Khandker (1998), in a seminal 
study, showed that microfinance in Bangladesh allowed clients to do consumption 
smoothing and increased their consumption. However, Morduch (1998) found no 
real positive impact but only a reduction in client vulnerability and Roodman and 
Morduch (2009) using a more sophisticated replication found negative impacts. 
 
It seems that the financial intermediation approach, an approach focused primarily 
on the provision of financial services to the poor, is not sufficient on its own to 
consistently reduce poverty. This suggests that financial intermediation needs to be 
paired with social intermediation which provides non-financial interventions for the 
poor. Sunderasan (2008, pages 1 ± 2) argues that while low cost access to financial 
services can be an important ingredient in reducing poverty, it is not enough by 
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itself to alleviate poverty. The other constraints poor people face is lack of primary 
education, primary health care and their use of relatively primitive technologies. 
Even Yunus (1998, page xvii) eventually admitted that microcredit alone will not 
end poverty.  
 
 One of the main problems in getting more poverty reduction for microfinance 
clients is that when they choose to start a microenterprise with the loan, these 
businesses tend to be low growth businesses with low barriers to entry which results 
in facing a lot of competition (Khandker, 1998, pages 148- 149; Kumar L., 2010; 
Bateman 2010; Spears, 2009). These businesses can have a high failure rate which 
sometimes leaves their owners worse off (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). 
 
Bhagavatula and Elfring (2010) argue that the only advantage a poor 
microentrepreneur can gain in a low entry barrier environment are the social and 
business networks they nurture.  Bateman (2010, pages 103 ± 105) goes further to 
say the way that microenterprises can overcome the disadvantages of small scale is 
to build a network with both horizontal and vertical links among each other. 
 
The contribution this research makes to microfinance theory is to apply social 
network theories to partially answer the problem of making the microenterprises of 
microfinance clients more successful. 6SHFLILFDOO\ XVLQJ *UDQRYHWWHU¶V 
seminal work, showing how the addition of weak bridging ties to the social 
networks of their businesses will bring in non-redundant information that will help 
to improve their businesses and increase their poverty reduction. The research 
population for this study is 111 sari sellers who are clients of a MFI, the Bullock 
Cart Workers Development Association (BWDA) in Tamil Nadu in India. Most of 
them are also members of Self-Help Groups (SHG). Sari sellers were chosen 
because sari selling is a low entry barrier and low growth business. The motivation 
for this research is to use the theories of social network analysis to improve the lives 
of microfinance clients by improving their businesses in a way that helps to reduce 
their poverty. The MFI also benefits because the probability of business failure goes 
down and the probability of repayment goes up. Finally, if this theoretical approach 
works for a low growth, low barrier to entry business such as sari selling, it will also 
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work for other low growth, low entry barrier businesses that microfinance clients 
tend to have.  
1.3 Thesis Outline 
This section will describe the contribution each chapter will make to the thesis. This 
thesis outline will give a preview each chapter showing how the thesis is organised.  
 
Chapter 2 focuses on a discussion of the concept of microfinance in general and will 
start with a definition of microfinance. It was the failure of the development bank 
approach in 196¶V DQG ¶V WKDW FUHDWHG WKH RSSRUWXQLW\ IRU PLFURILQDQFH
Microfinance started with microcredit in South Asia and Latin America in the 
¶V7KHre will be a review of achievements, contradictions and failures of the 
three big Bangladeshi MFIs, ASA, BRAC and Grameen Bank, because this model 
of microfinance was replicated all over the world. Another model of microfinance, 
Village Savings and Loans (VSLA) will also be described as well as informal 
financial organisations such as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCA) 
and Accumulating Savings and Credit Association (ASCA). All three of these 
continue to operate in parallel to microfinance and the VSLA approach has become 
more popular as the importance of savings for the poor is recognised.  
 
The ideal for microfinance is to become a financially sustainable way to reduce 
poverty. This led to a debate between the poverty lending approach versus the 
financial system approach in microfinance with the eventual victory of the financial 
system approach. However, questions arose over how much, if any, reduction of 
poverty was caused by microfinance. The myriad problems of measuring the impact 
of microfinance are described and examples from the literature of both positive and 
negative impact are discussed. The literature describing the benefits and criticisms 
will be reviewed with discussion on subjects such as profitability, transparency and 
economic development or the lack thereof. The chapter will end with research 
which shows how dependent microfinance clients are on businesses that are low 
growth and have low barriers to entry and then ask the questions of how reducing  
poverty can be achieved with businesses like these and what can be changed to 
make these businesses better agents of poverty reduction? 
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Chapter 3 is focused on the Indian context this research was done in. Besides having 
a large microfinance market, it also has a unique form of microfinance: the SHG. 
The chapter will start with a discussion of Indian culture in general including the 
caste system. This will be followed by a discussion of Tamil culture, one of the last 
classical civilisations in existence. The Indian government has been much more 
interventionist in its banking sector than Bangladeshi government has. The Indian 
banking sector will be described along with the interventions the Indian government 
has made in banking and especially the priority sector lending policy aimed at 
meeting the needs of the poor. As elsewhere, the development bank approach failed 
in India also which led to the rise of microfinance in India. The size, characteristics 
and models of Indian microfinance with particular attention paid to the SHG model 
created by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD). 
The host MFI for this research, BWDA, will be described. Finally, the microfinance 
crises in India will be portrayed as a cautionary tale of the dangers of rapidly scaling 
up of commercial microfinance and the questions it raises for the financial system 
approach of microfinance especially the Andhra Pradesh microfinance crises of 
2010. It will also be shown that Indian microfinance has also failed to come up with 
the answer to the question posed at the end of the last chapter of how the reduction 
of poverty can be achieved with low growth, low barrier to entry businesses and 
what can be changed to make these businesses better agents of poverty reduction. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on social networks and explores the potential answers that social 
networks provide to questions on how these low entry barrier businesses can 
become better agents of poverty reduction. If Bhagavatula and Elfring (2010) and 
Bateman (2010) are right about social networks being the only advantage a poor 
owner of a small scale, low growth, and low entry barrier business has, then role of 
social network in reducing poverty is now more important. The term social network 
is defined and the reasons why social networks are so important will be discussed. 
Key social network concepts such as homophily, centrality, ego networks, small 
world networks, scale free networks, diffusion, contagions and network 
interventions will be explained and the historical foundations for some of these will 
be described. The workings of connections and influence in networks will be 
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discussed. How networks impact the poor and work in microfinance will be 
explored. Until very recently, the importance of networks in microfinance has not 
been recognised. However, researchers have begun to explore how networks impact 
the work of microfinance and this literature will be reviewed in this chapter to 
identify the relevant insights. One of them describes the importance of the 
acquisition and dissemination of information for microentrepreneurs. However, so 
IDUQRRQHKDVWULHGWRDSSO\*UDQRYHWWHU¶VVWUHQJWKRf weak ties argument in 
microfinance to verify that the acquisition of non-redundant information will 
improve the poverty reduction for owners of low growth, low barrier to entry 
microenterprises.  
 
Chapter 5 sets out the theoretical framework for this research. This framework 
contains five sections. The first section will focus on microfinance theory. The 
chapter will first look at the theories that explain groups in microfinance, such as 
joint liability groups and self-help JURXSV¶ work. The irony today is that no MFI 
claims to use joint liability anymore. The next theoretical area looked at is that 
related to the importance of social relationships. With exception of Karlan (2001), 
theories in this area are mostly looking at how social relationships impact the 
repayment of loans. Karlan, on the other hand looks at how the social network 
impacts the repayment of loans. The second section looks at social capital and 
discusses what social capital is, how social capital works and how it impacts 
microfinance. The third section focuses on social intermediation. If financial 
intermediation alone does not help poor microentrepreneurs with low growth, low 
entry barrier businesses reduce their poverty then social intermediation needs to be 
added. Much of the early theoretical work on social intermediation concentrated on 
making microfinance clients ready for financial intermediation. However, later work 
on social intermediation centres on how it can provide a more holistic approach to 
reducing poverty. The fourth section focuses on social network theory. This 
research will use *UDQRYHWWHU¶VVWUHQJWKRIZHDNWLHVWKHRU\WRVKRZKRZWR
socially intermediate to build weak bridging ties in the social networks of 
microfinance clients who own these low entry barrier businesses so that they can 
acquire the non-redundant information they need to improve the business and 
reduFHWKHLUSRYHUW\*UDQRYHWWHU¶Vobservation that the poor rely on strong 
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ties because of the insecurity the poor face %XUW¶V (1992) theoretical concepts of 
structural holes and network brokerage and closure will be assessed on how helpful 
they are for microentrepreneurs needing to get access to non-redundant information.  
%XUW¶VDUJXPHQWLVWKDWEULGJLQJVWUXFWXUDOKROHVLQRQH¶VHJRQHWZRUNJLYes access 
to non-redundant information. The fifth VHFWLRQ IRFXVHV RQ +RIVWHGH¶V 3RZHU
Distance Index. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) created a theoretical framework on 
differences between cultures that had five dimensions. One of the dimensions, 
power distance, describes how the culture handles inequality. The high power 
distance index for India indicates a high level of inequality in the society. This poses 
an additional problem the poor owners of those low growth, low barrier to entry 
businesses. In order to establish those needed weak bridging ties, these microfinance 
clients need to connect to those who are more powerful or have more status than 
them. This means they run the risk of being seen as a supplicant and run the risk of 
being seen not worthy of establishing the tie.  
 
The above shows that there is a gap in the microfinance theoretical base on the 
power of social networks and specifically weak bridging ties being used to improve 
the social networks of microentrepreneurs who own low entry barrier businesses so 
they can access the non-redundant information needed to improve their businesses 
and reduce their poverty. The research questions become: 
x How can a MFI help their clients bridge the structural holes in their ego 
networks? 
x How can MFIs socially intermediate to help clients establish weak bridging 
ties in their social networks? 
This naturally develops into a hypothesis that if weak bridging ties are introduced 
into the social networks clients use for their businesses, one should see 
improvement in the business.  
 
In Chapter 6, the focus is on the methodology used. Taking a qualitative approach, 
178 members of 10 BWDA SHGs were interviewed to see the type of businesses 
they started. Of those who started businesses, all of these were low growth, low 
entry barrier businesses. The focus of the research was chosen so that it would be on 
a business owned by a significant number of BWDA clients but has not had major 
 25 
 
research into it yet. Of the top five by the number of businesses started, sari selling 
was chosen. Two of them, dairy animals and farming, are businesses that have had 
much research done on them and there have major work on agricultural value chains 
recently. Two of the others, tailoring and food products, have very short value 
chains that would not be of much interest. Sari selling offered much more varied 
value chains and not much research has been done on saris. In order to put the sari 
sellers in context, a description of the pertinent elements of the sari industry in India 
will be provided. Reverse small world technique questions will be used to make 
these networks as complete as possible. To measure the strength of the ties the focus 
was on the level of trust in the relationship. A high level of trust indicated a strong 
tie. A poverty index is used to determine how poor the sari sellers are. There is a 
discussion of the pros and cons of several indexes and the simplicity and low cost of 
WKHFKRVHQLQGH[ WKH*UDPHHQ)RXQGDWLRQ¶V3URJUHVV2XWRI3RYHUW\ ,QGH[33,
The other data collected will be on caste, financials of the business and data on 
network spillover.  
 
The next section describes the methodology for the third research field trip. To get 
better network data, a variation of a method by Kahn and Antonucci (1980) was 
used. This method has respondents placing their network contacts on a diagram of 
concentric circles to indicate how close personally the contacts are. This gives an 
indication of the strength of the relationship. The respondents will draw lines 
between the contacts who know each other to get an indication of how 
interconnected their network is.  
 
The next part describes the network intervention. The sari sellers were asked if they 
wished to volunteer to train other sari sellers in the areas of the business they knew. 
Of the 111, 54 sari sellers volunteered. Their names and contact details were 
collected. A sheet with the names and details of the volunteers was given to the 47 
sari sellers in the city of Villupuram, Tamil Nadu. None of the other sari sellers 
were given this information. The premise of the intervention is that the Villupuram 
sari sellers will be able contact the volunteers across the branches and be able to get 
non-redundant information on sari selling and use this to improve their business and 
reduce their poverty. 
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Chapter 7 presents the data analysis for all the research field trips. The social 
networks of 111 sari sellers were mapped concentrating on who they go to for 
information on customers, finance, markets and suppliers. The discussion will then 
move on to what the data says about the sari sellers. On average the sari sellers have 
42.9 percent probability of living below US$2/day which puts them among the 
borderline poor. Of course, there is a great variation of poverty level among the sari 
seller population. The analysis of the data shows that most of the sari sellers have 
small social networks for their businesses which are focused on strong ties. This 
confirms what Granovetter (1983) said about the networks of poor people. Because 
the sari sellers had at least one BWDA contact in their ego networks, a whole 
network could be created by connecting the sari seller ego networks to their 
common BWDA contacts. The resulting network showed a parent-subsidiary 
structure in the network as the branches was shown clearly in the network and that 
there were no links between any of the branches.  This suggested a network 
LQWHUYHQWLRQRI DGGLQJZHDNEULGJLQJ WLHV WR WKH VDUL VHOOHU¶VEXVLQHVVQHWZRUNV LQ
order to improve their businesses. 
 
The data analysis from the WKLUGUHVHDUFKILHOGWULSVKRZVDJDLQWKDWWKHVDULVHOOHUV¶
ego networks are small and are reliant on strong ties. The use of the degree, 
betweeness and eigenvector centrality analysis identified the best people in the 
network and the branches for spreading information. However, using the Girvan-
Newman technique showed how fragile the whole BWDA and branch networks 
were which indicates how easy to break the flow of communication. The addition of 
weak bridging ties would strengthen these networks. This suggested a network 
LQWHUYHQWLRQRIDGGLQJZHDNEULGJLQJWLHVWRWKHVDULVHOOHUV¶EXVLQHVVHJRQHWZRUNV
LQRUGHUWRLPSURYHWKHLUEXVLQHVVHVDQGVKRZKRZ*UDQRYHWWHU¶VVWUHQJWKRIZHDN
ties can fill the gap in microfinance theory on how to achieve a greater reduction in 
poverty.   
 
An organisational snafu during the intervention resulted in only 8 of the 47 
Villupuram sari sellers were interviewed at the end of the intervention. However, 
one Villupuram sari seller the introduction of weak bridging ties had a dramatic 
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impact on the business. A new contact in her social network introduced her to a 
significant number of new customers which resulted in a significant increase in the 
amount of business she did during Diwali 2011 compared to Diwali 2010. While 
interviewing sari sellers who were part of the control group in Pondicherry, one of 
them wanted BWDA to act as a broker and buy saris for all of their sari sellers at a 
big discount. Prompted by a BWDA staff member, the sari sellers there exchanged 
mobile phone numbers with a sari seller who had a relative in Surat, Gujurat, the 
centre for sari production in India, in order to form a group that could get a big 
discount buying saris in bulk.  While not conclusive, it is indicative of the big 
impact that weak bridging ties can have on low growth, low barrier to entry 
businesses owned by microfinance clients. However, the importance of connections 
in developing and growing business has been shown by Bateman (2010, pages 103 
± 105), Piore and Sabel (1984), Pyke (1994), Weiss (1988) and others. These are 
weak bridges originally that connects these businesses. One can easily imagine the 
large flow of non-redundant information as these firms first start cooperating. One 
should expect similar impact on low growth, low entry barrier businesses as they 
start to cooperate similar to the sari sellers in Pondicherry.  
 
Chapter 8 discusses the results of the research. It discusses how the evidence 
VXJJHVWVWKHEHQHILWRIDGGLQJ*UDQRYHWWHU¶VVWUHQJWKRIZHDNWLHVWKHRU\WR
microfinance. The benefit of adding this theory to microfinance is the improvement 
of the low growth, low barrier to entry businesses often started by microfinance 
clients. It will also discuss how microfinance clients need help in adding weak 
bridging ties to their social networks. There are five ways that MFIs can do social 
intermediation to help their clients: 
x Informal Connections in Same Sector ± Similar to the intervention which 
tried to connect those needing training with those willing to offer it. These 
can spawn weak bridging ties but the MFI needs to encourage this as was 
seen in Pondicherry. 
x Formal Sector-Based Network ± This formalises the above by forming an 
association for all the clients in the sector. This network can also spawn 
weak bridging ties. In India, a formal association has the additional benefit 
of being able to negotiate loans from banks in India. BWDA has started to 
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work on this but discovered it lacked the capacity to do this. It is applying 
for a grant to fund capacity building in this area.   
x Acting as a Broker ± Another way a MFI can help those who own low 
growth, low entry barrier businesses is for the MFI to act as a broker 
between the owners of these businesses and their suppliers. The owners get 
a reduction in their costs because the discount the MFI can get. However, 
MFIs need to obtain industry knowledge to ensure the relationship fully 
benefits their clients. By doing this non-redundant information can flow 
through this relationship in addition to supplies. BWDA is very interested 
in doing this and is attempting to find a sari industry expert to advise them.  
x Retired Industry Mentors ± BWDA has used retired business people to help 
with its financial intermediation. It can extend this by using retired sari 
industry personnel ZKRDUHHPSDWKHWLFWR%:'$¶VJRDOV, for example, to 
mentor sari sellers. Invariably, non-redundant information will flow 
through this weak bridging tie.  
x The MFI can reduce the insecurity felt by their poor clients. If the poor rely 
on strong ties because of insecurity (Granovetter, 1983) then reducing their 
insecurity would make them more willing to explore building weak 
bridging ties.  
 
Chapter 9 starts by summarising the research. This will be followed by a discussion 
of the limitations of the research, what further research needs to be done and the 
implications of the research. The key implication of this research is that if adding 
weak bridging ties to the social networks the sari sellers use for business helps them 
improve their businesses then adding weak bridging ties to the social networks of 
microfinance clients who own other low growth, low barrier to entry businesses can 
help to improve these also. This implication shows the strength of weak ties in 
microfinance.  
1.4 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter introduces the subject and defines the problem of microfinance clients 
starting low growth, low entry barrier businesses that do not help to reduce poverty. 
This research makes the theoretical contribution to microfinance by applying social 
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network theory, VSHFLILFDOO\*UDQRYHWWHU¶VVWUHQJWKRIZHDNWLHVDUJXPHQWWR
address the problem of how to grow these low growth, low barrier to entry 
businesses tended to be started by microfinance clients by introducing weak 
bridging ties to their social networks.    
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2 Chapter Two - Microfinance 
2.1 Chapter Summary 
This chapter focuses on the concept of microfinance. After defining microfinance, 
the reach of microfinance and the background on the conditions that cause 
microfinance to be used as a poverty reduction tool will be discussed.  The poverty 
lending approach and the financial systems approach to microfinance will be 
described. This will be followed by a description of the microfinance model in 
Bangladesh which is the most replicated microfinance model and its conversion to 
the financial systems approach. The chapter will then turn to subject of poverty. 
After a definition of poverty is given, various ways of reducing poverty in 
microfinance will be described. This leads to the subject of how much impact 
microfinance has had. Methodological problems and validity issues will be 
discussed. This will be followed by a discussion on the strength and weaknesses of 
microfinance. One of the reasons that microfinance does not produce radical 
transformation is because its clients often start the same, tiny, low growth, low entry 
barrier businesses. The chapter will conclude with an investigation on why this is 
the case and show that if the client has access to the appropriate information, the 
ability to act on it and the social network to grow the business, real poverty 
reduction can be achieved.  
2.2 Definition of microfinance 
The definition of microfinance has changed over the years. Originally it was 
synonymous with microcredit. For Khandker (1998, page 1), the purpose of 
microcredit is for the poor to become self-employed and escape poverty. It is one of 
the many ways to increase the incomes and the productivity of the poor. However, 
most other people now define microfinance as the provision of financial services to 
the poor that includes savings and other products. For Diop et al (2007, page 27), 
microfinance is a collection of low cost, short term financial products for people 
who do not have access to traditional financial services including individual and 
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group loans, savings, cheque cashing, payment orders, microinsurance, loan 
guarantees and remittances. Kamath (2009, page 86) defines microfinance as the 
provision of services which include savings, loans, payment services, money 
transfers and insurance to poor, low income households and microenterprises. 
Ledgerwood (1999, page 1) gives a similar definition for microfinance saying that it 
is the provision of financial services to low income clients which include savings 
and credit with some MFIs providing payment services and insurance. Platteau and 
Siewersten (2009) say that microfinance is the practice of providing small scale 
financial services to the world's poor, mainly loans and savings and increasingly 
other products like insurance and money transfer. For Johnson and Rogaly (1997, 
page 1), when they refer to microfinance they mean very small deposits and loans. 
Sundaresan (2008, page 1), somewhat more pessimistically, defines microfinance as 
a mechanism that attempts to deliver core financial services to the poor. The 
definition of microfinance this research will be using is financial services for the 
poor which includes credit, savings, insurance and remittances among other 
services. 
2.3 The Reach of Microfinance Today 
Today microfinance is widespread throughout the world. Worldwide there are an 
estimated 10,000 MFIs, ranging from non-profit NGOs to Credit Unions and 
Commercial Banks. The 1,300 MFIs who at the end of 2008 were reporting to the 
Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) have 70 million borrowers and a similar 
number of savers. Total loan portfolio stands at US$ 40bn. In the past years key 
volume indicators have been growing by 20-30% per year, more in some countries 
(Platteau and Siewersten, 2009). 
 
The stock of foreign capital invested in the sector, which more than tripled to US$4 
billion between 2004 and 2006, keeps on growing and now stands at over US$10 
billion. Much of it is held by specialised microfinance investment vehicles, with an 
increasing proportion coming from the private sector that sees investment in 
microfinance as an attractive asset. Commercialisation has come to microfinance 
although at the same time there is increasing interest in achieving the triple bottom 
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line (financial, social, and environmental) in microfinance (Platteau and Siewersten, 
2009). 
 
2.4 Microfinance Background 
The poor have had financial services before microfinance but these were provided 
by informal credit markets (Sundaresan, 2008, page 4). According to Malkamäki et 
al (2009), informal groups were classified under the following five types:  
x Welfare/clan group  
x Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs)  
x Individual Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCAs) 
x Managed ASCAs 
x Investment clubs.  
Welfare/Clan Groups do not intermediate funds but provide financial support for 
members and their next of kin in the case of illness, death etc. ROSCAs and ASCAs 
facilitate saving and lending within groups. In a ROSCA, savings are collected at a 
group meeting and the whole pot is given to one member who has not yet received 
the pot. This is done usually on a monthly basis. In the case of ASCAs, instead of 
allocating the pot to someone, funds are lent to willing borrowers with interest. The 
interest paid on the loans will then accumulate in the group fund. Investment clubs 
are more recent phenomena. People come together to form a group in order to invest 
in property or business. Several investment groups also invest in the stock market.  
After World War II, the formalisation of the credit markets for the poor began as 
part of the effort to reduce poverty. ,QWKH¶VJRYHUQPHQWVDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDODLG
donors set up development finance institutions such as development banks to 
provide cheap credit to farmers. However, the credit provision for poor people was 
transitory and limited because fluctuating whims of governments and donors, poor 
investment decisions and low repayment rates which resulted in development 
finance institutions being unable to sustain their lending programmes. The tendency 
of governments to waive outstanding and overdue loans at election time also helped 
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undermine the system (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997, page 5). It was not just the low 
repayment rates and frequent recapitalisations that caused the failures of these 
development banks but also the cheap credit offered to well off farmers 
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010, pages 9 -10; Ledgerwood, 1999, page 2).  
7KHIDLOXUHRIWKHSURYLVLRQRIVXEVLGLVHGDJULFXOWXUDOFUHGLW LQ WKH¶VEHJDQD
search for more market based solutions that created more sustainable approaches. 
Formal microfinance was started in response to this (Ledgerwood, 1999, page 2). 
Microfinance fit these requirements with Grameen Bank, ACCION International 
and Fundación Carvajal leading the way in the 1970s. Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
moved away from providing subsidised credit and took a more market oriented 
approach. Sundaresan (2008, page 4) added SEWA Bank in India as one of the 
microfinance pioneers. He added that the efforts of these microfinance pioneers 
showed that poor borrowers, especially women, can utilise small loans to create 
microenterprises but can also have excellent repayment records.  Ledgerwood 
(1999, page 2) shows that the pioneers were followed by many MFIs in the 1980s 
that provided credit and training. However, it was found that training required 
subsidies. While Grameen Bank pioneered the peer-group monitoring method to 
reduce lending risk, Johnson and Rogaly (1997, page 7-8) questioned the degree 
with which this method was implemented by staff. 
Harper (2001, page 6) argues that the success of microfinance institutions is in large 
measure due to the adoption of the strengths of money lending and the local savings 
group and their future depends on how successfully MFIs continue to match the 
merits of money lending and the local savings groups and, at the same time, 
overcome their disadvantages. Banerjee and Duflo (2011, pages 166 ± 167) agree 
that microcredit is moneylending reinvented for a social purpose. Where MFIs 
diverge from moneylenders, they say, is that MFIs remove all flexibility from 
microcredit. Johnson and Rogaly (1997, page 21) provide an example of the merits 
of money lending from Cochin, India. A professional moneylender charges his poor 
clients an APR of around 300 per cent. But, despite the very high interest rates, his 
clients have a favourable view of his service. Why? This is because the 
moneylenders do not needlessly harass clients over repayment but exhibit a 
willingness to accept loan losses. The moneylenders know their clients well enough 
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that they will not lend more than they think the client can repay out of normal 
income. As will be seen later on, some Indian microfinance institutions were unable 
to replicate these features in their service.  
2.5 Approaches to Microfinance 
Robinson (2009) described two main approaches to microfinance. The first is the 
³SRYHUW\ OHQGLQJ´ DSSURDFK ZKLFK VHHNV WR UHGXFH SRYHUW\ XVLQJ IRUHLJQ DLG DQG
VXEVLGLHV6HFRQGLVWKH³ILQDQFLDOV\VWHPV´DSSURDFKZKLFKIRFXVHVRQGHYHORSLQJ
savings and lending services that meet the needs of poor and non-poor households 
in a profitable manner.  
5RELQVRQ FKDPSLRQHG WKH ³ILQDQFLDO V\VWHPV´ DSSURDFK The World Bank also 
tended to favour the ³ILQDQFLDO V\VWHPV´DSSURDFK. It sees microfinance less as an 
antipoverty crusade and more as a double bottom-line business²a business that 
seeks at one and the same time to make surpluses and serve a social purpose. The 
financial systems approach encourages microfinance providers to cover their own 
costs with few subsidies. Ideally, funds for borrowing would come entirely from 
savings, commercial debt, for-profit investment, and retained earnings rather than 
from donors. The providers would be regulated and supervised for-profit companies 
rather than NGOs. There would be no need for an exclusive focus on women, and 
borrowers could just as easily be individuals as members of a group. Some 
advocates of the approach also believed that the sharp focus on targeting the poor 
should be softened. First, they argued that working with better-off groups as well as 
with the poor will improve revenues, allowing providers to expand their services to 
DOOFODVVHVPRUHTXLFNO\6HFRQGWKH\ZDUQHGDJDLQVWOHQGLQJWRWKH³HFRQRPLFDOO\
LQDFWLYH´SRRUZKRPLJKWHQFRXQWHUGLIILFXOWLHVZLWKORDQV7KH\WHQGWREHOLHYHWKDW
the ³HFRQRPLFDOO\LQDFWLYH´SRRU are best helped by nonfinancial social programs of 
safety nets. Morduch (1999) and Diop et al (2007, page 29) said offering financial 
services to the poorest of the poor is not compatible with financial sustainability for 
MFIs  
 
Morduch (2009) notes that a schism has opened up between those seeking primarily 
VXVWDLQDELOLW\ URXJKO\ HTXDWLQJ WR WKH ³ILQDQFLDO V\VWHPV´ DSSURDFK DQG WKRVH
SULPDULO\ VHHNLQJ HFRQRPLF DQG VRFLDO LPSDFWV URXJKO\ HTXDWLQJ WR WKH ³SRYHUW\
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OHQGLQJ´ DSSURDFK 0RUGXFh said that in order to resolve the schism 
experimentation and innovation is required. However, the success of Grameen Bank 
has led to replication rather than innovation.  
2.6 Bangladeshi Microfinance Model 
The replication of the Grameen Bank model has meant that the model of 
microfinance practiced in Bangladesh became the most widely copied microfinance 
model in the world. Because it was the most replicated model, it was the model 
most tested to see what, if any, poverty reduction it achieved. The model Grameen 
created was also used by two of the other big microfinance organisations in 
Bangladesh, ASA and BRAC.  
For Hulme (2009), the history of Grameen Bank is seen as a verification of 
5RELQVRQ¶V  ³ILQDQFLDO V\VWHPV´ DSSURDFK $IWHU WKH LQLWLDO H[SHULPHQW in 
Jobra, further trials were not as successful. Yunus (1998) thought this was because 
they had either used the money unwisely or were untrustworthy. So, after some 
time, a model was created that did the following: 
x Lending to poor rural women because they were less likely to misuse loans and 
were more reliable for repayments 
x Starting a Joint Liability Group (JLG) of 5 women creating social collateral and 
peer screening process. ,QD-/*ERUURZHUVJXDUDQWHHHDFKRWKHU¶VORDQVVRWKDW
if a JLG member does not repay, the other members are liable.  
x Establishing centres of six JLGs that met each week to apply for loans and make 
repayments 
x Charging higher interest rates than the government and NGOs 
x Compulsory microsavings each week for financial discipline and the creation of 
financial collateral 
x Simple, standardised products that required regular small repayments 
x Hiring and training bright, young graduates to administer services to minimise 
corruption 
 
The invention of the group lending model allowed Grameen Bank to grow quickly. 
This model had the poor being guarantors to each other. With this model, the 
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Grameen Bank was able to effectively outsource monitoring and enforcement to 
group members (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010, pages 12 -13). 
 
Originally, the Grameen Bank was a part of the state-run Bangladesh Krishi Bank 
(BKB). To prevent from becoming like BKB, Yunus negotiated through his 
connections a license for Grameen as an independent bank in 1983. With donor 
funding, Grameen Bank expanded to having 1 million FOLHQWVE\,QWKH¶V
DQG ¶V D ORW RI YLVLWRUV FDPH DZD\ LPSUHVVHG DQG UHVROYHG WR UHSOLFDWH the 
Grameen model,QWKHPLG¶V<XQXVZDVSURPRWLQJPLFURFUHGLWDVDSDQDFHD
to reduce poverty. The American NGO Results came up with the idea of a 
Microcredit Summit. Some within the Summit movement wanted to focus on 
microfinance and not just microcredit. However, this did not fit into Results 
campaigning style. They wanted the simple message that Grameen Bank was a 
panacea and the world should replicate it (Hulme, 2009). 
 
Ironically, according to Hulme (2009), it was at the turn of the century that 
Grameen Bank experienced a repayments problem. The longer clients stayed with 
Grameen Bank, they tended to take larger and larger loans which they could not 
service with their income. Branch managers gave them larger loans to prevent 
defaulting. The crisis came to a head with an article in the Wall Street Journal (Pearl 
and Phillips, 2001). Grameen Bank took a three prong approach to resolve the crisis. 
First, it rescheduled and wrote off loans. Second, it recapitalised itself with donor 
IXQGVWRRIIVHWORVVHV7KLUGLWUHGHVLJQHGWKHEDQN¶VSURGXFWVVRWKH\EHFDPHPRUH
profitable and could compete with other MFIs in Bangladesh. It took Grameen Bank 
25 years to get 2.5 million clients. It took 3 years for the bank to get its next 2.5 
million clients after the redesign. This became a vindication of moving from what 
5RELQVRQ FDOOHG WKH³SRYHUW\ OHQGLQJDSSURDFK´ WR WKH³ILQDQFLDO V\VWHPV´
approach. This redesign was called Grameen II by the bank. It included: 
 
x A major focus on savings with voluntary savings, term deposits and a pension 
scheme. 
x Flexible basic loans for variable amounts, variable terms, negotiable repayment 
schedules and interest rates determined by type of loan. 
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x Abandonment of joint liability 
x )RFXVHG ³VWUXJJOLQJ PHPEHUV´ SURJUDPPH IRU EHJJDUV Wo prepare them for 
microfinance. 
After Grameen II, Grameen found that not only was it more popular with the poor; 
it was also more popular with middle class and wealthy borrowers. The reason for 
this was they found the services and products offered to Grameen Bank members 
attractive. These services and products include large loans, educational loans, 
educational scholarships and the Grameen pension savings. What was also attractive 
was that these services were offered in a corruption free, friendly and relatively less 
bureaucratic environment. Grameen staff found it hard to resist the membership 
applications from the wives and daughters of middle class and wealthy villagers 
because of the pressure to recruit. Grameen found itself in a strange place because 
philosophically Grameen rejects the argument that by taking everyone on it will be 
able to expand its business and serve everyone, including the poor and very poor, 
better (Rutherford et al, 2006). 
The Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee (BRAC) started its 
development journey in 1972 as a small relief organization with a few employees. It 
now employs over 100,000 staff to carry out development activities in sixty-nine 
thousand villages in Bangladesh. It has also expanded its activities in Afghanistan, 
Sri Lanka, and several African countries. By 2009, BRAC is a conglomeration of 
organizations that typically combine three features in complex ways. The first 
feature is a projection of the image of a non-profit nongovernmental organization 
comprising an education program, a health program, and a social development, 
human rights, and legal services program. Second, the BRAC economic 
development program, with a strong microfinance component at its core, displays 
the features of a for-profit nongovernmental organization that transfers profits from 
its business operations to the BRAC poverty alleviation program and vice versa. 
Third, BRAC operates many profit-oriented business enterprises, including 
industrial concerns, a bank, and a university (Mannan, 2009). 
 
%5$&¶Vsavings and credit operations combine the advantages of a standard bank 
with mechanisms long used in traditional group-based modes of informal finance. 
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Similar to the Grameen model, BRAC formed their clients into groups called 
³YLOODJH RUJDQL]DWLRQV´. In village organizations, BRAC applies peer pressure on 
group members to attend weekly meetings, save and borrow money, and repay 
through weekly instalments (Mannan, 2009). 
 
Mannan (2009) describes how BRAC tries to link its clients to the markets. For 
example, BRAC runs the largest poultry industries in Bangladesh. The poultry 
industry requires feed for its birds; maize is the main ingredient. BRAC established 
a chain of contract farmers who buy hybrid maize seeds on credit. BRAC then buys 
back the harvest at predetermined prices to produce poultry and cattle feed at its 
own feed mills. These poultry industries produce day-old chicks and sells to group 
members on credit. The clients then raise the chicks and collect the eggs. What they 
produce is collected by BRAC to process in its automated broiler processing plant to 
supply the dressed chicken to meet the demands of a growing market. However, 
clients are largely unable to change and escape from the cycle of poverty. BRAC 
claims that poor borrowers benefit from its loan operation as they escape poverty 
and accumulate assets (BRAC, 2006), but this claim contradicts a recent finding that 
shows that income from BRAC-related activities is significantly lower than income 
from other sources (Ullah and Routray, 2007). These fast-growing industrial and 
business enterprises that link clients to markets are not financed by BRAC Bank. 
Instead, it borrows heavily from commercial banks. In 2006 its total indebtedness to 
those banks stood at $91 million (Mannan, 2009). 
 
%HVLGHVWKHODFNRISURJUHVVRQSRYHUW\DQRWKHUSUREOHPLVWKHFOLHQW¶VGHSHQGHQFH
on BRAC. Mannan (2009) quotes a senior staff member arguing,  
 
³:K\ VKRXOG WKH\ become independent as groups are continuously receiving 
finance DQGEHQHILWVIURP%5$&"´ 
 
Independence from BRAC may also mean the loss of trained and skilled persons 
who work for %5$&¶Vinternal markets (Mannan, 2009).  
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Mannan (2009) shows how BRAC has evolved through three phases journeying 
IURP WKH ³SRYHUW\ OHQGLQJ´ DSSURDFK WR WKH ³ILQDQFLDO V\VWHP´ DSSURDFK MXVW OLNH
Grameen Bank. The first phase (1972±1990) started with donor financed 
PLFURFUHGLWRSHUDWLRQVWKDWZHUH³VRcial´. In the second phase (1990±2000), BRAC 
needed to discipline itself in light of ever increasing activities that gave rise to a 
development bureaucracy. It redesigned its governance, program management, and 
organizational structures to find synergies between its development objectives and 
its business plan. In 1997 it adopted a strategic plan to become more of a business 
corporation by 2007 rather than a pure development-oriented organization. The 
current third phase (post-2000) BRAC has gradually shifted from donor-financed 
microcredit to market-financed microcredit programs under an economic rather than 
a social model. The BRAC model, although rooted in the effort to alleviate poverty, 
is always searching for alternative avenues in the business sector for funding and 
financial sustainability. 
 
BRAC can transfer capital between the non-profit voluntary sector and the for-profit 
business sector, which blurs the boundary between non-profit and for-profit. The 
ability to do this is an advantage to BRAC but DOVRDSUREOHP%5$&¶VRYHUWXUHWR
business has been challenged by civil society. Since 1994, it has faced periodic 
religious opposition from rural society. The civil society actors challenged the 
operation of a bank by BRAC, a voluntary organization. BangODGHVK¶V+LJK&RXUW
ruled against the operation of the BRAC Bank, but the Supreme Court overturned 
the decision. BRAC was even fined for evading taxes (Mannan, 2009). 
 
Unlike Grameen Bank and BRAC, the Association for Social Advancement (ASA) 
started as a radical social action group. It transitioned itself into a conventional 
NGO. A serious cyclone in 1985 and devastating flooding in 1987 and 1988 
allowed ASA to increase dramatically its cash support from international donors and 
to establish itself as a major mainstream NGO. Some of the cash was given as loans 
to cyclone or flood victims, and the ERUURZHU¶V propensity to repay took 
management by surprise. By 1990, in order to give the poor better incomes and 
reduced their poverty, ASA felt that there is no alternative to credit (Rutherford, 
2009, Chapter 5, page 1). 
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ASA set up groups similar to those of BRAC and Grameen Bank where the group is 
FDOOHG ³VDPLW\´ +RZHYHU LQ WKH HDUO\ ¶V LWV FUHGLW SURJUDPPH ZDV RI SRRU
quality.  Several thousand group members waited for several years to get credit 
(Rutherford, 2009, Chapter 5, page 12). By the end of 1996 ASA had half a million 
borrowing members and a billion-taka loan portfolio. Microcredit under ASA is 
simple, practical, measurable, and busy, characteristics that fitted snugly with the 
temperament of its founder (Rutherford, 2009, Chapter 6, page 1). At the end of 
2008, ASA had a loan recovery rate of 99.6 per cent. Armendáriz and Morduch 
(2010, pages 1 ± 2) say that the revenues have fully covered costs since 1993. 
However Rutherford (2009, Chapter 6, Page 18) says ASA became self-reliant in 
2002.  
 
ASA's loan officers and branch managers soon found that the standard claim that 
microcredit helped poor people escape poverty by investments in small businesses 
was hollow.  They saw with their own eyes that ASA's loans were used for all 
manner of purposes, and not just for business investment. Management at some 
microcredit NGOs refused to believe the evidence of their own workers but ASA 
did.  But ASA kept it tactfully quiet. It knew that international support for 
microcredit depended to a great extent on the microenterprise loan idea. But ASA 
eventually dropped the aspiration to make all its members self-reliant and described 
a new kind of loan product, designed expressly for real microentrepreneurs. A few 
of these were offered alongside the core loan. This was an early indication that ASA 
had understood that the core microcredit loan was in fact a multipurpose loan only 
sometimes used for business (Rutherford, 2009, Chapter 7, Page 10). The reason for 
this was that the three most important things to poor people are education of their 
children, food and shelter and if a loan could help pay for these three things when 
they had no other resources, they would use it (Maes and Reed, 2011). 
 
,QWKH¶VDQG¶VPDQ\0),VEHJDQWRGHYHORSDURXQGWKHZRUOG with many 
following the Bangladeshi microfinance model. Many of these MFIs were largely 
funded by governments and aid agencies. These MFIs focused on credit 
(Sundaresan, 2008, page 5). While there was a growing recognition of the 
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importance of savings (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010, page 171; CGAP, 2009b; 
Collins et al, 2009; Ledgerwood, 1999, page 2; Sundaresan, 2008, page 5), 
operationally, the focus remained on credit. This can be seen when in 2005 the 
United Nations wanted to recognise financial inclusion as a tool to reach the 
Millennium Development Goals, it declared the International Year of Microcredit, 
not microfinance (Sundaresan, 2008, page 5; UN, 2005).  
When Dr. Yunus won the Noble Peace Prize in 2006, some notable people in 
microfinance such as Elizabeth Littlefield (2007), the former CEO of Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) predicted there would be a backlash against 
microfinance. She and others knew that predominant Bangladeshi microfinance 
model did not meet all of the claims its promoters have made over the years. 
Armendáriz and Morduch (2010, pages 4 ± 5) said there were four myths 
surrounding microfinance: 
x Microfinance is only about providing loans. Savings is important but doubt that 
for the poorest that savings is more important. 
x The high repayment rates are due to the group lending model.  
x Microfinance has a clear record of social impacts and has shown to be a major 
tool for poverty reduction and gender empowerment. While microfinance can 
make a difference, it is not a panacea and cannot be expected to work 
everywhere and for everyone. Few rigorous studies have been completed so far 
and these show mixed results.  
x Most microlenders are both serving the poor and making profits. Profitability 
has been elusive for many MFIs. 
Cull et al (2009) state there is a basic tension between meeting social goals and 
maximising financial performance. Therefore, trade-offs need to be made between 
contracting mechanisms, level of commercialisation, rigor of regulation and levels 
of competition. Meaningful interventions in microfinance mean making deliberate 
choices and weighing trade-offs carefully.  
 
The focus on the Bangladeshi microfinance model has overshadowed other 
microfinance models such as Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLA) 
ZKLFK GR QRW IROORZ WKH ³ILQDQFLDO V\VWHPV´ DSSURDFK VSLA is a microfinance 
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model that provides simple savings and loan facilities in mainly rural areas. The 
model has group members contributing savings which are then lent out to members. 
After a year, the accumulated savings and profits from the loans are distributed back 
to the members (VSLA, 2011). 
 
The tension between meeting social goals and maximising financial performance, 
HOXVLYH SURILWV DQG ODFN RI D FOHDU UHFRUG RI VRFLDO LPSDFWV EULQJV WKH ³ILQDQFLDO
V\VWHP´ DSSURDFK LQWR VHULRXVTXHVWLRQ7KHPLFURILQDQFHFULVLV LQ ,QGLD DV
will be seen below, raises even more questions for this approach to microfinance. 
But, more importantly, it identifies that the central problem for the predominant 
Bangladeshi microfinance model is that it does not deliver the amount of poverty 
reduction envisaged by the founders of the modern microfinance movement. 
2.7 Poverty and Poverty Reduction 
Before the issue of reducing poverty in microfinance can be discussed, poverty must 
be described and defined. The World Bank estimates that 1.1 billion people are 
living below US$1 a day and 2.7 billion people living under US$2 a day 
(Sundaresan, 2008, page 1). For Khandker (1998, page 1) poverty is the result of 
low economic growth, high population growth and extremely unequal distribution 
of resources. In Bangladesh, poverty is caused by lack of physical and human 
capital. To combat this, employment needs to be created and human capital 
developed.  
 
How is poverty defined? Conventionally, poverty is defined as an income shortfall 
measured against a standard (Copestake et al, 2005, page 23). However, others have 
a broader definition of poverty. Johnson and Rogaly (1997, page 73) define poverty 
as either lack of income, vulnerability to income fluctuations or powerlessness. 
Diop et al (2007, pages 29 - 30) also agree that vulnerability is another dimension 
that needs to be added to the definition of poverty. For them, vulnerability refers to 
the tendency that the poor are more prone to fluctuations in income and find it 
difficult to spread that income over time to meet basic needs all of the time. In 
addition, they also state that poverty is not being able to meet basic needs in both 
economic and social development. Even when progress has been made on income 
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poverty, this does not mean social goals are closer to being met (Copestake et al, 
2005, page 92). 
 
How is poverty measured? Diop et al (2007, page 31 - 32) identify two measures 
that are widely used to measure poverty. First is the poverty line method ± this 
method compares the household income against a threshold (the poverty line) that 
represents the income needed to meet basic needs in that country. Second is the 
unsatisfied basic needs method ± observes the extent that basic needs are met or not. 
The definition of what are basic needs is the central difficulty with both methods 
 
Diop et al (2007, pages 33 - 37) identify two theories of how microfinance can help 
reduce poverty. The first theory is that MFIs should target the less poor whose 
enterprises will create jobs for the poorest.  The transaction costs for the MFIs are 
lower than targeting the poorest. The criticisms of this approach include that it 
reinforces local hierarchies and the creation of jobs does not necessarily benefit the 
poorest. The second theory is that MFIs should target the poor directly. However 
this means high transaction costs and much higher interest rates.   
 
Comim (2007, pages 48 -51) reviews the literature to identify the issues 
microfinance has in reducing poverty:  
x Mission Drift ± The tendency for MFIs to serve wealthier clients over time 
x Lack of depth ± The poorest are the least likely to benefit from microfinance. 
However, this is based on an income only definition of poverty. The poorest 
could benefit in non-monetary ways from microfinance. 
x :RPHQ¶V HPSRZHUPHQW ± It has been found that this is not automatic under 
microfinance. Before and after income comparisons provide only an incomplete 
SLFWXUHRIZRPHQ¶VHPSRZHUPHQW 
x Wider impacts ± Microfinance can impact the poor non-borrower community 
but these are very difficult to assess.   
 
There has been recognition that the poorest do not benefit from microfinance. Two 
different approaches are being tried to reduce the poverty of the poorest. BRAC 
created the Targeting the Ultra Poor programme that has had some success of 
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graduating the poorest out of extreme poverty. This programme uses asset transfers, 
business development training and ensures minimum subsistence needs are met and 
assists in helping the poorest set up sustainable livelihoods. It is only at this point 
that these people become eligible for loans. The TUP programme was done in 
Bangladesh originally and now has expanded to Ethiopia, Haiti, India and Pakistan 
(Huda and Simanowitz, 2009; Huda et al, 2009; Huda et al, 2011). The other 
approach is using conditional cash transfers. This programme entitles the very poor 
to a small cash sum on a conditional basis. Conditions can be taking the children for 
health checks or ensuring the children attend school. Unlike the BRAC TUP 
programme there is no attempt to build a sustainable livelihood. The cash 
guarantees that the minimum subsistence needs of the poorest are met (Bateman, 
2010, pages 121-122, 167-168). 
2.8 Microfinance Impact 
To understand the impact of microfinance, one needs to measure the poverty 
reduction actually caused by microfinance. It is the causal link that is one of the 
most contentious issues in microfinance. There has been research that has claimed 
that microfinance has reduced poverty and research that claims it has not. There 
have even have been claims that microfinance has had a negative impact on the 
reduction of poverty.  
 
A small sample of microfinance impact studies shows the variety of results 
obtained. Imai et al (2010) confirmed a significant positive effect of MFI productive 
loans on multidimensional welfare indicator. In addition, they found that loans for 
productive purposes were more important for poverty reduction in rural than in 
urban areas. However in urban areas, simple access to MFIs has larger average 
poverty-reducing effects than the access to loans from MFIs for productive 
purposes. In a 2001 study, BASIX in India found that half of its best established 
microcredit customers reported income increases, a quarter stayed the same and a 
quarter saw their income decline (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010, page 268). Beck 
(2010) claims that rigorous microcredit studies find mixed results on the access of 
credit by the poor. 
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One of the biggest promoters of microfinance is the Microcredit Summit Campaign. 
This NGO gathers those involved in microcredit around the world with the goal of 
extending the outreach of microfinance. While savings is mentioned, the focus 
remains on microcredit. Their Global Microcredit Summits are the largest 
gatherings of the microfinance community. Table 1, presented at the Global 
Microcredit Summit 2011, shows where the campaign claims to have accomplished 
in outreach.  
 
Microcredit Summit Campaign Figures as of December 31, 2010 
Data Point Finding 
Number of MFIs Reporting (data from 12/31/97±12/31/10) 3,652 
Number of MFIs Reporting in 2011 (data from 12/31/10) 609 
Total Number of Clients (as of 12/31/10) 205,314,502 
Percent of Poorest Clients Represented by MFIs Reporting in 
2011 
56.5% 
Total Number of Women (as of 12/31/10) 153,306,542 
Total Number of Poorest Clients (as of 12/31/10) 137,547,441 
Total Number of Poorest Women (as of 12/31/10) 113,138,652 
Table 1 (Maes and Reed, 2011) 
The Microcredit Summit Campaign has set some ambitious goals.  The first goal is 
to HQVXUHWKDWPLOOLRQRIWKHZRUOG¶VSRRUHVWIDPLOLHVHVSHFLDOO\WKHZRPHQRI
those families, are receiving credit for self-employment and other financial and 
business services by the end of 2015. The campaign believes that this goal can still 
be met by 2015 despite the crisis in Andhra Pradesh (see Chapter 3). The second 
goal is to ensure that 100 million families rise above the US$1.25 a day threshold, 
adjusted for purchasing power parity, between 1990 and 2015. The campaign 
believes it will not be able to meet this goal. The campaign believes that going 
above US$1.25 a day threshold will move the client from mere subsistence to being 
able to provide a better life for her family and will also mean she is likely to belong 
to a rich social network. The campaign admits that it has a major problem in 
measurement because there is no poverty baseline for clients when entering a 
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microfinance programme. Estimations made for the campaign claim that 2 million 
households in Bangladesh moved above the US$1.25/day threshold between 1990 
and 2008 and that 9 million households in India moved above the US$1.25/day 
threshold between 1990 and 2010 (Maes and Reed, 2011). 
 
These estimations are challenged today as there is growing uncertainty about the 
fruits of microfinance. Part of this is the backlash predicted by Littlefield (2007) 
above. The publicity surrounding the Nobel Prize reminded Bangladeshis again and 
again that microfinance, their country's most famous invention, is the single best 
antidote to poverty. In that case, why does Bangladesh still suffer so much poverty? 
Exactly where are all these empowered women and their successful 
microenterprises? (Rutherford, 2009, Chapter 9, page 2) 
 
For Rutherford, (2009, Chapter 9, page 11) measuring the impact of microfinance 
on poverty is hard. It is not easy to understand the extent that microfinance 
improves incomes, or promotes microenterprises, or has some other effect on 
poverty or on poor people, such as improving their health or advancing their 
education or helping them to exercise their rights or to influence local or national 
politics. 
 
In an attempt to put this issue to rest, in the late 1990s, Khandker (1998) undertook 
a large survey of 1,798 households in Bangladesh for the World Bank. It showed 
that households with someone in a microcredit group increased their expenditure on 
food and other goods and services more than households that lack such a member 
but are otherwise similar. It was presumed that they had increased their income. 
They were also better able to smooth consumption (meaning that savings and credit 
help them to have something to eat always, rather than just when they happen to 
have earned some LQFRPH7KLVGLGQ¶W VRXQG OLNHpanacea to end of poverty and 
some practitioners were disappointed (Rutherford, 2009, Chapter 9, page 11). 
 
Despite the disappointment, Khandker (1998) study was used to prove microcredit 
reduced poverty. Khandker (1998, pages 60 ± 61) showed that participating in a 
microcredit programme had a significant impact on per capita expenditure for 
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women and the impact on consumption was twice as much for women than men. 
Borrowing by women improved the nutritional status of children. On the village 
level, microcredit increased household output by about 50 per cent. Grameen Bank 
and BRAC had positive impacts on average household income but only Grameen 
Bank had a positive and significant impact on rural wages. Consumption for 5 per 
cent of participants increased to the point that they were above the poverty line. This 
suggested that microcredit could reduce poverty in Bangladesh by about 1 per cent a 
year. Khandker (1998, page 81) also showed that Grameen Bank and infrastructure 
development projects appear more cost effective than other programmes in 
LQFUHDVLQJFRQVXPSWLRQDPRQJ%DQJODGHVK¶VUXUDOSRRU. 
 
+RZHYHU.KDQNHU¶V(1998) study also contained some warnings. First, better credit 
availability does not ensure growth in income and employment in the rural nonfarm 
sector. Skills development, market promotion and other policies to enhance 
productivity must also be promoted. Plus, government facilitate growth by investing 
in infrastructure (Khandker, 1998, page 81). Second, credit-based interventions are 
best targeted to those among the poor who can productively use microcredit to 
become or remain self-employed. However, many women lack the entrepreneurial 
skills to become self-employed (Khandker, 1998, page 143). Third, if the reduction 
of poverty is achieved mainly through increases in consumption rather increases in 
income and productivity then poverty reduction impacts are difficult to sustain. 
Loan size matters as larger loans are needed to reduce poverty on a sustained basis 
(Khandker, 1998, pages 148- 149). Many studies have attempted to measure the 
benefits of microcredit in terms of income, employment and other socioeconomic 
outcomes but the analysis has largely failed to indicate whether measured benefits 
are due to programme participation (Khandker, 1998, page 9). 
.KDQGNHU¶VVWXG\GLGQRW UHPDLQXQFRQWHVWHGMorduch (1998), ran an analysis of 
the data that Khandker (1998) had gathered and found the consumption smoothing 
but did not find an increase in consumption (Rutherford, 2009, Chapter 9, page 11). 
Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011) applied the propensity score matching method 
along with sensitivity analysis to the study done by Pitt and Khandker (1998), which 
is the same study as Khandker (1998) on Bangladeshi microfinance, shows that the 
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relationship between microfinance and the outcomes is not causal. This despite an 
earlier paper by Duvendack (2010) concluding that doubts remain about the quality 
of the impact estimates obtained through advanced econometric techniques such as 
propensity score matching and sensitivity analysis. Roodman and Morduch (2009) 
redid the analysis of the Khandker (1998) again. This time they got negative 
impacts. They do not claim lending to women does harm but rather that the study 
failed to get rid of endogeneity.  
 
Johnson and Rogaly (1997, page 73) identified three methodological problems faced 
by impact assessments of microfinance on the lack of income: 
1. The respondents may give false information if loan was used for purposes other 
than the one given to MFI 
2. (VWDEOLVKLQJFDXVDOLW\WRWKHORDQUHTXLUHVNQRZOHGJHRIDOOWKHFOLHQW¶VVRXUFHV
and use of funds 
3. It is difficult to establish what would have happened if the loan had not been 
made 
 
Armendáriz and Morduch (2010, page 267) agree with the last point that the key 
question is how have the outcomes changed with the intervention of microfinance 
relative to what would have occurred without the intervention. Agreeing with the 
point made by the Microcredit Summit Campaign, Copestake et al (2005, page 69) 
state that at most times there are no base line studies to compare the outcomes to.  
Johnson and Rogaly (1997, pages 10-11) imply that microfinance impact 
assessments are too narrow by DVNLQJ IRU D IRFXV RQ PLFURILQDQFH¶V influence on 
social relations and the circumstances which reproduce them.  
 
Another serious problem with microfinance impact studies is selection bias. Without 
controlling for self-selection, estimated impacts will be misleading by making 
microfinance seem more positive than it really is (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010, 
pages 269 ± 270). In several studies such as Coleman (2006) and Alexander (2001), 
microfinance clients are wealthier than non-clients. Hashemi (1997) found half of 
WKRVH ZKR FKRVH QRW WR SDUWLFLSDWH LQ %5$&¶V PLFURILQDQFH SURJramme did so 
because they felt they could not generate enough income to pay off the loans. A 
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quarter did not do so because of religious and social sanctions on attending meetings 
away from home with nonfamily males. Another reason selection bias is important 
is that the biases can be large. McKernan (2002) found that not controlling for 
selection biases can lead to overestimation of the effect of microfinance by as much 
as 100 per cent.  
 
One way around selection bias is for researchers take advantage of natural 
experiments which remove self-selection among clients. In his study, Coleman 
(2006) chose 14 villages in Thailand where eight had a village bank at the start of 
1995 and the other six villages had to wait a year for a bank. But all villages were 
organised into groups. As mentioned above, he found that the wealthy participated 
and benefited from microfinance (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010, pages 276 ± 
278). 
 
In agreement with Coleman are Hulme and Mosley (1996) who also show that 
microcredit has a more significant impact on the incomes of the non-poor than the 
poor. They reason that this is because the poor have a greater need to divert 
microenterprise loans to consumption, sell assets because of shocks and have more 
limited investment opportunities than those who are better off. In order to improve 
microcredit impact, they suggest that savings facilities, simple insurance and small 
consumption loans with flexible repayment periods are provided to the poor. 
However, they realise that this may not work in all contexts.  
 
One of the newest ways of getting around selection bias in microfinance impact 
studies are Randomised Control Trials (RCT). RCT finds ways around the problems 
of impact evaluations by using a methodology used in clinical medical research. A 
randomly chosen group is chosen to receive microfinance services while another 
group is randomly selected not to receive these services. The difference between the 
average outcome of the treated group and the average outcome of the control group 
is an accXUDWH LQGLFDWLRQ RI WKH LQWHUYHQWLRQ¶V DYHUDJH LPSDFW +RZHYHU
randomisation is not always feasible. Spillover can be a problem if someone in the 
control group can benefit from knowing someone in the treatment group 
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010, pages 293 -305). 
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Banerjee and Duflo (2011, pages 168 ± 171) try to answer the question of does 
microfinance work for the poor? They found the answer depended on the definition 
of work. They found that no independent research had been done to answer this 
question. The MFI Spandana agreed to do a RCT on the impact of microfinance on 
poor people in two different neighbourhoods in Hyderabad in 2008. They found 
clear evidence that microfinance was working. They defined working as those in the 
Spandana neighbourhood being more likely to start businesses and more likely to 
have purchased large durable goods. Those households who did not start businesses 
in the Spandana neighbourhood were consuming more. Those who had started 
businesses were consuming less so that more money can be put into the business. 
But, they found no evidence of radical transformation. They found no evidence that 
women were feeling more empowered nor did they see any difference in spending 
on education or health between the treatment and control groups. The percentage of 
families starting businesses went up from 5 per cent in the control group to 7 per 
cent in the treatment group. While more studies needed to be done, they believed 
they had shown that microfinance was working and had earned its rightful place as 
one of the key instruments in the fight against poverty. In a report by 
Développement International Desjardins (DID, 2011), Esther Duflo later added: 
 
³,WLVWUXHWKDWPLFURILQDQFH results on an individual scale are modest ± but they are 
real. And because they affect 200 million people, they have a multiplier effect 
making this one of the strongest programs in recent GHFDGHV´  
 
Of course, no method is without its weaknesses. Armendáriz and Morduch, (2010, 
pages 305 ± 308) summarise the criticisms of RCT. First, RCT provides an estimate 
of the average impact only. It does not do median impact or the distribution of 
impacts. Second, it may be difficult to generalise form RCT results due to lack of 
external validity. Third, there may be major spillovers which remove the advantages 
of randomisation. Fourth, attrition and contamination can impact RCT results. Fifth, 
there is the ethical issue. Is it right to deny those who need the treatment access to 
it? Bateman (2010, pages 34 - 35) adds that RCT does not consider the displacement 
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effects of new microenterprises displacing existing ones and the effects of the 
failure of client microenterprises. 
 
Comim (2007, pages 56 - 58) proposes another way to measure microfinance which 
he calls the capability perspective. This perspective recognises that capabilities 
cannot be measured solely in the terms of resources but what the individual is 
capable of doing and being with these resources. He agrees with Sen (1999) who 
argues that it is difficult to conclude that equal levels of resources generate equal 
levels of wellbeing.  
Duvendack et al (2011) comes to a pessimistic conclusion on the microfinance 
impact studies done so far.  They conclude that almost all impact evaluations of 
microfinance suffer from weak methodologies and inadequate data (as already 
argued by Adams and von Pischke (1992), thus the reliability of impact estimates 
are adversely affected. This can lead to misconceptions about the actual effects of a 
microfinance programme, thereby diverting attention from the search for perhaps 
more pro-poor interventions.  
 
Rutherford (2009, Chapter 9, page 12) makes two counterarguments on why 
microfinance impact studies do not pick up big effects associated with microcredit. 
First, because microcredit loans are so easy to repay, households use these loans, 
which are rarely worth more than two or three months of household income, for 
whatever purpose is most urgent at the time. Investment in businesses ² permanent 
and profitable enterprises ² is done by a minority of borrowers and the small 
microcredit loans more often supplement, rather than transform, the businesses. This 
helps explain why surveys do not pick up big effects on microenterprise 
development, and register only mild effects on household income. But, having a 
reliable financial partner is of immense importance for poor people because it helps 
them manage a resource that, by definition, poor people have in short supply²
money. That may be why all surveys pick up microfinance's effects on consumption 
smoothing.   
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Second, many of microfinance's most important effects are indirect and surveys 
cannot detect them. For example, one lady was always able to borrow from her 
family when she needed to buy medicine for her children because they could rely on 
her repaying them when the next ASA loan came along. Another man and his 
family never used microcredit to run a business, but as the foundation for a complex 
structure of transactions that led to vastly increased income from his two employed 
sons which made them a part of the rural well-to-do. Another woman saved her 
father's life with the help of microcredit loans, something of immense value to her 
that would show up in no survey of income or microenterprise growth.  
 
In summary, microfinance impact studies have at best shown that it helps the poor 
but no evidence of transformational change. Rutherford (2009) may be correct that 
some of the impacts of microfinance are indirect and hard to measure. But the talk 
of microcredit possibly being a panacea for poverty iQ WKH PLG ¶V PD\ KDYH
given the microfinance movement promise it could not possibly deliver on. It may 
be as Banerjee and Duflo (2011, pages 168 ± 172) state that microfinance finds 
itself trapped by overpromising. But, if only a minority of clients use loans to start 
businesses and a considerable number of those businesses fail, then it is not a 
surprise transformational change has not been found by the rigorous impact studies 
done recently. This is because, as a general rule, MFIs have focused on financial 
intermediation and have not done significant social intermediation alongside it.  
2.9 Strength and weaknesses of microfinance 
If there are questions on what impact microfinance delivers, what are the benefits of 
microfinance? What are its strengths? What are its weaknesses? According to 
Rutherford (2009, Chapter 7, Page 19), the key benefit of microfinance is having 
savings that allow you to spend past income now, or taking loans that allow you to 
spend future income now. Poor people need those services more often than others, 
because they are most often without liquidity when they need it. Where there are no 
microfinance providers, poor people have to manage this essential task on their 
own. Two studies show that when microfinance organizations arrive on the scene, 
they do not replace these well-established, homemade systems, and may not even 
handle more than a fraction of all the transactions that poor people make. But they 
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are very much welcomed as unusually reliable, convenient, and transparent financial 
partners. Finding a reliable financial partner is no small thing. Rutherford argues 
that it is by supplying this basic service, more than by financing businesses, that 
microcredit has become so important to the poor of Bangladesh.  
 
Green (2005) lists the benefits microfinance can bring. These include promoting 
microenterprise development, enabling bulk purchases of inputs, improving 
household income, reducing poverty, promoting the economic independence of the 
poor, stimulating employment creation for household members and others, enabling 
consumption smoothing by reducing seasonal fluctuations in income, help to avoid 
recourse to moneylenders, acting as a social safety net and reduce vulnerability by 
helping to protect against risk ahead of time and to manage losses following an 
adverse shock, increasing physical asset accumulation, improving assets, improving 
ZRPHQ¶VHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOVWDWXV, increasing FOLHQWV¶VHOI-confidence, increasing 
human capital, allowing provisions for old age and allowing improvements in 
housing. As will be seen, many of these benefits of microfinance will be disputed by 
others.  
 
Green (2005) also recognised the limits of microfinance despite its significant 
strengths and benefits. It was not a panacea for the elimination of poverty. Green 
found that by itself microfinance is often insufficient to alleviate poverty and 
PLFURILQDQFH W\SLFDOO\ GRHV QRW UHDFK WKH µSRRUHVW RI WKH SRRU¶. Not all 
economically active poor want to become microentrepreneurs and microfinance 
may lead to the displacement of entrepreneurs without access to microfinance. 
There also might be cultural or religious reasons against accessing microfinance 
products. Finally, many microfinance programmes have simply failed. 
 
Harper (2010a) says that microfinance was born with the purpose of giving support 
to millions of indigent people around the world, acting as a force for good. 
However, it has been acting both for good and for bad. The good includes targeting 
mainly women, as they are more reliable in terms of households, child-care and 
savings protection, and tend to put every effort into repaying the debt by the 
required time. Also, women tend to be less empowered than men, thus giving them 
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credit can make them stronger. The bad includes basing the psychology of 
microfinancing on the dependence of its clients. The quote from the senior staff 
PHPEHURI%5$&DERYHVKRZVWKHYDOLGLW\RI+DUSHU¶VFRQFHUQ 
 
Since the respondents in this research are all women, it is worth looking at the 
claims of the benefits that microfinance brings to women. Green (2005) makes the 
traditional case that microfinance empowers women by allowing them to make a 
greater economic contribution to the household which gives greater status and 
decision making power in the household. Also, women who are microfinance clients 
report better relationships with their husbands and less domestic violence.   
 
However, all of the above has been disputed. For example, Agier and Szafarz 
(2011) actually find gender discrimination in microfinance. This is based on the 
findings that women entrepreneurs are known not only to reimburse loans swifter 
than men, but also to receive smaller loans. However, on average women have 
smaller-scope business project and are poorer than men.  
 
Thakrar (2006) reports that microfinance can be a cause of domestic violence in the 
household because obtaining credit may make them challengers of patriarchal ideas 
and beliefs. Thakrar argues that breaking women out of the cycle of domination and 
patriarchy requires not just the expansion of the economic space through credit 
initiatives but equally the expansion of mental spaces of both genders. The 
empowerment of women is not dependant on access to credit therefore, but how that 
credit is put to use and who controls it.  
 
One of the recognizable weaknesses of microfinance is overindebtedness. Schicks 
and Rosenberg (2011) define borrowers as overindebted if they have serious 
problems repaying their loans. This definition implies a view that borrowers can be 
over-indebted even if they are repaying their loans. Over-indebtedness often implies 
heightened vulnerability and further impoverishment of borrowers. Schicks and 
Rosenburg (2011) also argue that there are sociological effects related to peer 
pressure and a loss of social position, as well as psychological effects on mental and 
SK\VLFDOKHDOWK,QH[WUHPHFDVHVERUURZHUV¶GHVSHUDWLRQFDQHYHQOHDGWRVXLFLGH
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This will become very pertinent in the next chapter when the crises in Indian 
microfinance are discussed. Schicks and Rosenberg (2011) do not believe 
overindebtedness can be totally eliminated but want the objective to be to reduce the 
prevalence of overindebtedness to reasonable levels. Schicks (2010) adds that if 
loan information is inappropriate to how borrowers mentally process information, 
this may contribute to overindebtedness.  
 
Strong criticisms of microfinance come from those who argue that microfinance is 
not ideally suited to deliver economic development. De Ferranti and Ody (2007) 
argue that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), typically employing 
between 10 and 250 workers, form the backbone of modern economies and can be 
crucial engines of development. However, in much of the developing world, SMEs 
are under-represented, stifled by perverse regulatory climates and poor access to 
inputs, especially capital. Tinier firms²micro-enterprises²frequently get more 
attention, as donors seek to help the very poor. But they argue that the type of 
support inherent to microfinance lending is generally ill-adapted to serving their 
slightly larger, and arguably more dynamic, cousins, the SMEs.   
 
'LFKWHU  DUJXHV WKDW WKH H[SHFWDWLRQ WKDW PLFURILQDQFH¶V LQYHVWPHQW LQ
microenterprises will help promote economic growth is unrealistic for several 
reasons. First, most people, poor or otherwise, are not entrepreneurs, so there is little 
reason to think that mass credit would in general lead to viable business start-ups. 
Second, today as in the past, business start-ups in the advanced countries depend 
predominantly on savings and informal sources of credit. Third, most microcredit is 
actually used for consumption rather than investment. Fourth, in the history of 
WRGD\¶V ULFK FRXQWULHV PRUHRYHU HFRQRPLF JURZWK RFFXUUHG ILUVW and then came 
credit for the masses. Therefore, Dichter concludes, we should not expect 
microfinance to noticeably affect growth or successful business development. 
'LFKWHU¶V  DUJXPHQW PHDQV WKDW KH GRHV VXSSRUW PLFURVDYLQJV DQG
microinsurance.  
 
Bateman (2010) makes a strong case that microcredit does not deliver economic 
development. He uses countries such as Bangladesh with a high concentration of 
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microcredit as examples. The spark for this argument was the use of microcredit as 
DQHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWWRROLQWKHPLG¶VOne of the arguments he uses is 
the fallacy of composition which assumes that what is good for a part of the 
economy will be good for the whole economy. Specifically, Yunus and others 
believed that an economy could absorb as many microenterprises as could be 
created. The example of Grameen Phone shows this. This is a social business 
created to allow clients to use loans to buy mobile phones that can be rented out for 
use by other villagers. Initially, a number of ladies were able to progress out of 
poverty but Grameen kept adding more and more women to the business to the 
point there was so much competition that it stopped allowing women to progress out 
of poverty. Another problem is that new enterprises from microcredit can displace 
already existing ones. It can also displace funding to SMEs. He gives alternatives to 
microfinance that are highly subsidised, long term and focused on small businesses 
as a local economic base. Ironically, two of these alternatives come from 
microfinance. The first alternative is the Kerala state SHG programme which takes a 
collective approach that builds cooperatives that could provide real economic 
growth. The second alternative is the MFI programme in Vietnam. These MFIs are 
public or semi-public entities that have much lower administrative expenses which 
mean they can charge lower interest rates, are policy based lenders and fund 
themselves through equity, donations and savings. However, Bateman (2011) 
criticisms are aimed at microcredit not at microsavings and microinsurance.  
2.10 Trying to get clients beyond subsistence jobs 
Banerjee and Duflo (2011, page 208) tell the story of a woman who was a client of 
the MFI Spandana in Andhra Pradesh in India. She was a trash collector, a very low 
status job. She took her first loan to pay off the moneylender to avoid the crippling 
interest rates. She noticed that the company that bought her trash sorted it before 
selling it to the recyclers. To earn extra money, she decided to do the sorting herself 
and sell it to the recyclers. With the second loan, she bought a cart which allowed 
her to collect more trash. The third loan allowed her to buy trash from others. Today 
she is at the apex of a large network of trash collectors. She no longer collects trash 
but organises the trash collection. The key ingredients to her success was getting the 
capital when she needed it, obtaining the information about the price differential for 
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unsorted trash for the business she used to sell trash to and for sorted trash for the 
recyclers, obtaining the information on the how the recyclers wanted the trash sorted 
and the ability to build a large network of trash collectors.  
 
This is what can sometimes happen in microfinance and this is the type of client 
MFIs like to show off. However, we know that this type of client is not the norm. If 
they were the discussion on microfinance impact and poverty discussion above 
would have been very different.  :K\ DUHQ¶W PLFURILQDQFH FOLHQWV PRUH OLNH WKH
trash collector? Banerjee and Duflo (2011, page 213) identify two reasons for this. 
First, the businesses typically run by the poor are tiny. Second these businesses 
make very little money. Banerjee and Duflo (2011, page 213) found that these 
businesses tend to have a high failure rate. In Mexico, only 41 per cent of the 
businesses they recorded in 2002 were still in existence in 2005. In Indonesia, 67 
per cent of the businesses of the poor survived 5 years.  These businesses remained 
tiny. In Mexico, 20 per cent of the businesses of the poor that had zero employees in 
2002 had one employee in 2005. However, 50 per cent of the businesses of the poor 
that had one employee in 2002 had none in 2005. In Indonesia, the percentage of 
businesses that had one or more employees did not grow in the 5 years this was 
measured. In Andhra Pradesh, Banerjee and Duflo (2011, page 213 ± 214) 
calculated the median business profit by the poor was around US$2/day. This 
explains why microfinance typically does not produce radical transformation. 
 
The paradox is that these tiny businesses of the poor generate high marginal returns 
on investment. Banerjee and Duflo (2011, pages 214 ± 223) argue that the marginal 
returns the poor make on their investment must be at least the interest rate charged 
by the MFI. So, if a MFI charges 4 per cent LQWHUHVW SHU PRQWK WKH ERUURZHU¶V
business must give a return on investment of at least 4 per cent per month.   
 
To find out the type of returns microentrepreneurs get, Harper (2001, pages 14 ± 16) 
undertook a study that was conducted in India and Kenya collecting data from 215 
enterprises and got similar results to Banerjee and Duflo (2011). These businesses 
were selected at random. One third of these were owned by women. This was not a 
representative sample. The investment figure is an estimate of the total investment 
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at the time they were visited. This was adjusted for seasonality.  The opportunity 
cost of labour was estimated based on the work available locally. In 37 cases it was 
zero because no work was available locally. Failed businesses were not included. 
There is no allowance for the risk of failure. Many of these businesses had been 
operating for at least five years but the owners may have had previous failures. The 
average annual incremental return on investment after subtracting the opportunity 
cost of labour was 847 per cent. The returns ranged from minus 480 per cent to plus 
19,200 per cent. In only 40 cases, where investment was over US$500, was the 
annual return less than 100 per cent. In 44 cases, the return was over 1,000 per cent. 
In only 10 cases where the owner would have made more money having a job. 
These figures do not mean the owners are rich. Because the investments were so 
small, even those with very large returns amounts to very low earnings that is often 
below the official poverty line or minimum wage.  
 
Armendáriz and Morduch (2010, page 6, 19) similarly argue that the diminishing 
returns principle in economics shows that the marginal returns from investment get 
smaller as investment increases. This results in a poorer entrepreneur getting a 
higher marginal return on investment than a richer entrepreneur which means that 
the poor entrepreneur is willing to pay a higher interest rate. But this is only true if 
everything but capital is held constant. If this is not true, then poor entrepreneurs 
could have lower marginal returns than rich entrepreneurs. This gives us the 
paradox that the poor are getting high marginal rates of returns on their investments 
because of the overall small size of the investment but does not generate enough 
profits to grow the business.  
 
Bhagavatula and Elfring (2010) show the tendency of the poor is to start low barrier 
to entry businesses that are vulnerable to competition. Unless the poor entrepreneur 
does what the trash collector did in Andhra Pradesh, these will tend to be low 
growth businesses. Khandker (1998, pages 148- 149) agrees that microcredit 
borrowers tend to have low levels of skills and knowledge and therefore borrow for 
self-employment in businesses with low growth potential. He argues that unless 
high growth businesses are started the possibility of long run poverty reduction 
through microcredit is remote. 
 59 
 
 
Not only do the poor start low barrier to entry, low growth businesses, they tend to 
open the same low entry barrier business. Spears (2009) asks the obvious question 
of why do so many poor people maintain identical small businesses? He attributes 
this tendency to present bias. This bias indicates a tendency to focus on a business 
that will produce money now rather than wait for a more valuable business to 
produce money in the future. However, Spears (2009) found an exception to this 
tendency towards present bias. If the microfinance clients were literate who treat 
their water before drinking it, who report wanting to cut any category of spending, 
or who report wanting to cut spending on intoxicants are more likely to have an 
uncommon, rather than a common, business. These actions also indicate a 
significant commitment to the business. L. Kumar (2010) has a simpler explanation. 
She says that these microfinance clients are just emulating the businesses that other 
women have set up which end up saturating the market.  
 
Banerjee and Duflo (2011, pages 223 ± 225) argue that the real problem is that 
growing the business is too hard for most poor people. They cannot borrow enough 
to grow the business to a reasonable size and unless the business is extremely 
profitable, it takes too long to save that amount. This can lead to a lack of 
commitment to and a lack of enthusiasm for the business.  
 
This is exacerbated by the tendency to run multiple businesses as a risk mitigation 
strategy. They cannot specialise and become good in one business and cannot 
commit to one business. Also, the structure of the typical microcredit product 
encourages not taking big risks. The loan repayments usually need to start soon after 
the loan is given which means the client needs a business that generates cash right 
away which leads to the present bias tendency Spears (2009) talked about. Unless 
you have access to information through literacy, for example, and the discipline to 
act on it, as Spears (2009) found, the microfinance client will set up a low growth, 
low barrier to entry business. But, as the trash collector shows, if you access to the 
appropriate information and have access to a social network that can assist in 
building the business, it is possible to build a business that can really grow and 
actually help to reduce poverty.    
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2.11 Chapter Conclusion 
Microfinance, financial services for the poor, has the ideal of doing financially 
sustainable poverty reduction. The failure of the agricultural development bank 
model opened the door for microfinance. Microcredit was the initial and still 
predominant product. The initial success with the pilots freeing poor entrepreneurs 
from moneylenders led to the expansion of the concept. The most replicated model 
was that from Bangladesh used by MFIs such as ASA, BRAC and Grameen Bank. 
The Bangladeshi model eventually represented the victory of the financial systems 
approach over the poverty lending approach. However, the extent of reduction of 
poverty achieved by microfinance was nowhere near what was envisaged by the 
pioneers of microfinance. The early impact studies claiming significant poverty 
reduction have been shown to be methodologically faulty and the best evidence to 
date shows that microfinance can work but cannot produced radical transformation. 
The reason for this is that most microfinance clients start tiny, low growth, low 
entry barrier businesses that do not make much money. However, examples from 
this chapter show that if a microfinance client has access to the appropriate 
information, the ability to act on it and a social network to grow the business, real 
poverty reduction can occur. This strongly suggests that focusing solely on financial 
intermediation will not achieve this but MFIs need to do social intermediation in 
parallel. The next chapter will discuss microfinance in the Indian context and will 
set up the discussion of how social networks are affected by this context. 
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3 Chapter Three ± India and Indian Microfinance 
3.1 Chapter Summary 
The chapter will focus on the Indian context. This chapter will first look at poverty 
in India both its depth and pervasiveness. Another important factor to be discussed 
is the caste system. The actual experience on the ground shows that it is a complex 
system that can both hinder and help poor people. As this research is focused on the 
state of Tamil Nadu, the Tamil culture will be discussed along with the central role 
kinship ties play in keeping this classical civilisation alive. Next, Indian 
microfinance will be examined with a spotlight shown on its unique form of 
microfinance, the self-help group. The Bullock Cart Workers Development 
Association (BWDA), the host institution of this WKHVLV¶ILHOGresearch, use of self-
help groups in its microfinance operations will also be discussed. Finally the impact 
of the Andhra Pradesh microfinance crisis will be discussed.   
3.2 Poverty in India  
India, the second most populous country in the world with just over 1.2 billion 
people (UNPOPIN, 2011), is seen as an up and coming world power. However, 
,QGLD¶VELJJHVWSUREOHPremains that of poverty. 
Harper (2010b, page 2) argues that India is poor and in absolute terms it is the 
poorest nation on Earth.  He uses the evidence shown in Table 2 and Table 3. In 
Table 2, which compares the poverty and malnutrition data for China, India and 
Nigeria, it is shown that India has the most people living under US$1.25 a day. This 
is around 38% of its population. Table 2 also shows again that India has far and 
away the most children under five years old who are malnourished. UNICEF (2009) 
concurs with this and says that the biggest reason for malnutrition is not a lack of 
food but social such as the low social status of women, early marriage and little gap 
between the births of children (Pandey, 2006). In another comparison, the BBC 
(2008) shows that China has 0.0003% of the total population and 0.002% of those 
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between the ages of 0 and 14 die of child malnutrition, By comparison, in India 
0.2% of the total population and 0.5% of those between the ages of 0 to 14 die of 
malnutrition.  
 
Comparative Poverty and Malnutrition Data 
Country Numbers Living Under 
US$1.25 a Day 
Numbers of 
Malnourished Children 
Under Five Years Old 
India 456 million 52 million 
China 208 million 6 million 
Nigeria 88 million 7 million 
Table 2 (Harper, 2010b, page 2) 
Table 3 compares the child nutrition data for the four South Asian nations, 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan. The differences in Table 3 are not as great in 
Table 2 but it, again, shows that India leads in the percentage of low birth weight 
babies and the percentage of children under the age of five who are underweight. 
The impact of poor nutrition will be discussed later but these figures show the 
immensity of the problem of poverty in India. 
South Asia ± Comparative Child Nutrition Data 
Country % of Low Birth Weight 
Babies  
% of Under Five 
Children Underweight  
India 28% 43% 
Pakistan 19% 31% 
Bangladesh 22% 41% 
Nepal 21% 39% 
Table 3 (Harper, 2010b, page 3) 
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Banerjee and Duflo (2011, pages 29 ± 32) disagrees that India is the poorest nation 
on Earth. They cite Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda as being poorer. However, they agree that the child 
nutrition numbers are devastating. These numbers suggest that children in India are 
very badly nourished. They are extraordinarily underweight given their height. Half 
the children are stunted (far below the norm), one fourth is severely stunted 
(extreme nutritional deprivation) and one in five children under the age of three is 
wasted (falls below the international definition of severe malnourishment). Sub-
Saharan Africa has half the rates of stunting and wasting of India. Undernutrition is 
associated with lower economic status and lower cognition. 
However, it is not clear that the government of India officially recognises the scale 
of poverty in the country. MicroSave (2011), in a number similar to Harper (2010b) 
and UNICEF (2009), calculate ,QGLD¶VDJJUHJDWHSRYHUW\as 37.2% of the population 
with 41.8% of the rural population in poverty and 25.7% of the urban population 
who live below the poverty line. On the other hand, the Government of India (2007) 
said that in the state of Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry in 2004-2005 16.9% of people 
in the rural areas are below the poverty line and 17.8% of the people in Tamil Nadu 
and Pondicherry are below the poverty line. This is a result of setting the poverty 
line much lower than the international standard. The lowest poverty lines 
internationally tend to be set to US$1.00 or US$1.25 a day. But, the Indian Planning 
Commission set the poverty line in Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry as 351.86 rupees 
per capita per month in the rural areas and 547.42 rupees per capita per month in the 
urban areas in Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry for 2004-2005. Using historical 
exchange rates from July 1, 2004 to July 1, 2005 (OANDA, 2011), this rural 
poverty line equates to US$0.26 per day and the urban poverty line equates to 
US$0.41 per day.    
BBC News (2011) recently reported the debate on the recommendation by the 
Indian Planning Commission to set the poverty line at 32 rupees a day which 
equates to around US$0.65 a day. The report showed the results of two young 
Indians attempt to exist on 32 rupees a day to test the Indian Planning 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VFRQWHQWLRQ WKLVDPRXQWRIPRQH\ represented enough of an income 
for an individual not to be considered as being poor. They found that they had to 
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drink well water and could not afford any public transport. They also found they 
could not afford any protein. They could only afford carbohydrate-heavy foods like 
wheat, rice and plantains. As a result the duo experienced weight loss, fatigue and 
skewed blood sugar levels over the past month. 
One can imagine the impact of these experiences on those who actually live on 32 
rupees a day especially if they are doing heavy physical labour, as many of the poor 
do, or trying to run a business. Therefore, in India, being able to get any significant 
reduction of poverty becomes important. This is not just for the adults in the family 
but more importantly for their children. If poverty is reduced significantly, it is 
possible for the children to receive better nutrition. Banerjee and Duflo (2011, page 
39) calculate that the child who gets the proper nutrients in utero or during early 
childhood will earn more money every year of his or her life.  
In 2006, the government of India passed a law guaranteeing each and every rural 
household in the country one hundred days of work at a basic minimum wage. The 
law, known as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), in effect 
FUHDWHG,QGLD¶VDQGSUREDEO\WKHZRUOG¶VODUJest anti-poverty program in terms of 
number of beneficiaries. According to official statistics, 45 million households 
participated in NREGA in fiscal year 2008-09 (D. Johnson et al, 2009). 
However, Harper (2010b, pages 5 ± 6) says the problem with even well designed 
programme, such as NREGA, in India is that they are incompletely enforced and 
delivered. In many places, NREGA is failing to deliver the required 100 days of 
work for every rural household because of apathy, mismanagement, state level 
disinterest and corruption. In this way, poverty reduction continues to lag.  
3.3 Caste System 
Reporting on a credibility crisis of the Indian media, Biswas (2010) remarked that 
the fact that India remains an intensely hierarchical society also reflects the way 
journalists behave and interact with powerful politicians and businessmen. It is 
almost never a professional relationship between equals. The hierarchical nature of 
Indian society is most evident in its caste system. The word caste derived from the 
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Portuguese ZRUG µCasta¶ ZKLFK PHDQV D EUHHG UDFH RU D complex of hereditary 
qualities (Ayyar, 2011). The lack of any mention of caste in the early Tamil 
literature is an indication to Puthenkalam (1977, page 17) that caste is a 
comparatively new institution in South India. In addition, the word most often used 
for caste in South India, jati, is not a word from any of the indigenous languages but 
from Sanskrit.  
Kishor (2011) gives the traditional descriptions of castes based on the Vedas, the 
ancient Hindu scriptures. He describes the four exclusive, hereditary and occupation 
based Varnas. The Vedas say that these four Varnas originated from the different 
body parts of Lord Brahma with the Brahmins coming from the mouth, Khatrivas 
(Warriors) coming from the hands, Vaishyas (Merchants) coming from the thighs 
and Shudras (Artisans and Labour) coming from the feet. The Ati Shudras 
(Untouchables), who were added later, were condemned to all dirty and polluting 
jobs. Table 4 shows the Varna caste descriptions based on Kishor (2011). Table 5 
shows the Indian government caste definitions. 
Varna Castes and Descriptions 
Level of 
Pollution 
Caste Characteristics 
None 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
Brahmin Priestly Class 
Kshatriya Jati groups with the greatest economic and 
political power 
Vaisiya Jati groups engaged in trade that have economic 
affluence but little political power 
Shudra Artisan and labourer jatis with neither economic 
or political power 
Untouchables Jatis that do the ritually unclean jobs 
Table 4 (Kishor, (2011) 
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Indian Government Caste Categories 
Category Description 
OC Other Category ± this includes the Brahmins, Kshatriyas and 
Vaishyas. 
ST Scheduled Tribes ± these people claim to be the Aboriginal 
population of India. Also known as the Adivasi. They are called 
scheduled tribes because they recognised in a schedule of the 
Indian constitution. 
SC Scheduled Castes ± These are the Dalits, formerly known as the 
untouchables. They are called scheduled castes because they are 
recognised in a schedule of the Indian constitution.  
BC Backward Castes ± these people come from what the Indian 
government perceives to be castes that are socially and 
economically backwards.  
OBC Other Backward Castes ± these castes are similar to scheduled 
tribes but they are not aboriginal and are perceived to be by the 
Indian government castes that are socially and economically 
backwards. 
Table 5 (Kishor, 2011)  
Quigley (1993, pages 1 ± 2) says that the popular view of caste consists of three 
beliefs. First is that the Hindu world is made up of a number of castes. Second is 
that castes are cloVHG VRFLDO JURXSV 2QH PD\ PDUU\ ZLWKLQ RQH¶V FDVWH DQG WKH
FKLOGUHQRIWKHPDUULDJHEHORQJWRWKHSDUHQW¶VFDVWH7KHV\VWHPLVSHUSHWXDWHGDG
infinitum. Third is that castes are hierarchically ranked on a purity-pollution scale 
according to their traditional occupations. This view contains a certain amount of 
WUXWKEXWLVDOVRPLVOHDGLQJ4XLJOH\¶Vreview of the literature makes it is clear that 
the caste system is nowhere as simple as Kishor (2011) claims it to be.  
 
First, there is the confusion between caste and jati. Quigley (1993, pages 4 ± 7) 
states that caste can be translated into two terms, varna and jati. This can cause 
confusion because varna and jati refer to two different concepts. The varna 
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classification is based on function. These are Brahmin, Ksatriya, Vaishiya and 
Sudra described by Kishor (2011) above. However, jati means a collection of people 
who share a common origin. It could be a common lineage, all the lineages that one 
can marry, common ethnic heritage or common cultural heritage. Jati is therefore a 
relative term. One way to get around the confusion is to say that varna is a 
theoretical category that never actually existed in the real world while jati is the 
operational unit, the real caste.  It is then possible to place each jati into one or more 
varnas or as an untouchable. Ayyar (2011) takes this view saying that the 
Portuguese applied this term caste to different classes of people in India known as 
µjati¶Ayyar argues that the Varnas were actually name of classes rather than castes 
in the pre-historic period. For Ayyar, jatis are the real castes. Puthenkalam (1977, 
page 18) agrees that jatis or sub-castes should be recognised as the real castes. 
However, Quigley (1993) warns that there are constant arguments about which jati 
belongs to which varna. There are also arguments on who belongs in which jati. 
This is because of the jatis can be broken into many different groups and these all 
may not intermarry because of the differences between them. In other words, they 
do not perceive that a common origin is shared.  
 
On caste hierarchy, Fuller (1976, page 10) says that in theory, the castes in a 
geographical area can be ranked into a single hierarchy but in reality there will no 
way to get universal agreement on it. Quigley (1993, page 10) agrees that there are 
often arguments about which jati is higher in the hierarchy. The reason for this is 
that caste hierarchy is determined by the economic and ritual relationship two jatis 
have with each other. If these relationships do not exist, it will be impossible to 
determine which jati is higher or lower in the hierarchy (Quigley, 1993, page 166). 
 
There are two popular conceptions of history for caste in the literature. First is the 
Materialist conception where caste is a rationalisation and legitimisation of 
inequality using the idiom of purity to obscure the true nature of the social 
divisions.  Second is the Idealist conception where caste is a cultural construct and 
the result of religious ideas. This is an ideological framework for explaining the 
universal problems of social order. It transcends local preoccupations and 
hierarchies because the structure of the caste is found in a system of ideas not in the 
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manifestation of those ideas. Materialists are right about caste regulating inequality 
but wrong that it obscures inequality. These inequalities are highlighted and 
perpetuated by the caste system. Idealists are right about caste ideology seeking to 
provide a transcendent foundation for the social order but are wrong that the 
manifestation of the caste system requires a kingdom which is not just a system of 
ideas (Quigley, 1993, pages 2 ± 3). 
 
There is no connection between ritual status of a jati and its economic strength and 
political strength. The reason for this is that economic and political fortunes of jatis 
can change. The ritual functions a jati performs can change. However, jati 
affiliations are expressed in the presence or absence of kinship ties and kinship 
identities are not very changeable (Quigley, 1993, pages 160 ± 161). 
 
An example of how ritual status does not equate to political or economic strength is 
provided by a study done by Pandian. Pandian (1987) did a study on Pulicat Island 
at the northern end of Tamil Nadu which showed how important context is in jati 
dominance. Pandian (1987) generated a ranking for each jati in regards to its 
economic, political, religious and social status on Pulicat Island. PDQGLDQ¶VUDQNLQJV
are approximate because jatis ranked themselves and others in different ways at 
different times. These rankings are meaningless for interpreting how people use 
them in different contexts. The status of each jati fluctuates depending on whether 
you are looking at an economic, political, religious or social context. According to 
the Varna system, Brahmins should always be on top but this is not true on Pulicat 
Island in 1987. They are only on top in the religious context but also share that 
status with the Labbay Muslims. It is the Beri Chettiar jati that seems to dominate 
Pulicat Island. They do so because they have a monopoly on the sale of rice, 
groceries and textiles and they give financial credit to a number of low ranking jatis. 
This means a sari seller on Pulicat Island at this time who belonged to the Beri 
Chettiar jati could piggy back on the extensive social network built up by her jati 
throughout the island. A sari seller in the Harijan (Dalit) jati may have the network 
to sell within her own jati but it is very unlikely that she would have any useful 
contacts for her business in the higher jatis.  
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The traditional academic view of the caste system is derived largely from sacerdotal 
Hindu texts which is very agreeable to members of the upper castes. These texts 
LPSO\WKDWDSHUVRQ¶VSRVLWLRQLVGXHWRKLVRUKHUNDUPD7KHIDFWWKDWRQHLVERUQ
LQWR D FHUWDLQ FDVWH LV DQ RXWFRPH RI RQH¶V SDVW GHHGV LQ DQ HDUOLHU LQFDUQDWLRQ
However, on the ground the view is very different. There is not a single caste 
hierarchy that is universally acknowledged and accepted by everyone in the caste 
system. There are probably as many hierarchies as there are castes in India. No 
caste, howsoever lowly placed it may be, accepts the reasons for its degradation. 
Different castes have different hierarchical elaborations and those castes which 
currently find themselves in extremely humiliating and subordinate positions refuse 
to accept the theory of karma. If they did, they would have to accept the 
Brahmanical dictum they were made from base substances. The upper castes would 
like the lower castes to accept this without murmur. However, the evidence points to 
the contrary. From medieval India until now there have been caste revolts, caste 
mobility, caste wars, Dalit uprisings and modern demands for preferential politics 
(Gupta, 2000, pgs. 1 ± 3). 
 
If everyone is perceived as equal, then there is no stratification. Stratification and 
hierarchy require difference. Gupta (2000, pgs. 6 ± 8) argues that the caste system 
not only requires difference but a closed feudal-like social structure. However, not 
all closed feudal societies give rise to castes.  
Stratification systems can be open or closed. In open stratification systems, mobility 
among the strata is allowed. This is not allowed in closed stratification systems such 
DV,QGLD¶V (Gupta, 2000, pg. 23). An example of an open stratification system is the 
United States. The reason that it is open is because there is an ideological 
acceptance of a certain degree of similarity (Lipset and Bendix, 1957), whereas in 
India there is an enormous investment in keeping differences alive. As differences 
are emphasised in closed systems of stratification, the group rather than the 
individual becomes the unit of mobility. Changes in a closed stratification system 
are a zero sum game. Any change in ranking of a jati would automatically entail that 
some other group or groups lose status. In an open system of stratification, upward 
mobility does not mean that somebody else must lose status as a consequence. Open 
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systems of stratification must assume all people are equal and that mobility occurs 
to the extent that people can realise their potential. On the other hand, closed 
systems of stratification, assume that people are inherently different which is why 
the notion of the upstart, the parvenu and the social climber have such pejorative 
connotations (Gupta, 2000, pgs. 36 ± 39). Quigley (1993, page 162) counters that 
class is a system of social stratification while caste is not. Caste works through the 
idiom of kinship because it provides order in an unstable political climate. Class 
benefits from state provided order and oppose the extension of kinship into the 
political arena beyond the minimum necessary.  
 
Continuing with this theme, Gupta (2000, pgs. 130 ± 131) argues that the separation 
of castes is not only based on matters of purity and pollution but also difference. 
Differences are observed as strictly as with pollution and purity. He also negates the 
view that each jati is following its hereditary occupation which has been sanctified 
in the sacred texts.   A larger number of jatis in existence today are not mentioned 
by the sacred texts. Quigley (1993, page 10) and Fuller (1976, page 10) agree that 
the modernisation of India has resulted in jati members now doing non-traditional 
occupations.  
The caste system is often seen as something that traps people into roles and helps 
keep the low castes mired in poverty. However, this is not always the case. Luke 
and Munshi (2005) look at a group of tea plantations in South India where women 
are employed in permanent wage labour and where incomes do not vary by caste in 
order to anticipate the impact of globalization on mobility across social groups in 
the future. Their main finding is that a relative increase in female income weakens 
WKHIDPLO\¶VWLHVWRWKHDQFHVWUDOFRPPXQLW\DQGWKHWUDGLWLRQDOHFRQRP\ but these 
mobility enhancing effects are obtained for the low castes alone. The reason for this 
is that the higher castes have too many ties to the traditional economy to take 
advantage of the new opportunities offered by globalisation. On the other hand, 
historically disadvantaged groups may be especially responsive to new opportunities 
precisely because they have fewer ties to the traditional economy to hold them back.  
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In another study, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) found a case where the caste 
network both hindered and helped low caste people. This low caste had a traditional 
occupation for the male lower caste members and the networks of that caste 
continued to channel boys into local language schools that led to the traditional 
occupation, despite the fact that returns to non-traditional white collar occupations 
had risen substantially. On the other hand, the females in the caste did not have a 
traditional occupation and who historically had low labour market participation 
rates and so did not benefit from the network. Because this caste network was 
focused solely on getting the boys into the traditional occupation, it left the females 
free to pursue other avenues.  These females took full advantage of the opportunities 
that became available in the new economy by switching rapidly to English schools. 
Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) suggest that the overall increase in English 
schooling in recent years, and the growing mismatch in education choices and hence 
occupational outcomes between boys and girls in the same caste, suggests that the 
remarkably resilient caste system may finally be starting to disintegrate. Field et al 
(2010) also found something similar. They found that upper caste Hindu women 
face significantly more restrictions than Hindu women in the scheduled castes, the 
lowest group in the caste hierarchy.  
 
Quigley (1993, page 167) agrees with 'XPRQW¶V  WKHRU\ WKDW WKH HPSKDVLV
should be put on structure and relations rather than on bounded groups and 
substantial entities. For Quigley (1993, page 164), caste is both a cultural and 
structural phenomenon.  
 
The power of a network to both help and hinder low caste entrepreneurs, through its 
being open or closed, will be explored in later chapters. The good news that Quigley 
(1993, page 12) states is that the two qualities often associated with castes, 
unambiguous closure and unambiguous hierarchy, are not always unambiguous. 
This makes the important point that caste networks do not always put an 
impenetrable wall around its members and that it is possible to help these 
entrepreneurs to explore beyond the boundaries of their caste networks in India and 
access the information they need to grow their businesses. The microfinance 
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literature has not looked at role of network and the strength of the ties in the 
network to help microfinance clients get the information they need to grow their 
businesses. This research will be helping microfinance clients get that information.  
 
3.4 Power Distance 
Caste may not be unambiguously hierarchical as Quigley (1993) states but it does 
permeate the culture. As L. Kumar (2010) argues, the hierarchical nature of the 
culture is ingrained in the people. Therefore, this hierarchy does pose a significant 
challenge for any poor entrepreneur wanting to explore beyond the boundaries of 
their caste networks in India and access the information they need to grow their 
businesses. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) created a theoretical framework in which 
to understand the differences between highly unequal and relatively equal societies. 
Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) conducted groundbreaking research on how values in 
the workplace are influenced by culture and what differentiates cultures.  The data 
for this study was collected from IBM employees from 70 countries between 1967 
and 1973. This dataset was extended based on replications and extensions of the 
original IBM study on different international populations. Hofstede and Hofstede 
(2005) found that the differences to the answers to the questions were strongly 
correlated to the nationality of the respondents.  Based on the analysis of this data, 
Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) created a model that identifies four primary 
dimensions to assist in differentiating cultures: Power Distance, Individualism, 
Masculinity and Uncertainty Avoidance. Research in China led Hofstede and 
Hofstede (2005) to add a fifth dimension called Long Term Orientation. 
 
The power distance index (PDI) is an indication of how a culture handles inequality. 
The name comes from how the index can show the emotional distance that separates 
subordinates from their bosses (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005, page 41). Hofstede 
and Hofstede define power distance as the extent to which the less powerful 
members of institutions and organisations within a country expect and accept that 
power is distributed unequally where institutions are basic elements of society, such 
as the family, the school and the community and organisations are the places where 
people work (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005, page 48). The higher the PDI score, the 
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higher the acceptance of unequally distributed power. The range of scores is from 
11 to 104. Great Britain scores 35 and is ranked 63rd to 65th out of 74 nations or 
regions sharing its score with Germany and Costa Rica. On the other hand, India 
scores 77 and is ranked 17th to 18th out of 74 nations or regions sharing its score 
with the West Africa region (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005, pages 43- 44). PDI 
scores can vary by occupation within a country. Hofstede and Hofstede looked at 
the PDI scores among occupations ranging from low skill to professional in France, 
Germany and Great Britain. They found that within all three countries, lowest status 
and educational level (unskilled and semiskilled workers) showed the highest PDI 
scores while those with the highest status and educational level (managers of 
professional workers) showed the lowest PDI scores (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005, 
page 49).  
Key Differences Between Small and Large Power Distance Societies: General 
Norms 
Small Power Distance Large Power Distance 
Inequalities among people should be 
minimised. 
Inequalities among people are expected and 
desired. 
Social relationships should be handled 
with care. 
Status should be balanced with restraint.  
There should be, and there is to some 
extent, interdependence between less 
and more powerful people. 
Less powerful people should be dependent; 
they are polarised between dependence and 
counterdependence.  
 
Table 6 (Excerpts from Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005, page 57) 
 
India is an intensely social hierarchical society where inequality is seen as a fact of 
life. The implication is that backward and scheduled caste people, as less powerful 
people, should be dependent on the more powerful people. (See Table 6) This will 
impact how these less powerful people establish ties with the more powerful who 
have the information needed. There is no assumption of equality. They will 
probably need to approach in a subservient manner (as confirmed by Sinniah, 2010). 
The implication is that if these less powerful people were living in a relatively low 
PDI country such as Jamaica with a PDI of 40, they would find it easier to create the 
ties needed to get the information needed for their businesses. Counterdependence is 
a psychological term usually defined as dependence with a negative sign. This is 
usually shown by the subordinate rejecting the dependence entirely (Hofstede and 
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Hofstede, 2005, page 46). This may result in the less powerful person rejecting any 
ties with the more powerful broker because of the implied dependence. A fuller 
discussion of the theory of how information passes through a network will be 
discussed in the Theoretical Framework chapter. 
 Key Differences Between Small and Large Power Distance Societies: The 
Workplace  
Small Power Distance Large Power Distance 
Hierarchy in organisations means an 
inequality of roles, established for 
convenience. 
Hierarchy in organisations reflects 
existential inequality between higher 
and lower levels.  
Decentralisation is popular. Centralisation is popular. 
Managers rely on their own experience 
and on subordinates. 
Managers rely on superiors and on 
formal rules. 
Subordinates expect to be consulted. Subordinates expect to be told what to 
do. 
The ideal boss is a resourceful 
democrat. 
The ideal boss is a benevolent autocrat 
RU³JRRGIDWKHU´ 
Privileges and status symbols are 
frowned upon. 
Privileges and status symbols are 
normal and popular.  
Table 7 Excerpts from (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005, page 59) 
Indian society tends to be highly centralised. The implication of centralisation is that 
any industry in India will be centralised around powerful brokers in a large power 
distance country such as India. If this is a scale-free network, a network dominated 
by a few hubs with a large number of connections, it would be important to be able 
to connect in some way to the central hubs (See Table 7).  
7KHILYHVWDQGDUGFULWLFLVPVRI+RIVWHGH¶Vapproach are (Hofstede, 2002): 
 
1. 6XUYH\V DUH QRW D VXLWDEOH ZD\ RI PHDVXULQJ FXOWXUDO GLIIHUHQFHV +RIVWHGH¶V
response is that they should not be the only way.  
2. 1DWLRQVDUHQRW WKHEHVWXQLWV IRUVWXG\LQJFXOWXUHV +RIVWHGH¶VDQVZHU LV WKDW
this is true, but they are usually the only kind of units available for comparison 
and are better than nothing. 
3. A study of the subsidiaries of one company cannot provide information about 
HQWLUH QDWLRQDO FXOWXUHV +RIVWHGH¶V UHSO\ LV WKDW ZKDW ZHUH PHDVXUHG ZHUH
differences between national cultures. Any set of functionally equivalent 
samples from national populations can supply information about such 
differences. The IBM set consisted of unusually well matched samples for an 
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unusually large number of countries. The extensive validation in the following 
chapters will show that the country scores obtained correlated highly with all 
kinds of other data, including results obtained from representative samples of 
entire national populations. 
4. The IBM data are old and therefore obsolete. Hofstede justifies the data by 
stating that the dimensions found are assumed to have centuries-old roots; only 
data which remained stable across two subsequent surveys were maintained; and 
they have since been validated against all kinds of external measurements; 
recent replications show no loss of validity. 
5. Four or five dimensions are not enough. Hofstede says that additional 
dimensions should be both conceptually and statistically independent from the 
five dimensions already defined and they should be validated by significant 
correlations with conceptually related external measures.  
 
Singh et al (2008) cautions that the PDI score for India may not be universally true 
for all workplaces. In their study, significant differences were found between public, 
Indian private sector and international private sector workplaces with the 
international private sector having a significantly lower score than the average for 
India. While it may be possible for an international private sector company to 
override prevailing culture inside its workplace, the overwhelming majority of 
Indians do not have jobs in this environment and none of the respondents in this 
research have jobs in a low PDI environment. Therefore, establishing a connection 
with someone more powerful to obtain relevant information for the business 
remains a significant challenge. However, Singh et al (2008) recognise that India is 
seeking to modernise, and transform its institutions without sacrificing its 
commitment to economic progress, socio-cultural heterogeneity and traditional 
social hierarchical values. How to overcome this challenge in a society holding on 
to its traditional social hierarchical values will be explored later.  
3.5 Tamil Culture 
This research takes place in Tamil Nadu. Tamils see themselves as a unique culture 
within India and so a short discussion will take place on Tamil culture and its 
impact on how Tamils network among each other.  
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The total population of Tamil Nadu as per 2011 census is 72,138,958. Nearly 69 
percent of the total population of the State belong to Backward Classes, Most 
Backward Classes and Denotified Communities. Among the Muslim Minorities in 
Tamil Nadu, nearly 95% of them are in the list of Backward Classes and among 
Christian Minorities nearly 80% are in the list of Backward Classes and Most 
Backward Classes (Tamil Nadu, 2011).  
 
Tamil is part of the Dravidian language group which, unlike Sanskrit, is not part of 
the Indo-European language group. The best evidence points to the Tamils 
migrating to South India from Baluchistan on the Iranian ± Pakistani border (Wood, 
2007, page 55). 
 
Wood (2007, Introduction) argues that Tamil Nadu is the last existing classical 
civilisation. Wood defines a classical civilisation one in which a substantial element 
of the traditional ways of thinking ± in belief, culture, music, and literature ± is still 
alive in the mainstream. 7KHJUHDWHVW HUDRI7DPLO1DGX¶V FLYLOLVDWLRQZDVGXULQJ
the Chola dynasty between the 9th and 13th centuries (Wood, 2007, page 59). 
 
Tamils use kinship ties to keep this classical civilisation alive. Examples of this are 
the Oduvars, Dikshitars and Cholan bronze sculptors. Oduvars are the traditional 
poets of the Tamils. The word means he who sings. These are non-Brahmins and 
from the lower class of people7KH\DUHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUVLQJLQJWKHVDLQWV¶VRQJVLQ
the temples. These songs are over a thousand years old and have been handed down 
within the family in a living chain of transmission from ancient times which are a 
Tamil oral tradition (Wood, 2007, pages 17 ± 18). The Dikshithars, the hereditary 
clan of priests who run the Nataraja Temple in Chidambaram, Tamil Nadu, can only 
marry endogamously, that is only within their own clan. They can trace their right to 
administer the Nataraja shrine back to the sixth century AD (Wood, 2007, page 24). 
Those who still cast Cholan bronzes in Tamil Nadu are the 7th generation of 
sculptors (Wood, 2007, page 199).  
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Therefore, it is not surprising, given these examples that Tamils marry within the 
family (Wood, 2007, page 21). Tamils traditionally have three family units. First is 
the nuclear family, second is the extended family that includes everyone from 
grandparents to grandchildren including aunts and uncles that use resources in 
common and have a common residence DQGWKLUGLQFOXGHVWKHZLIH¶VUHODWLRQV%\
FXVWRPZLYHVPRYHWRWKHLUKXVEDQG¶VKRPH&XVWRPVDQGWUDGLWLRQVRIHDFKFDVWH
keep kin together and these kinship ties are why marriage is within caste (Sahay, 
2008, pages 15). Kinship systems in Tamil Nadu encourage cross cousin marriages. 
&URVVFRXVLQPDUULDJHVLQYROYHHLWKHUPDUU\LQJ\RXUPRWKHU¶VEURWKHUFKLOGRU\RXU
IDWKHU¶V VLVWHU FKLOG 0F*LOYUD\SDJH. Since, as Quigley (1993) argues, 
caste is based on kinship, again it is not surprising that Tamils will look for 
marriage partners from within the caste. Caste can be seen as a moral system that 
exemplifies the values of a community which is seen as supportive and enriching. It 
was a system of mutual support despite oppressive rules such as dowry (Wood, 
2007, page 236). 
 
 In the towns and cities, modern methods such as caste magazines are used to 
advertise for suitors (Wood, 2007, page 26). However, in the villages geography can 
play a strong role which has the tendency to reinforce kinship ties. Sekine (2002, 
page 97) reports that fifty per cent of Paraiyars (Untouchables) of Kinnimangalam 
in Tamil Nadu get married to partners from within 5 km of the village, seventy five 
per cent of Paraiyars get married to partners within 10 km of the village and eighty 
four per cent of Paraiyars get married to partners within 15 km of the village. It is 
even stronger for the Kallars, a lower middle jati in the same village. For them, 
eighty five per cent of Kallars get married to partners within 5 km of the village, 
ninety two per cent get married to partners within 10 km of the village and ninety 
seven per cent get married to partners within 15 km of the village  
 
Tamil society, like the rest of India, has a hierarchical structure.  This has an impact 
on how relationships are established and conducted especially if there is a difference 
in how high two different castes are perceived. If one person is in a higher caste 
than the other, the tendency is that the higher caste will have more power in the 
relationship even though Pandian (1987) showed that this is not always the case. 
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Sinniah (2010) reports that her cousin who runs a family farm outside of Trichy, 
will consider a business proposal from her lower caste workers. But, these workers 
will not approach her until she calls for them. It is as if her cousin is the patron for 
these workers. Patronage can even have a more powerful effect the lower the patron 
is in the hierarchy. For an untouchable, patronage may give the only improved 
status available to them.  Sekine (2002, page 222) gives the example of government 
aid to the Paraiyars who are a Dalit jati in the village of Kannimangalam in Tamil 
Nadu.  This government aid involves an opaque and complicated application 
procedure. This results in a more educated and more propertied person being asked 
to act as a mediator between the government and the poor uneducated applicants. 
The tendency is that the better off Paraiyars are asked to be mediators. The mediator 
acts as a broker and patron and is able to extract profit from this position.  
 
One case of this is the Kinnimangalam Cooperative Society of Milk Producers 
which was set up in 1982 to raise the economic conditions of the Paraiyars in the 
village. It was not easy to set up the cooperative as it required filling out the 
application forms, negotiating with administrative officers, obtaining permission 
from the higher castes and reaching a consensus among the Paraiyars themselves. A 
talented Paraiyar who was able to do all of this and had political connections got put 
into a position of broker and was able to monopolise the management of the milk 
cooperative. This makes him a patron to the cooperative members and able to profit 
from his position. Not surprisingly, this caused problems in the village further down 
the road DV KH GHYRWHG D WUHPHQGRXV DPRXQW RI HIIRUW WR UHPDLQ LQ WKLV EURNHU¶V
position (Sekine, 2002, page 304 ± 305). 
 
Tamils value their kinship ties especially those that help keep their classical 
civilisation alive. The tendency is for Tamils to build their social networks around 
their kinship ties and reinforce these ties by geography, endogamous marriage and 
simple things such as families living and sleeping together in a single room (Wood, 
2007, page 209). However, this tendency leaves them vulnerable to others who are 
able to act as brokers to networks outside the kinship ties and who may use the 
power of this position for exploitation.  However, as Quigley (1993) stated these 
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networks are not always closed which gives an opportunity to the poor Tamil 
business owners who are the subject of this research.   
3.6 Indian Microfinance History 
Similar to other countries after World War II, India started a variety of government 
schemes to improve access to credit for the rural poor. In particular, the introduction 
of special credit programmes and the expansion of the banking sector were intended 
to make the financial system responsive to the needs of small and marginal farmers, 
landless labourers, rural artisans and other economically active poor. From 1977 
until financial liberalisation in 1990, the Indian banking network saw a rapid 
expansion under the initiative of the central bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 
The RBI had mandated that commercial banks could only open a branch in 
developed areas if four branches were opened in locations with no bank branches. 
The bank expansion programme resulted in an extensive branch network, which is 
unparalleled in other countries (Green, 2005). 
 
In addition the RBI required that commercial banks must direct at least 40% of their 
credit portfolio to priority sectors (including agriculture and allied activities as well 
as small, cottage and village industries). Moreover, 10% of their loan portfolio must 
be provided to weaker sections of society, including scheduled castes and tribes, 
small and marginal farmers, agricultural labourers or rural artisans (Green, 2005). 
 
However, the Indian effort to extend credit to the poor especially farmers suffered 
the same fate as these efforts did in other developing countries where the financial 
needs of the rural poor remained largely unmet by the formal financial system. 
Some schemes were predetermined and could not be modified to the needs of 
borrowers. As in many other developing countries, the subsidised loans provided 
resulted in significant losses. Loan recovery of regional rural banks was 56% of 
amounts due in March 1996. The failure of government credit programmes raised a 
need to find more viable mechanisms for administering small loans to the rural poor 
(Green, 2005). 
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As in other countries, it was the mechanism of microfinance that stepped into the 
gap. Green (2005) identified three main models of microfinance in India. First was 
the Grameen model, which is based on the methodology pioneered by the Grameen 
Bank in Bangladesh. Second, was the cooperative model, in which cooperative 
societies provide credit and savings services to their members. Third was the Self-
Help Group (SHG) model which is unique to India. The SHG model will be 
discussed below.  
 
After 2005, a fourth model developed in India which was the commercial 
microfinance model. This model was funded by the capital markets and pursued a 
high growth strategy which it was able to implement. This model was centred in the 
Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The largest of these is SKS. SKS Microfinance Ltd 
is one of the largest MFIs in India with 7 million clients. It had an IPO in July 2010 
that raised US$155 million and valued the company at US$1.5 billion. Existing 
shareholders sold US$195 million of shares and booked big profits with the share 
price being four times greater than book value (Maes and Reed, 2011).  
India does get significant donor funding for microfinance. The South Asia Region 
(Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) gets the most microfinance 
funding from the top 20 donors in the world. In the year ending in December 2010, 
the region got 24 per cent of microfinance funding from these donors. The amount 
given to the South Asia region grew 12 per cent from the amount given in 2009. 
When looking at just the 10 largest development financial institutions which are the 
private sector arms of government owned bilateral and multilateral development 
agencies such as KfW (Germany) and International Finance Corporation (World 
Bank) (CGAP, 2009a), South Asia got only 8 per cent of the worldwide 
microfinance funding available from them in the year ending in December 2010. 
This represented a 4 per cent decrease in the amount given in 2009 (CGAP, 2011).  
3.7 SHG-Bank Linkage 
The SHG model is unique to India. SHGs are self-selected groups of ten to twenty 
persons that mobilize member savings and provide need-based loans out of the pool 
of funds created. Members determine the rules and norms of the group (e.g. loan 
size and interest rate) and rely on microfinance institutions for training and support 
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services. Once internal transactions are strengthened, groups are linked with formal 
banks for supplementary financing, usually through the intermediation of 
microfinance institutions (Tazi et al, 2006).  
 
The idea for the SHG ± Bank linkage programme came from the National Bank for 
Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD).  NABARD did a research project 
with the NGO Myrada in 1987 which was the genesis of the idea. This was piloted 
in 1992 and the SHG-Bank linkage programme was fully operational in India in 
1996. The programme was supported by the Reserve Bank of India. The RBI 
allowed the savings accounts of SHGs to be opened by the formal banking system 
and classified SHG-lending as priority sector lending for commercial banks, RRBs 
and cooperative banks (Green, 2005). 
 
Between 2003 and 2004, 361,731 new SHGs were formed and received US$412 
million in bank loans in the context of the program. SHGs often organize into 
federations to obtain external funds in bulk and lower their cost of funds (Tazi et al, 
2006). 
 
1$%$5'¶Vgoal in 1998 was to provide access to finance for one third of the rural 
poor through the SHG-Bank Linkage Programme by linking 1 million SHGs to 
banks by 2008. This goal was met ahead of schedule in March 2004, banks had 
cumulatively lent Indian Rupees 39.04 billion (US$860 million) to 1,079,091 SHGs. 
To achieve this goal NABARD partly financed the cost of SHG promotion, 
provided 100% refinancing to participating banks and offers revolving fund 
assistance on a selective basis to NGOs, SHG Federations, credit unions and other 
organisations providing capital for on-lending. NABARD also provides capacity 
building support to bank officials, NGO staff, government officials and SHG 
members (Green, 2005). 
 
NABARD (2008) claimed that the SHG - Bank Linkage Programme could be 
regarded as the most potent initiative since Indian independence for delivering 
financial services to the poor in a sustainable manner. The programme has been 
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growing rapidly and the number of SHGs financed increased to 2,925,000 on 31 
March 2007.  
 
 
However, there have been criticisms of the SHG ± Bank linkage programme. The 
first is that the geographical spread of the programme has been geographically 
uneven. Most SHGs are located in the southern states.  But, the states with the high 
incidence of poverty are not the southern states (NABARD, 2008). The states of 
Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar have the lowest SHGs to population ratio 
(<200 SHGs per 100,000 of population) as well as the highest percentage of poor 
population (>30 per cent). The reason the has been geographically uneven is 
because of various factors like pro-active role of state governments, presence of 
well performing NGOs, socio-cultural factors, better performance of SHGs, etc. 
(MicroSave, 2011). 
 
To even out the geographical spread requires scaling up the SHG ± Bank linkage 
programme. Kamath (2009, pages 86 ± 88) says there are challenges in scaling up 
this model and recommends having SHGs serve a wider set of clients is one option 
for scaling up.  
Arunachalam (2011) says that the self-help group and bank- linkage model has been 
touted as the panacea for solving the current crisis facing Indian microfinance but 
this linkage model faces a number of issues that need urgent attention. Arunchalam 
identified three urgent issues with the SHG-Bank linkage programme. First, there 
are serious data issues. No one knows the correct number of operational SHGs in 
the country. No one can say with certainty as to how many SHGs really exist or 
work in India today.  Data on SHG transactions (especially, savings, loans, etc.) is 
very weak. This means we only know about SHGs being linked but nothing about 
their day-to-day working and post-linkage performance. Second, there is no 
accountability among MFIs, SHGs, SHG Federations, Banks for providing good 
and transparent governance on the ground, minimum systems that function properly 
during implementation and an overall commitment towards really ensuring low 
income people gain access to a wide range of affordable and need based financial 
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services. Third, and most importantly, ensuring the larger infrastructure and 
ecosystem necessary to enable low-income people to get the rewards/returns 
commensurate with the efforts they put in, investments they make and risks they 
undertake in their livelihoods. This is a repeat of the argument above that the poor 
need more than financial intermediation to have successful livelihoods.  
NABARD (2008) also recognises this argument. It says that ideally the SHG - Bank 
linkage programme needs to meet the financial needs of their members and to meet 
the non-financial requirements necessary for setting up business and enterprises. 
Morduch and Rutherford (2003) believe the prospects for the SHG movement are 
uncertain because they believe that the present system is unsustainable for lack of 
clarity about who is to play the key role of maintaining quality and how the costs of 
doing so are to be met. NGOs with their social-development perspective are not 
ideal candidates for this role and it is not clear who will pay them for this role. 
Banks will not take on the time-consuming task of helping groups manage the 
bookkeeping of their internal savings and loan accounts. Without outside assistance, 
most SHGs will have great difficulty maintaining quality, and the poorer the SHG 
is, the truer this will be. Just because a group of poor women come together to run a 
savings-and-loan club, they will be immune from poor management, confused 
accounting, capture of assets by the leadership, and other kinds of abuse.  For 
Morduch and Rutherford (2003), if the SHG movement is to offer poor people 
reliable and convenient services on a continuous basis, it needs to undergo a 
transition into a more stable institutional form, such as the Credit Union system. 
There is a view that the SHG movement can serve as a quick way to deliver 
PLFURILQDQFH LQDQ³LQWHULP´SHULRGEHIRUHRWKHU LQVWLWXWLRQVFDQEHGHYHORSHGRU
adapted. The idea is to then graduate SHG members to these other institutions 
where the\FDQDFFHVVVWDQGDUG³LQGLYLGXDO´ORDQVSRVVLEO\RQDIXOO\FRPPHUFLDO
basis. The problem with this, they point out, is that there are no obvious lenders for 
SHG customers to graduate to.  No other financial institution is close to offering the 
reliability, convenience, continuity, and flexibility of good microfinance for low-
income customers. Plus, the notion of graduation is not built explicitly into the SHG 
design. Finally, Morduch and Rutherford (2003) believe that the SHG movement 
will find it difficult to compete with mass-outreach retailers of the Grameen, should 
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they emerge in India. After 2003, they did emerge and its competition with the 
state-sponsored SHGs in Andhra Pradesh was one of the sparks of the microfinance 
crisis there in 2010 that will be discussed later.    
3.8 SHGs 
Since almost all of the subjects of this research are SHG members, some of the 
details of how a SHG works will now be discussed. SHGs are informal groups of 10 
± 20 individuals formed by people coming together for mutual help and cooperation 
on various activities including financial matters. They pool in small amounts of 
thrift money and lend it to group members who need credit. SHGs can be promoted 
by NGOs, banks, state governments, MFIs or cooperatives. SHGs can have their 
own savings account with a bank, and often this linkage with a bank is facilitated by 
an NGO working in the area. 7KH DFFRXQW LV RSHUDWHG E\ WKH 6+*¶V DXWKRULVHG 
signatories, and most banks provide the SHGs with a loan that is in proportion to the 
savings of the group. Not only has the number of SHGs linked to banks and the 
savings amount of these SHGs increased over the years, but even the average 
balance per SHG account increased. There is substantial evidence to suggest that 
SHG members save only a limited amount in their SHGs because they do not fully 
trust the mechanism, and would prefer an individual account with a bank, or in a 
client-responsive post office (MicroSave, 2011).  
According to Green (2005), SHGs should be homogeneous in socio-economic 
terms, have members who are residents of the same area and who have an affinity to 
each other, have written rules which regulate aspects related to membership, 
frequency and time of meetings, savings, and credit. They also should hold regular 
meetings, maintain records (including minutes, attendance register, PHPEHUV¶ 
savings ledgers and a group passbook) to ensure transparency, take decisions 
collectively, elect leaders democratically, and ensure that loan requests and loan 
approval as well as payments take place during group meetings to ensure 
transparency. Finally, SHGs should discuss and try to find solutions to family or 
community problems during meetings. 
In recent years, SHG Federations have been created to improve access to finance as 
well as to improve service provision to SHGs. These are formal institutions, 
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typically registered under the Societies Registration Act. SHG Federations allow the 
resources of individual groups to be pooled and thus to channel resources from 
surplus groups to resource-deficit SHGs. Some federations also act as financial 
intermediaries between financial institutions and SHGs. A number of federations 
perform no direct financial function, but instead provide services such as training, 
marketing, legal advice, advocacy as well as SHG promotion (Green, 2005). 
 
MicroSave (2011) argues that as a community led model, SHGs have an inherent 
limitation on the quantum of savings that it can mobilise and maintain. This 
limitation can only be addressed if members also have access to personal savings 
accounts, outside the group model, where they can save with the confidence that not 
everyone in the village will come to know of their savings balance and where 
savings will not be at the risk of group dynamics.  
 
NABARD (2008) recognises the aforementioned challenge and is trying to graduate 
SHG members into mature enterprises and increase their access to the supply chain, 
linkages to the capital market and appropriate production and processing 
technologies. However, NABARD has not actually acted on this yet.  
 
Project Shakti, started by Hindustan Unilever Limited, the Indian subsidiary of 
Unilever Limited, shows this can be accomplished by connecting SHG member 
entrepreneurs to an existing multinational supply chain and network. The project 
does this by helping self-help group members become home sales distributors of its 
products in villages that have been ignored by its previous efforts. A study done by 
Xavier et al, (2008) to compare the differences in outcomes between self-help group 
members engaged in Project Shakti and those not engaged with Project Shakti. The 
analysis demonstrated that involvement in Project Shakti led to entrepreneurial 
development resulting in economic empowerment that in turn led to social 
empowerment. 
 
This research will explore potential of connecting poor entrepreneurs to established 
value chains and networks in a way that they benefit from the connection. This will 
be explored in the discussion on value chains and the results.   
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3.9 BWDA 
 
Figure 1 ± BWDA Logo 
The respondents involved in this research are clients of the Bullock Cart Workers 
Development Association (BWDA) and its MFI, BWDA Finance Limited (BFL). 
BWDA was set up in 1986 by Mr. C. Joslin Thambi in Villupuram, Tamil Nadu and 
registered as an NGO under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 with 
the primary objective providing improved design for the bullock carts and help in 
promoting human and animal welfare for the unorganized, illiterate and 
economically poor bullock cart workers in Villupuram and Cuddalore districts 
(Yeswanth, 2005; Arora, 2008). Later on BWDA expanded its work to include all 
poor families (Yeswanth, 2005). 
Shortly after NABARD started its SHG-Bank linkage pilot programme, BWDA 
started to form SHGs. Its microfinance programme started in 1992 in Villupuram 
XQGHUWKH:RPHQ¶V'HYHORSPHQW3URJUDPPHRIWKH7DPLO1DGXVWDWHJRYHUQPHQW
and then expanded in 1996 with the assistance of the Tamil NDGX :RPHQ¶V
Development Corporation (Yeswanth, 2005). BWDA worked closely with the 
banks. However, despite advocacy efforts by Women Development Corporation and 
BWDA, the banks were meeting only a small proportion of SHGs demand for loans 
(Arora, 2008). 
In response to the unmet SHG demand for loan funds, in 1998 BWDA started 
lending its own funds to SHGs. There were worries over the lack of skills in 
delivering financial services and borrowing from financial institutions. Despite 
these worries BWDA went ahead and in 1999 Rashtriya Mahila Kosh, the National 
Credit Fund for Women, DSSURYHG%:'$¶VDSSOLFDWLon for a Rs. 1.5 million loan. 
SHGs mobilised savings from its members and used these internal funds together 
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ZLWKH[WHUQDOORDQVIURPWKHEDQNVWRPHHWWKHPHPEHUV¶ORDQGHPDQG2QO\ZKHQ
the loan demand at the SHG exceeded available funds from members and banks did 
the SHGs approached BWDA for funding the gap. Unlike some MFIs, BWDA was 
not trying to maximise its control or earning potential, as it manages a small portion 
of the funds deployed (Arora, 2008). 
 
So, BWDA did microfinance and also continued with its other development 
activities such as social mobilisation, education, health, sanitation, and vocational 
training. BWDA eventually concluded that for better management of its 
microfinance and development programmes, it was important to separate these. In 
2003, BWDA promoters and staff mobilised Rs. 3.3 million to purchase an existing 
Non-Banking Finance Company (NBFC) and expanded the microfinance 
SURJUDPPHWKURXJKµ%:'$)LQDQFH/LPLWHG%)/¶ (Arora, 2008). 
 
To avoid the cumbersome licensing process involved in starting a new NBFC, 
BWDA took over the Nagercoil Prompt Finance and Investment Pvt Ltd was 
functioning as an NBFC since 1995 in Nagercoil, Tamil Nadu and renamed it as 
BWDA Finance Limited (BFL). The process of taking over and renaming NPFIL as 
BFL was completed in August 2003 (Yeswanth, 2005). 
 
A Non-Banking Finance Company (NBFC) is a company registered under the 
Companies Act, 1956, and engaged in the business of loans and advances, financial 
brokering or is in the business of leasing, hire-purchase, insurance or chits. NBFCs 
are governed by the Non-Banking Financial Companies Prudential Norms 
Directions, 1998, and regulated by the Reserve Bank of India. However, an NBFC 
is different from a bank because it cannot accept demand deposits, it is not a part of 
the payment and settlement system and it cannot issue cheques drawn on it. 
Furthermore, NBFCs also do not have access to a deposit insurance facility through 
the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation (MicroSave, 2011).  
 
BWDA and BFL are separate legal entities. Five of the Board Members of BWDA 
are on BFL Board. Mr. Joslin Thambi is the managing director of BWDA and BFL. 
The staffs of both are co-located at the head office and branches in Villupuram. 
 88 
 
BWDA does not own any of the BFL shares as a non-profit society in India is 
prohibited from investing in a for-profit company. BWDA staff organised the SHGs 
and BFL provided the loan financing. BFL reimburses BWDA for the promotion 
expenses. BWDA also has schools, a college, a skills training centre, and a 
programme for children during school vacation (Arora, 2008). 
 
BFL gives loans between 15 and 36 months. The interest is 18 percent per annum 
on a declining balance basis. BFL charges an upfront fee of 1% of the loan and a 
membership fee (CRISIL, 2009). BFL largely lends to SHGs. It also does individual 
loans to SHG members. It also lends to NGOs so that they can on lend to their 
SHGs. It operates in Tamil Nadu, Pondicherry and the Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands (CRISIL, 2009). 
 
BWDA was involved in the efforts to recover from the destruction of the Boxing 
Day tsunami of 2004. Cordaid partnered with BFL, its first partner, and 
implemented projects within the 25 km radius from the coast in 6 different affected 
districts of Tamil Nadu.  Originally, Cordaid earmarked the grant component to 
cover the cost of the capacity building of the institution and of the target borrowers. 
BFL used the grants to cover costs incurred in expanding the operation to tsunami 
areas, promoting SHGs, and diversifying livelihood skills through courses and 
training, BFL together with its NGO wing, BWDA organized different vocational 
courses. BFL succeeded in delivering both humanitarian assistance and 
reconstruction loans. BWDA did most of the relief delivery while BFL provided 
loans immediately to its members affected by the tsunami for consumption of Rs 
100,000 per SHG (Cordaid, 2008). 
 
In order to develop BFL as a community-owned institution, SHG members were 
invited to subscribe to the BFL shares. Every borrower taking loan was persuaded to 
invest 5% of the loan amount in BFL shares. For a short period, the BFL even 
offered 2% incentive to its field staff to market the shares to SHG members. 
However, only few SHG members and some staff understand the difference 
between a deposit and share investment and most of the SHG members, who 
collectively own 80percent of BFL do not really understand this distinction. Of 
 89 
 
course, it is possible but a low probability that SHG members could lose their 
capital investment. This would result in adverse media and political attention. This 
risk is mitigated by BFL continuing to perform well, keeping average investment 
size per SHG member below Rs. 1,000 and refunding the share amount to members 
of disbanded SHGs. Since January 2008, fresh issue of shares to SHG members has 
been discontinued. BWDA also sold shares to its staff. It took substantial 
convincing in the beginning to mobilise staff contributions towards share capital, 
especially as BWDA salaries are quite modest (Arora, 2008).  
 
SHG members save and rotate their savings amongst themselves but this creates 
challenges. Some SHGs lack the skills, the internal leadership or the group pressure 
to keep up to date accounts. This increases the risks that members will lose money 
through error or fraud and adds to the BWDA/BFL responsibility in SHG training 
and monitoring (Arora, 2008). 
 
The core BFL-BWDA function is to organise, support, and finance self-help groups. 
The women or men groups, of 20 members each, are led by an animator (group 
leader) and supported by a group representative. The animator and the 
representative are members of the SHG and not employed by BFL. The SHG 
animator is provided with a 6 day formal training within 45 days of SHG formation. 
Each of the SHG members is provided four days training within the first three 
months of group formation.  
 
BFL gives the animator various incentives to maintain the group performance. First, 
the animator is paid 0.5% of the loan principal incentive from BFL, if SHG repays 
the entire borrowed amount on time. Second, every three to five years, SHGs take 
stock and twenty per cent of the profits net of savings and expenses are allocated to 
reserves. Animators usually get 10% of this profit. The rest of the profits are 
distributed to members (including the animators) in the ratio of savings made over 
the period. This is estimated at Rs.300 ± 400 (US$6 ± $8 from OANDA, 2011) per 
month for an average SHG managing a Rs. 200,000 (around US$4,000 from 
OANDA, 2011) portfolio. Third, animators are paid for food and other expenses to 
attend various training programmes sponsored by state government, financing 
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institutions and others. Fourth, some of the animators are motivated by the prospects 
of being recruited as a BFL cluster coordinator. Fifth, the role of Animator bestows 
status and profile in the local area. BFL employs 10-12 Cluster Coordinators at each 
branch. The cluster coordinators are front line BFL field staff and oversee 75-100 
SHGs (about 1,500 to 2,000 members). This is much higher than the number of 
clients covered by loan officers in most other MFIs. The cluster coordinators report 
to the field monitor, who in turn reports to the Branch Manager. Depending upon 
workload, number of staff at the branch varies between 13 and 25 (Arora, 2008).  
Branch managers report to senior managers who are responsible for 3 or more 
branches. 
 
Women make up a large part of the staff and clientele of BWDA. Seventy four per 
cent of BWDA-BFL staff and eighty five per cent of the SHG members are women. 
In addition, many of the field staff was originally SHG members and a number of 
them were SHG animators before being recruited. This is unusual, as most MFIs 
have largely male staff from outside the work area, providing financial services to 
largely women customers (Arora, 2008). 
3.10 Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Crisis 
BWDA has been affected by the biggest crisis in Indian microfinance centred next 
door in the state of Andhra Pradesh in 2010-11. Client suicides allegedly connected 
to the inability to pay back microfinance loans caused the state government to 
hurriedly pass a microfinance ordinance which severely restricted the operations of 
microfinance institutions in the state and the collapse of client¶s loan repayments. 
This had led to calls for better and more rigorous regulation nationwide mainly 
through a new microfinance bill to regulate microfinance at the national level and a 
debate about the efficacy and future of microfinance in India (EIU, 2011). The main 
impact on BWDA is a credit crunch. It is finding it more and more difficult to 
borrow money from banks even though it has an outstanding credit rating. Since 
BWDA mainly finances itself through bank loans, this is a very worrying trend.  
 
Why has this crisis have such an impact? Wright and Sharma (2010) argue that this 
crisis had three dress rehearsals and Indian microfinance had not managed to learn 
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the lessons from these crises. The first rehearsal was in Krishna District in Andhra 
Pradesh in 2006, when the local government District Collector, responsible for the 
administration of the whole district, shut 50 offices of leading MFIs including 
Spandana, Asmita and Share, and instructed clients not to repay their loans. This 
was done essentially on the basis that MFIs were charging usurious interest rates, 
making super-profits on the backs of the poor, co-opting the government self-help 
groups and being coercive in their collection methods. In short, an abbreviated list 
of the charges levelled at MFIs in Andhra Pradesh in 2010.  The MFIs made 
voluntary agreements with Andhra Pradesh and promises for MFIs to behave better 
in Andhra Pradesh were never honoured. Arora and Harper (2011) and Ramanathan 
(2011) agree that the inability to learn lessons from the Krishna crisis led the state 
government to conclude that the MFIs in the state could not be trusted.   
 
For Wright and Sharma (2010), the second rehearsal was in Kanpur (and other cities 
of Uttar Pradesh) in 2009, where a local MFI, Nirman Bharti defaulted on the loans 
it had received from a variety of banks and other financial institutions amid 
significant portfolio problems. The underlying problem was that Nirman Bharti had 
not developed the processes, systems of internal control and management 
information system (MIS) to manage the rapid growth driven by the priority sector 
lending-based flood of debt financing 
 
For Wright and Sharma (2010), the third rehearsal was in Kolar district in 
Karnataka in 2009 to 2010, where a repayment strike instigated by the Anjuman 
committee, a local Muslim group, paralysed repayments for many months affecting 
most of the major southern MFIs. The underlying reasons for this strike were 
complex, but what was striking to Wright and Sharma was how few clients resisted 
the strikes or defended the MFIs. One study concluded that multiple lending was a 
serious problem with multiple lending with one town in the district having nine 
MFIs and at least thirty three per cent of the clients have more than one loan and 
around twenty per cent have three or more loans. In addition, problems in the local 
VLONUHHOLQJLQGXVWU\UHGXFHGIORZVRILQFRPHWRVHUYLFHGHEWVSUHVVXUHIURPFOLHQWV¶
husbands to cut back on attending weekly meetings and the use of agents by MFIs 
to drive sales all created an environment that was highly risky for traditional, zero 
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tolerance, group-based lending operations which the commercial MFIs of Andhra 
Pradesh were.  
 
The Andhra Pradesh microfinance crisis started in October 2010, when suicides by 
microfinance clients were reported in Andhra Pradesh. The state government 
responded by passing an ordinance that set a limit on how much MFIs could lend to 
their clients, required loans to be repaid monthly rather than weekly and that all loan 
repayments be made at government offices. As a result, microfinance in the state 
ceased operations. Loan recovery rate went as low as 10 per cent. In November 
2010, state supported SHGs reached 17 million clients in the state and MFIs were 
reaching 6 million. Many clients had multiple loans putting the average 
microfinance debt in the state at US$1,700 per person compared to US$150 per 
person in other states (Maes and Reed, 2011).  
Several commentators believe that politics and the MFIs competition with the state 
SHG programme was a key factor in the crisis. As Ballem et al (2011) point out that 
a majority of MFI clients are members of state SHG programme of the Government 
of Andhra Pradesh, there is possible conflict of interest between those of the state 
and those of its SHG members. EIU (2011) believes there is a perception that the 
rapid grRZWKRIPLFURILQDQFHKDVUHGXFHGORFDOSROLWLFLDQV¶DELOLW\WRXVHUXUDOFUHGLW
as a tool of patronage and has put MFIs in the firing line. Intellecap (2010) said that 
the state believed that it was serving its poor by providing them low-cost loans in its 
state SHG programme. However, they saw that MFIs were able to attract clients and 
achieve a better repayment rate, despite charging higher interest rates. The state 
believed that it had a better product and lower costs and refused to see any logical or 
business reason why poor people still borrowed from MFIs. So the state began to 
believe that the MFIs must be following coercive business practices to achieve such 
success. But, Arora and Harper (2011) argued that what they called the politicised 
SHGs did not meet demand which opened the doors for the MFIs. This can be seen 
in the growing overlap of MFI and SHG clients. Arora and Harper (2011) show that 
in 2001, the percentage of SHG clients who were also MFI customers was four per 
cent in Andhra Pradesh. But by 2010, it was up to forty five per cent. Ballem et al, 
(2011) agree with this saying that over the years, the SHGs have proliferated across 
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Andhra Pradesh but the state SHGs were not able to meet the credit requirements of 
the borrowers. In addition, Ballem et al (2011) point out that the state SHG 
programme had some shortcomings, such as delay in loan sanctioning (more than 2-
3 months in most cases), inadequate loan amounts, and no short term credit 
products. As a result, many of the poor approached moneylenders and daily finance 
corporations and took loans at exorbitant interest rates because they could not get 
loans on a timely basis from the state SHGs.  
 
Another key factor in the crisis was overindebtedness. M-CRIL (2011) found that 
this was caused by excessive lending. M-CRIL found that of the financially 
excluded families, just over hundred per cent of them had loans from MFIs and 310 
per cent had loans from state SHG programme. M-CRIL questions if MFI lending 
alone was responsible for the crisis. Arora and Harper (2011) say that the combined 
number of SHG and MFI loans in Andhra Pradesh was 10 times the number of poor 
households in the state.  
Another key factor in the crisis was suicide. However, most commentators could not 
find a clear statistical link between microfinance and the suicides in October 2010. 
Harper (2011) says that most of the farmers who committed suicide were heavily 
indebted. However, in most suicide cases, about 75 per cent of the KRXVHKROG¶V
indebtedness was to informal moneylenders rather than formal sources such as 
MFIs. Ashta et al (2011) have shown that the suicides in microfinance in Andhra 
Pradesh do not seem to be any greater than the average suicide rate in India. 
However, suicides by female microfinance borrowers in Andhra Pradesh are higher 
than the average female suicide rates. Sinha and Sinha (2011) argue that the 
presumption that overindebtedness had led to the suicides was the cause of the 
crisis.    
 
A final factor was the rapid expansion of microfinance in Andhra Pradesh. Arora 
and Harper (2011) point to the annual growth rate of MFIs in Andhra Pradesh 
between 2001 and 2010 was seventy three per cent while the average annual growth 
rate for SHGs in the state was forty one  per cent for the same period. For Sinha and 
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Sinha (2011), funding MFI growth by mainly commercial loans, meant that equity 
was needed as well to grow in order to meet capital adequacy requirements. The 
equity was obtained at high valuations by promising continued high growth and 
high returns. To deliver high growth, MFIs concentrated their efforts in the better 
connected and easier to reach areas of Andhra Pradesh because it was less costly. 
This led to geographical concentration and multiple lending. The number of 
microfinance loans exceeded the number of clients by forty per cent in 2010. Four 
hundred eleven per cent of the eligible population was covered by microfinance 
loans with three hundred per cent of the coverage coming from SHG loans. This 
means that in Andhra Pradesh that each microfinance client had on average 4 loans 
with 3 of those loans coming from SHGs.  
The Andhra Pradesh microfinance crisis highlighted the need for effective 
regulation for microfinance in India. Currently, however, there is no national 
regulatory framework for microfinance in India. This is why the state of Andhra 
Pradesh felt the need to rush through its microfinance ordinance in the autumn of 
2010. As the above discussion shows, all parts of the microfinance sector needed 
regulation. 
 
In 2007, a bill to regulate microfinance in India was introduced into parliament. 
This bill designated NABARD as the microfinance regulator. However, this bill was 
referred to the standing committee of parliament with no subsequent action being 
taken. As a result, this bill lapsed (Shankar and Asher, 2009).  
In response to the 2010 crisis, the RBI appointed the Malegam Committee to look at 
the issues in the microfinance sector with the view of recommending to the RBI a 
regulatory reply. The committee made recommendations for a separate NBFC 
category for MFIs, interest rate cap of twelve per cent, transparency in interest rate 
charges, rules to help prevent multiple borrowing and overindebtedness, 
establishment of a national credit information bureau, establishment of a customer 
protection code and that microfinance should remain in the priority sector scheme. 
The committee also said that if the RBI implemented these recommendations, there 
would no longer be any need for the Andhra Pradesh microfinance ordinance   (EIU, 
2011; Darshaw, 2011). 
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The RBI issued new regulations for the microfinance sector in May 2011 which 
implemented the Malegam Committee recommendations including introducing a 
margin cap of 12% and an interest-UDWHFDSRIIRUEDQNV¶SULRULW\VHFWRUORDQV
including those by NBFCs (EIU, 2011). In August 2011, the Indian government 
introduced a Microfinance Bill to have the sector regulated by the Reserve Bank of 
India (Maes and Reed, 2011). 
 
The key impact of the Andhra Pradesh microfinance crisis was feeling among those 
both outside and inside of microfinance that microfinance may have lost its way. It 
also brought to the forefront challenges to the financial systems paradigm that had 
reigned in microfinance since the turn of the century. More and more, microfinance 
was asked to refocus on generating social impact and greater reduction of poverty. 
3.11 Chapter Conclusion 
There is an immensely high level of poverty in India. This especially shows up in 
the child nutrition figures. Some go as far as to say India may be the poorest country 
on Earth. There have been a number of anti-poverty efforts in India but these have 
been compromised by corruption, apathy and mismanagement. The complexity of 
the caste system allows it to sometime be a help to the poor instead of a hindrance. 
But, many Indians see the caste system as a system of mutual support despite its 
oppressive features. The kinship ties that form the core of the caste system is also 
central to how Tamils keep their classical civilisation alive which is the last classical 
civilisation on the planet. These close kinship networks are vulnerable to brokers 
who connect these to the outside world. However, these kinship networks are not 
unambiguously closed leaving room for members to extend connections outside. 
Indian microfinance got its start due to the failure of the development bank 
DSSURDFKDVHOVHZKHUH+RZHYHU,QGLD¶VXQLTXHFRQWULEXWLRQLVWKHself-help group 
which is essentially a microbank owned and operated by its clients. BWDA uses 
mainly SHGs in its microfinance but does not try to completely control them.  
Unlike other MFIs in India, it uses a mostly female staff. BWDA was impacted by 
the Andhra Pradesh microfinance crisis by finding it more difficult to obtain capital. 
However, the main overall impact of the crisis was to challenge the financial 
 96 
 
systems approach and a growing concern to produce more social impact and greater 
reduction of poverty. Social network analysis brings a new theoretical tool to 
microfinance to help its clients to obtain higher levels of poverty reduction. But 
before looking at its theoretical contribution, the background on social networks 
will be discussed in the next chapter.    
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4 Chapter Four ± The Importance of Social Networks 
4.1 Chapter Summary 
The chapter will start by defining social networks and social network analysis 
followed by a discussion on the importance of the structural view social network 
analysis provides. Next will be a look at what research has discovered about the 
rules on how networks work and why WKHSRRU¶VVRFLDOQHWZRUNVUDUHOy benefit the 
poor. The chapter ends with descriptions of case studies which connect the poor to a 
special kind of network, the value chain. The case studies show both the benefit and 
the risks of connecting the poor to existing mainstream value chains.   
4.2 Social Networks and Social Network Analysis definitions 
Social networks are defined and measured as connections among people, 
organisations, political entities (states and nations) and/or other units. Social 
network analysis is a theoretical perspective and a set of techniques used to 
understand these relationships (Valente 2010, pg. 3). Christakis and Fowler (2010, 
pg. 32) say that the science of social networks provides a distinct ways of seeing the 
world because it is about individuals and groups and how the former becomes latter. 
4.3 Importance of Social Networks 
Social network analysts view society through a structural lens. The structural view 
says that the structure of society and the relationships that form them are as 
important as the attributes of individuals in explaining what happens in society. 
Why is the structural view of society so important? Why are the relationships that 
form social networks so important?  Valente (2010, pgs. 3 ± 7) says that 
relationships matter because relationships influence DSHUVRQ¶VEHKDYLRXUDERYHDQG
EH\RQG WKH LQIOXHQFH RI KLV RU KHU DWWULEXWHV $SHUVRQ¶V DWWULEXWHV GRHV LQIOXHQFH
who people know and spend time with: their social network. Valente quotes 
Borgatti et al (2009),  
³One of the most potent ideas in the social sciences is the notion that individuals are 
HPEHGGHGLQWKLFNZHEVRIVRFLDOUHODWLRQVDQGLQWHUDFWLRQV´ 
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The reason that social networks are so important is because human beings are ultra-
social animals that create social networks (Haidt, 2006). Syed (2010, page 110) 
concurs by quoting Geoffrey Cohen:  
³7KHQHHGWREHORQJWRDVVRFLDWHLVDPRQJWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWKXPDQPRWLYHV:H
are almost certainly hardwired with a fundamental motivation to maintain these 
DVVRFLDWLRQV´ 
Christakis and Fowler (2010, pJ  DGG WKDW KXPDQ EHLQJV MXVW GRQ¶W OLYH LQ
groups, they live in networks. Valente argues the traditional social science approach 
of using random sampling is not adequate for measuring network concepts because 
random sampling removes individuals from the social context that may influence 
their behaviour. Valente explains that one primary reason social network research 
has grown in recent decades is that scholars have become dissatisfied with attributes 
theories of behaviour. Many attribute theories have not explained why some people 
do things (e.g. quit smoking) while others do not.  Social network explanations have 
provided good explanations in these cases. Social network analysis concepts and 
techniques have found wide application across a number of scientific disciplines 
including anthropology, business, communication, computer science, economics, 
education, marketing, medicine, public health, political science, psychology and 
sociology to name a few.  
Freeman (2004, page 2) also believes that the unique contribution of social network 
analysis is its structural approach which looks at the social structure as a whole 
rather than focus on the individual. For him, the social network approach is 
grounded in the intuitive notion that the patterning of social ties in which actors are 
embedded has important consequences for those actors. Network analysts, then, 
seek to uncover various kinds of patterns. And they try to determine the conditions 
under which those patterns arise and discover their consequences.  
 
Comparing the structural approach of social network analysis to the traditional 
random sampling approach of social science, Freeman (2004, page 1) quotes Allen 
Barton, a Columbia University sociologist,  
 
³)RU WKH ODVW WKLUW\ \HDUV HPSLULFDO VRFLDO UHVHDrch has been dominated by the 
sample survey. But as usually practiced, using random sampling of individuals, the 
survey is a sociological meat grinder, tearing the individual from his social context 
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and guaranteeing that nobody in the study interacts with anyone else in it. It is a 
little like a biologist putting his experimental animals through a hamburger machine 
and looking at every hundredth cell through a microscope; anatomy and physiology 
get lost, structure and function disappear and one is left with cell biology..... If our 
DLPLVWRXQGHUVWDQGSHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRXUUDWKHUWKDQVLPSO\WRUHFRUGLWZHZDQWWR
know about primary groups, neighbourhoods, organizations, social circles and 
communities; about interaction, communication, role expectations and social 
FRQWURO´ 
 
4.4 Key Social Network Analysis Concepts 
Therefore, social network analysis allows one to take a holistic, structural view in 
addition to the traditional approaches. In order to take a structural view of the 
businesses owned by microfinance clients, there are several key concepts of social 
network analysis being used in this research. The first is small world networks. This 
is defined as a network in which most people have few connections yet the overall 
distance between any two people in the network is shorter than expected by chance 
(Watts, 1999). Small world networks are characterised by local clustering which 
indicates dense pockets of interconnectivity. There are bridges, however, that 
connected these subgroups and these bridges enable people to connect to seemingly 
distant others by fewer steps than would occur in a random network (Valente, 2010, 
pgs. 9 ± 19). The jatis described in the previous chapter have the characteristics of a 
small world network. The dense kinship ties create pockets of interconnectivity with 
bridges to other dense pockets of interconnectivity inside the jati. There can also be 
bridges to outside the jati.  7KHVHEULGJHVDUHZK\4XLJOH\¶V(1993) assertion above 
that jatis are not unambiguously closed is correct.  
 
Homophily is the tendency for people to affiliate and associate with others like 
WKHPVHOYHV$VDUHVXOWDSHUVRQ¶VVRFLDOQHWZRUNWHQGVWREHDUHIOHFWLRQRIKLPRU
herself because people feel more comfortable being with people like themselves 
rather than with people who are different. Homophily helps to explain why the 
small world effect occurs. The set of people from which contacts are drawn are 
narrowed by homophily and the probability that two people have an acquaintance in 
common is much higher than random chance alone would dictate.  Homophily also 
explains why new ideas and practices have difficulty in getting a foothold within 
most social networks because most people talk to others like themselves and usually 
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hold similar attitudes, beliefs and practices and as a result avoid those who do not 
share their views slowing the spread of new ideas. However, homophily can also 
speed the diffusion of an idea. Once a new idea does gain a foothold in the social 
network, the trust generated by homophily causes it to spread quickly (Valente, 
2010, pgs. 9 ± 19). By their very nature, jatis are homophilous since they share 
kinship ties. The concept of homophily was developed by Almack (1922) who 
asked children to name those they would like to invite to a party and then compared 
the similarities between the choosers and the chosen to study the effect of 
homophily. 
 
One of the key innovators in social network analysis was Jacob Moreno (1934). 
Moreno, along with Helen Hall Jennings created sociometry which was an 
experimental technique obtained by application of quantitative methods which 
inquire into the evolution and organization of groups and the position of individuals 
within them (Freeman, 2004, page 37). +LV ZRUN¶V DLP ZDV WR LQYHVWLJDWH KRZ
psychological well-being is related to the structural features of what he called social 
configurations. His major innovation was to devise the sociogram as a way of 
representing the formal properties of social configurations (Scott, 2000, page 9). 
The sociogram turned out to be one the most powerful innovations in social network 
analysis because it allowed the visualisation of social networks. Because human 
beings are so visually oriented, visualisation is an efficient way to present a lot of 
network data in a way that is easily understood. The Data Findings and Data 
Analysis chapter will present a number of visualisations resulting from this network 
research. 
 
Another key concept is centrality which focuses on who is the most central player in 
the network. The reason centrality is important is that Alex Bavelas (1948) said that 
the degree to which a single individual dominates its communication network ± the 
degree to which it was centralised ± affected its efficiency, its morale and the 
perceived influence of each individual actor. Bavelas and the group around him 
developed a formal model, drew graph theoretic images of social structures, 
designed an experiment and collected experimental data on efficiency, morale and 
the recognition of leadership which showed that Bevelas had been correct. As a 
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result, a formal model for centrality was developed (Freeman, 2004, pages 68 ± 70). 
In the data analysis chapter there will be a focus on centrality to identify the central 
players in the network who would be probably be the best link for new information 
for the sari sellers taking part in this research.  
 
The Manchester anthropologists were extremely influential in social network 
analysis in Britain, with their work focused on ego networks. Ego networks are 
networks that focus on one indivLGXDO DQG WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V FRQQHFWLRQV LQFOXGLQJ
connections between the people connected to the individual. The Manchester 
Anthropologists include John, Barnes, Elizabeth Bott, Max Gluckman, J. Clyde 
Mitchell and Sigfried Nadel. Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown, who espoused the 
structural perspective in anthropology, was a great influence on the Manchester 
Anthropologists (Scott, 2000, pages 26 ± 33; Freeman, 2004, page 105). Of all the 
Manchester anthropologists, Scott (2000, pages 28 -32) considered Mitchell the 
most important contributor of this tradition. Mitchell, an anthropologist, said that 
the pattern of interactions that people have among themselves is the sphere of 
network analysis. These networks are built on a flow of information and the transfer 
RIUHVRXUFHVDQGVHUYLFHV0LWFKHOO¶VIRFXVZDVPDLQO\RQHJRQHWZRUNV0LWFKHOO¶V
major contribution was to translate graph theory and sociometry into a sociological 
framework. From this came the concepts of density, the completeness of the 
network and reachability which measures how easy it is for all people in a network 
to contact one another through a limited number of steps.  This research will 
measure the density of networks collected.  
4.5 Networks Rules 
Christakis and Fowler (2010, pgs. 17 ± 26) described five rules on networks 
discovered through research. The first rule is that individuals shape their network. 
One example they give of how individuals shape their networks is homophily which 
was described above. Individuals also decide the structure of the network by 
deciding how many people they are connected to, influencing how densely 
interconnected their family and friends are and by controlling how central they are 
to the social network. Individuals also shape their networks through transitivity 
which is the tendency where an individual has strong ties to two separate people; 
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those two people will know each other thus forming a triangle. The importance of 
transitivity will be discussed in the theoretical framework. 
The second rule is that the network shapes us. The network shapes individuals 
because the number of social contacts can affect people, transitivity, or the lack of 
LWFDQDIIHFWLQGLYLGXDOVDQGKRZPDQ\FRQWDFWVDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VIULHQGVDQGIDPLO\
have can affect them. +RZDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VFan be constrained by its network will be 
discussed in the theoretical framework and the discussion of the results.  
 
The third rule is that friends affect individuals.  Due to the human tendency to 
influence and copy one another, friends help determine the content that flows across 
the network which affects the individual. This seems obvious and will be shown in 
the impact of the number of strong ties in the collected ego networks. 
 
The fourth rule is that oXU IULHQGV¶ IULHQGV¶ IULHQGV DIIHFWV LQGLYLGXDOV. Two 
examples of this rule are described. First is hyper dyadic spread which is the 
tendency of effects to spread from person to person to person beyond an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VGLUHFW VRFLDO WLHV7KH VHFRQGH[DPSOH LV0LOJUDP¶V IDPRXV VLGHZDON
experiment (Milgram et al, 1969). In this experiment, researchers would stop and 
look up at a window and record how many other passers-by also looked up. The 
more researchers that looked up, the more passers-by that looked up. This illustrated 
the importance of a threshold in influencing a network.  
 
The fifth rule that the network has a life of its own or to put it another, a network is 
more than the sum of its parts. Christakis and Fowler give two reasons why the 
network has a life of its own. First, networks combine properties and functions that 
are neither controlled nor perceived by its members. They can only be understood 
by studying the whole network. Second, networks also have emergent properties. 
Emergent properties are new attributes of a whole that arise from the interaction and 
interconnection of the parts.  
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2QH TXHVWLRQ WKDW FRPHV XS LV KRZ IDU GRHV DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V FRQQHFWLRQV DQG
influence reach into the social network? Christakis and Fowler (2010, pgs. 26 ± 30) 
give different answers to the question for connections and influence. 
 
)RU FRQQHFWLRQV WKH\ SRLQW WR 0LOJUDP¶V IDPRXV VL[ GHJUHHV RI VHSDUDWLRQ
experiment. In this experiment (Travers and Milgram, 1969), Milgram gave a few 
hundred people who lived in Nebraska in the USA a letter addressed to a 
businessman in Boston more than 2300 kilometres to the east in the USA. These 
people were asked to send the letter to someone they knew personally. The goal was 
to get the letter to someone they thought would be more likely to have a personal 
relationship with the Boston businessman. The number of times the letter changed 
hands was tracked and it was found that on average it changed hands six times. 
'RGGV 0XKDPDG DQG :DWWV  UHSHDWHG 0LOJUDP¶V H[SHULPHQW XVLQJ H-mail 
instead of letters. This time 98,000 subjects were recruited. Each subject was 
randomly assigned a target from a list of eighteen targets in thirteen countries. The 
subjects sent an e-mail to someone the subject knew who might in turn know the 
targeted person. Again, it took roughly six steps to get the e-mail to the targeted 
SHUVRQ UHSOLFDWLQJ 0LOJUDP¶V UHVXOWV 7KHUHIRUH &KULVWDNLV DQG )RZOHU FRQFOXGH
that an individual reach extended six steps or degrees into their networks. 
 
For influence, Christakis and Fowler conclude that the reach of an indiviGXDO¶V
influence is much shorter. They promulgate the three degrees of influence rule. This 
UXOH VWDWHV WKDW DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V LQIOXHQFH WKURXJK WKH QHWZRUN JUDGXDOO\ GLVVLSDWHV
and ceases to have a noticeable effect on people beyond the social frontier that lies 
at three degrees of separation. They give three reasons for this.  First is the Intrinsic 
Decay Explanation. This explanation says that influence eventually peters out as 
information loses it fidelity. Second is the Network Instability Explanation. This 
explanation says that links beyond three degrees have a tendency to become 
unstable as the network evolves. Third is the Evolutionary Purpose Explanation. 
This explanation says that humans evolved in small groups in which everyone was 
connected to everyone else by three degrees which constrains influence going 
beyond three degrees.  
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4.6 Visualisations  
One of the key advantages of social network analysis is the ability to use software to 
visualise the network. Features not readily apparent looking at the numbers become 
very apparent when looking at the visualisation. The software used to do the 
network calculations was UCINET (Borgatti et al, 2002) and NetDraw (Borgatti, 
2002) was used to visualise the network. NetDraw uses a spring-embedded 
algorithm where the edges in the network behaves as springs and does not like long 
lines. 
During the first field trip, each respondent was asked to identify which members of 
the SHG who did the most work. In looking at the visualisation, it is important to 
note that direction is important. In this case, the base of the arrow is at the 
respondent and the arrowhead points to the people the respondent thinks are 
important. The more arrowheads a person has, the more important the person is 
within the SHG.  
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Figure 2 ± Male SHG: Who Does the Most Work? 
In Figure 1 above is the visualisation of the answers for the male SHG and Figure 2 
below is the visualisation for one of the female SHGs. 
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Figure 3 ± Female SHG: Who Does Most of the Work? 
In Figure 1, most of the arrows point to the animator (SHG leader) and the two 
representatives (deputy SHG leaders). In Figure 2, almost all of the arrows point to 
the animator. In one sense, this is not surprising that the leaders would have the 
most arrows pointing at them. However, another way to interpret these is to say that 
if anything happened to the leader of the male SHG, there are two ready 
replacements. The female group, on the other hand, could be in considerable 
difficulty if their leader disappeared. These two figures show the power of 
visualisation in social network analysis.  
4.7 Networks and the Poor 
So, how do the dynamics of the network affect the poor? Price (1976) was the first 
to apply the process of cumulative advantage or preferential attachment to networks. 
For Price, preferential attachment explains why the millionaire gets income faster 
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than the beggar. This is now known as the rich get richer effect. This produces what 
is known as a scale-free network. A scale-free network, as a result of a power law 
distribution, is one where a few nodes have an overwhelming number of the 
connections. Networks that follow the power law are ones where the number of 
nodes having a certain number of connections is found to vary as a power of the 
number of connections.  Barabási (2003, pg. 87 ± 92) argued that scale-free 
networks occurred because people want to connect to networks at its most central 
locations. This would result in those in the most central locations in the network 
retaining their central positions. Barabási also called this the rich getting richer 
dynamic. This describes the situation that many of the poor find themselves as the 
rich maintain themselves at the centre of the most important networks in the nation 
and the poor find themselves on the periphery. Christakis and Fowler (2010, pg. 31 
± 32) argue that the rich get richer dynamic of social networks can reinforce two 
different kinds of inequality. First is situational inequality where some are better off 
in socioeconomic terms. Second is positional inequality where some are better off in 
where they are located in the networks. Christakis and Fowler (2010, pg. 167) also 
argue that the rich get richer dynamic means that the positive feedback loop 
between social connections and success could create a social magnifier that 
concentrates even more power and wealth in the hands of those who already had it. 
 
For Christakis and Fowler (2010, pgs. 301 ± 302), the ability of network inequality 
to create and reinforce inequality of opportunity comes from the tendency of people 
with many connections to be connected to other people with many connections. This 
distinguishes social networks from neural, metabolic, mechanical and other 
nonhuman networks. The reverse holds true as well: those who are poorly connected 
usually have friends and family who are themselves disconnected from the larger 
network.  They argue that to address poverty, the personal connections of the poor 
must be addressed. To reduce poverty, the focus should not merely on monetary 
transfers or even technical training; the poor should be helped to form new 
relationships with other members of society. When the poor on the periphery of the 
network are reconnected, the whole fabric of society benefits and not just any 
disadvantaged individuals at the fringe.  
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Huda and Simanowitz (2008) in an impact assessment of the Haitian replication of 
%5$&¶V7DUJHWLQJ WKH8OWUD3RRUSURJUDPPH, mentioned in chapter two, found a 
correlation between the depth of poverty and the strength of the social networks of 
the poor. The social networks of the poor are formed from relationships with family, 
neighbours and community members. However, they found that being poor is 
inextricably linked to being marginalised. The poorer the person, the thinner the 
social networks they can depend on. They also compared those who climbed out of 
extreme poverty the fastest with those who climbed out the slowest. The key 
difference was the strength of their social network. The fast climbers often had a 
strong social network to rely on to get them through emergencies. On the other 
hand, slow climbers had little or no social network to rely on. Being extremely poor 
exacerbates the social exclusion and marginalisation. The extremely poor reported 
that the biggest destroyer of their social networks is buying on credit and being 
unable to repay. This leads to broken relationships and ostracism. As a consequence, 
the poverty is associated with being poor in people. The result is that being 
financially poor and having poor social networks seem to perpetuate each other. Of 
course, this means that the rich would tend to have strong social networks but they 
found that the poor are hesitant to approach the rich because of the power dynamics 
at play.   
Huda et al (2005b) found power dynamics at work in an experiment to connect the 
ultra-poor to village elites in order take advantage of the networks of the elite. 
While there was some success, they recognised the risk that their experiment could 
risk reinforcing the dependency of the ultra-poor on the elite. Wood (2003, 
page.456) says that securing any kind of longer term future for the ultra-poor 
requires support of these elites but this comes at the price of dependency. Implicit 
here is the unwillingness or inability of the ultra-poor to support one another during 
distress. This sense of powerlessness leads to an expectation that those who are 
better off should or will provide them charitable assistance (Huda et al, 2005b). This 
power dynamic between rich and poor could also apply to Tamil mainly low caste 
members who are the subjects of this research.  
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4.8 Networks and Microfinance 
 
+RZ GR QHWZRUNV DIIHFW PLFURILQDQFH¶V HIIRUWV WR UHGXFH SRYHUW\" &KULVWDNLV DQG
Fowler (2010, pgs. 168 -170) point to the fact that microfinance uses the social 
networks of the poor that consist of their friends and family as a form of social 
collateral. They point to Grameen Bank as an example of this approach. Yunus 
(2003, pg. 62) attributes the success of Grameen Bank to features of the social 
network:  
 
³6XEWOHDQGDWWLPHVQRWVRVXEWOHSHHUSUHVVXUHNHHSVHDFKJURXSPHPEHULQOLQH´ 
 
Christakis and Fowler also state that ROSCAs are another manifestation that 
capitalises on the power of social networks. 
 
However, network theory points to a much stronger role that microfinance can play 
in reconnecting the poor to the larger networks around them. The concepts of weak 
ties and brokerage discussed below show how being better connected to the larger 
network can help the poor using microfinance to create and sustain their 
microenterprises to improve their businesses and reduce their poverty. The 
structural argument of social network analysis points to the importance of social 
structure and social context in the lives of microfinance clients and that just 
focusing on the individual misses some crucial information. However, taking 
advantage of the structural outlook this requires that microfinance institutions focus 
more on social intermediation to help their bridge the structural holes around them. 
 
There has been some research that has looked at the impact of networks in 
microfinance. Hasegawa (2009) argues that those excluded from microcredit may 
not be the poorest but the socially weakest. In a result that confirms this, Karlan 
(2007) in a study of FINCA Peru found that those with strong social ties to the 
group are less likely to be forced from the group than those with weak ties if the 
default was EH\RQG WKH ERUURZHU¶V FRQWURO )RU Armendáriz and Morduch (2010, 
pages 119 ± 120) the problem is that it is hard to determine if this is due to trust or 
due to the fact that those who are similar and live closer to each other have an easier 
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time monitoring each other. However, Hermes and Lensink (2007) argue that 
Karlan is able to circumvent this endogeneity problem by making use of a natural 
experiment, which allows him to rule out the possibility that the nature social 
connections correlates with other group characteristics influencing repayment. 
FINCA Peru randomly creates groups. If a person wants to obtain a loan, she is put 
on a list, without taking into account where she lives or whether she knows the other 
persons who are already on the list. Once the list contains 30 persons the group can 
start. This process of group formation exogenously creates groups with different 
levels of initial social ties, which enables the actual measurement of the impact of 
these social ties on monitoring and enforcement efforts within the group. 
 
Nelson (2004) says that entrepreneurs use networking for different purposes at 
different stages in the life cycle of their businesses. New entrepreneurs need access 
to peers for information, advice and support. Entrepreneurs with growing businesses 
require advice to meet new challenges. Finally, entrepreneurs with maturing 
businesses need strategic alliances. Eastwood (2004) says that one of the barriers 
women face in setting up businesses includes access to networks to get help to 
manage the business. Lack of access to business networks can have a detrimental 
effect on the success of a business. Shaw et al (2001, page 13) quote Aldrich and 
Zimmer: 
 
³1HWZRUNVDUHNQRZQWRDVVLVWLQEXVLQHVVVWDUW-up and growth by providing access 
WRLQIRUPDWLRQDGYLFHDQGILQDQFHDVZHOODVPXFKQHHGHGEXVLQHVVFRQWDFWV´  
 
However, Armendáriz and Morduch (2010, page 272) argue that measuring an 
attribute such as access to valuable social networks is harder than measuring 
attributes like age, education and experience. However, as this chapter shows, it is 
possible to measure the social networks and access to networks of microfinance 
clients.  
4.9 Value Chains 
Bhagavatula and Elfring (2010) showed that most microfinance clients start low 
growth, low barrier to entry businesses that are very vulnerable to competition and 
that social networks may be the only asset these clients have to fight the 
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competition. But, could these clients profit from joining the networks of larger firms 
as suppliers? This has been the focus of value chain research to see if the poor can 
benefit from joining existing value chains that include these networks of larger 
firms. However, the poor are not generally part of these existing value chains. L. 
Kumar (2010) arguing why microfinance had not empowered women said that one 
of the reasons why is that the women in the village of study are not in any of supply 
chain initiatives and the village is not integrated with other villages. It should be 
noted that these women may be part of local value chains but these tend to be small 
or have a one link to outside networks which tends to lead to exploitation.  
 
Shah (2010) shows how federations managing milk collection and processing 
centers, has helped link small farmers to value chains and receive better prices for 
their produce. For the OECD (2004), the effect of business networks on pro-poor 
outcomes is that they spread knowledge of how to improve productivity across the 
private sector, including the poor DVVHHQE\6KDK¶VH[DPSOHThe development of 
business networks, in the form of horizontal and vertical clusters, and the 
strengthening of business organisations have an important role to play in innovation 
and increasing productivity. However, such linkages are based on trust and so it is 
difficult to establish clusters where they do not exist organically (OECD, 2004). 
 
The important thing is not so much whether a cluster exists, but how well it 
performs in boosting systemic innovation and competitiveness and reducing 
transaction costs throughout the value chain. The competitiveness of the cluster 
depends on competitive performance and therefore innovation at all levels of the 
value chain (Ernst, 2004).  
 
But, the poor do not always benefit from joining value chains of larger firms. The 
benefit the poor get from a value chain depends where the market power lies in 
value chains. They may either be producer or consumer driven. In consumer-driven 
supply chains, the balance of market power lies with the consumer. These tend to be 
commodity or undifferentiated markets with low barriers to entry in which 
producers receive a small share of the total value created in the market. Agricultural 
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commodities such as coffee, tea and palm oil are examples. On the other hand, 
producer-driven value chains tend to be those in which products are differentiated 
by technology, design and/or natural attributes and with barriers to entry. In these 
markets, the balance of power tends to lie with the producer (OECD, 2004). 
Because microfinance clients tend to start low entry barrier businesses, these tend to 
be linked to consumer-driven value chains where they get a small share of the total 
value created in the market.  
 
Another problem is that markets work in social space and the social networks in the 
space may be a source of conflict that prevents access. There are numerous 
examples of markets in which one ethnic or social group predominates and where 
others are excluded. In the extreme, there may be conflict over market participation, 
which disrupts their functioning entirely (OECD, 2004). 
Is there a way for the poor to be involved in value chains of larger firms that include 
rather than exclude them? Or value chains where the poor get a fair value rather 
than exploitation? Harper (2010b) looked at possible ways of answering these 
questions. He presents a series of case studies in India where interventions were 
made to include poor people and have poor people benefit from inclusion. There are 
two that are relevant to this research. 
The first case study involves connecting potato farmers with the value chain of a 
giant multinational. BASIX, a MFI and livelihoods promotion agency, was 
interested in contract farming model as a strategy and proposed to link the Kolkata 
potato crisp factory of Frito-Lay subsidiary of PepsiCo with very poor small scale 
farmers in the Indian states of Jharkand, Orissa and Bihar. BASIX saw an 
opportunity match the potato harvest in October and November from these farmers 
ZLWK 3HSVL&R¶V VKRUWDJH RI SRWDWRHV LQ WKHVH VDPH PRQWKV $IWHU D \HDU RI
negotiations, PepsiCo, BASIX and the farmers entered a partnership. BASIX aim 
was to create a sustainable revenue model that would be profitable for all three 
parties. PepsiCo supplies the seeds with BASIX providing credit and technical 
services. BASIX helped form the Growers Association which included all of the 
potato farmers. %$6,;PDGHVXUHWKDW3HSVL&R¶VLQVWUXFWLRQVZHUHIROORZHGE\WKH
farmers through the planting and growing seasons through constant monitoring of 
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the farmers. PepsiCo would occasionally monitor the farmers. At the harvest, the 
farmers would grade the potatoes in the presence of BASIX staff. The rejected 
potatoes would be taken home for consumptions. PepsiCo would transport the 
remaining potatoes to the factory in Kolkata where they would be subjected to a 
final grading at the factory gate. In the first year, the farmers benefited from this 
project by getting guaranteed prices for their crops. These prices were slightly 
higher than the ones the farmers normally got. This, plus the saved transport costs, 
meant the farmers made more profits. They got higher yields from by following 
3HSVL&R¶VLQVWUXFWLRQV7KH\OHDUQHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIJUDGLQJDQGTXDOity. BASIX 
made a surplus of Rs. 45,036. In the second year, serious problems developed in the 
UHODWLRQVKLSV 7KLV KDG VHYHUDO FDXVHV 3HSVL&R¶V VWDQGDUGV VHHPHG WR YDU\
according to the availability of the potatoes. When supply was scarce, almost any 
potato was accepted. When there were plenty of potatoes, the quality standards were 
very stringent. The more checks at the factory were done without the presence of 
representatives from BASIX and the Growers Association. PepsiCo would pay a 
higher rate in the open market for the same type of potato the farmers were growing 
enticing the farmers to break the contract by selling significant amounts of potatoes 
on the open market. The Growers Association took much longer to build as an 
institution than BASIX estimated. As a result, the Growers Association, which was 
supposed to take care of all the logistics, was actually run by BASIX. Farmers came 
WRWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWORJLVWLFVZDV%$6,;¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\BASIX did not account 
for the cost of this and in addition the farmers blamed BASIX for all of the negative 
outcomes. Not surprisingly, an atmosphere of distrust developed between all three 
parties (Mishra, 2010).  
The second case study focused on connecting SHG members directly with retailers. 
PRADAN, a livelihood NGO working in the same states as BASIX, took a different 
approach. After years of experimentation, it created a value chain centred on home 
based SHG members farming chicken broilers. It is a scaled down version of the 
modern industrial broiler value chain. Unlike BASIX, PRADAN does not provide 
ILQDQFH EXW 6+* PHPEHUV JHW ILQDQFH IURP JRYHUQPHQW VFKHPHV 7KH IDUPHU¶V
margin is 60% higher because of the low to negligible labour costs. The cooperative 
aggregates the production of several small households into marketable lots. The 
 114 
 
FRRSHUDWLYH¶Vcosts include administration, veterinary and management support but 
this is offset by the increased margin of selling directly to the retailers without 
intermediaries. The cooperative provides their members with the food and medicine 
they need giving them an advantage over non-members using traditional methods 
(A. Kumar, 2010). 
There are several key learning points from these case studies. First, is that there is 
always a risk in connecting poor people to value chains especially ones belonging to 
giant multinationals. The BASIX case study seems to bear out the OECD argument 
that the poor have little power in consumer driven value chains such as the one for 
potato crisps. PepsiCo knew the farmers could do little to challenge their decision 
on what potatoes to accept. So the key learning point is the need to understand how 
the business actually runs so the poor can be protected from the vagaries of the 
business. On a positive note, the BASIX case study showed the importance of 
access to the latest information and techniques.  Building a network of potato 
farmers through the Growers Association shows the benefits of working collectively 
because none of the farmers could have individually negotiated a deal similar to the 
one BASIX got for the farmers. Another key learning point is that building 
cooperative organisations takes skills that an MFI may not have. Therefore, it is 
important that capacity building is done in this area to improve the needed skills. It 
is possible that BASIX could have learned from the experiments that PRADAN did 
since both organisations were working in similar states. The PRADAN case study 
shows the importance of experimentation. PRADAN did make many mistakes over 
the years but it learned lessons and applied them until it got a successful working 
model. The good corporate governance in its cooperatives is a direct result of the 
years of experimentation. PRADAN was able to help its SHG members to override 
the disadvantage they normally would have had in a consumer driven value chain 
like chicken broilers by directly selling to the retailers. If BASIX continues 
experimenting with value chains like PRADAN, BASIX will eventually get it right. 
The PRADAN case study again shows the importance of gaining access to inputs 
and information through the network PRADAN had setup.  
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4.10 Chapter Conclusion 
The important contribution that social network analysis makes is the structural view 
it provides. What determines what an individual does is not just his or her attributes 
but also the societal structure the individual finds him or herself embedded in. The 
network has emergent properties as it is more than the sum of its parts. The social 
network analysis concepts of homophily, where people connect to people similar to 
themselves, and the small world networks, which is a network of groups of closely 
connected people connected by a handful of ties describes the world of the jati 
discussed in the previous chapter. While connections can have six degrees of 
separation, influencH¶V VSUHDG WR RQO\ WKUHH GHJUHHV RI VHSDUDWLRQ LPSOLHV WKDW
influence involves more trust.  
 
The poor often find themselves on the margins and periphery of the social networks 
around them. For the poor, it is very important to have strong social networks to 
help with the emergencies the poor often suffer from but the poorer they are, the 
less likely they will have a strong social network surrounding them.  There is the 
problem for the poor of connecting to those more powerful than them in a network 
and not become dependent on the more powerful person. Social network analysis 
can measure the social networks of the poor and the technique of ego networks, 
which focuses on the individual, to understand and measure the networks of the 
microfinance clients who are at the centre of this research. As was said in a previous 
chapter, most microfinance clients start low entry barrier businesses in which the 
RQO\DVVHWWRILJKWRIIWKHFRPSHWLWLRQPD\EHWKHFOLHQW¶VVRFLDOQHWZRUN2QHEUDQG
of social network that can assist these microfinance clients are value chains of larger 
firms. Connecting to a value chain can bring the poor business owner access to key 
information and inputs. But, especially with consumer driven value chains, there is a 
strong risk that the poor find themselves at a power disadvantage. The case studies 
in this chapter show how collective action can help address the power disadvantage. 
The PRADAN case study shows how experimentation and careful thought about the 
design of the value chain, in this case the disintermediation of the middlemen, that 
even the poor can benefit from a consumer driven value chain. 
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The next chapter will set out the theoretical framework for this research. This 
chapter will look at the microfinance, social network analysis and social capital 
theories driving this research. Most importantly, it will identify the gap in 
microfinance theory that the structural view of social network analysis can fill.  
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5 Chapter Five ± Theoretical Framework 
5.1 Chapter Summary 
This chapter will set out the theoretical framework for this research on how to 
improve the businesses of and the poverty reduction for poor entrepreneurs who 
own low growth, low barrier to entry businesses. It will be broken into three main 
sections. In the first section, microfinance theory will be discussed. A detailed look 
at the joint liability theory will show that this theory does not provide convincing 
case of how microfinance groups work. Social capital theory will be explored next 
discussing what social capital is, how social capital works and how it impacts 
microfinance. This implies that financial intermediation is not sufficient and that 
social intermediation is required. However, most social intermediation literature 
focuses on it as a prerequisite to financial intermediation. Social capital is important 
because social networks can generate it. It is network theory that will be used to fill 
the gap in microfinance theory to help these poor entrepreneurs improve their 
businesses. Descriptions of how the strength of weak ties, structural holes, 
brokerage and network spillover will help these poor entrepreneurs improve their 
businesses. The chapter will conclude with two research questions to be answered.  
5.2 Microfinance Theories 
Much of the theoretical work in microfinance in the past has been focused on giving 
a theoretical explanation of the success of Grameen Bank and other early 
microfinance institutions. These explanations used the concept of joint liability. 
Joint liability group contracts make group members jointly lLDEOH IRU HDFKRWKHU¶V
loans. If a member does not repay, the other members must repay the loan (Ghatak, 
1999). If the loan is not repaid, there will be no new loans to any borrower until all 
loans are repaid (Diagne, 2000).  
Armendariz (1999) analysed the optimal design of collective credit agreements with 
joint responsibility. She demonstrated that these agreements can potentially induce 
SHHUPRQLWRULQJUHGXFHWKHLQFLGHQFHRIVWUDWHJLFGHIDXOWDQGHQKDQFHWKHOHQGHU¶V
ability to elicit debt repayments. The resulting benefits in terms of extended credit 
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should, however, be weighed against the higher monitoring effort that such 
agreements impose upon participant borrowers. She also showed that the relative 
benefits from peer monitoring are maximized when risks are positively correlated 
DFURVV ERUURZHUV DQG WKH VL]H RI WKH JURXS LV QHLWKHU WRR VPDOO GXH WR D µµMRLQW
UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶¶µµFRVWVKDULQJ¶¶DQGµµFRPPLWPHQW¶¶HIIHFWVQRUWRRODUJHGXHWRD
µµIUHHULGLQJ¶¶HIIHFW 
 
The joint responsibility effect is the same as joint liability. The cost sharing effect 
tends to increase the peer-monitoring effort: as the size of the group becomes larger, 
the cost of monitoring another borrower becomes smaller, given that such a cost is 
shared among an increasingly large number of peers. A free riding effect is where a 
larger group size discourages individual monitoring effort. Indeed, with a larger 
number of peer borrowers, there is an increased probability that at least one 
borrower will be fortunate, and will therefore be able to repay for a borrower who 
defaults strategically. Hence, the reduced incentive for individual borrowers to 
monitor their peers. 6KHIRXQGWKDWSHHUPRQLWRULQJLQVWLWXWLRQV¶UHVWULFWHGDWWHQWLRQ
on the standard mutual structure of monitoring (whereby each borrower in the group 
is being simultaneously monitored by all of her peers) may also be misleading, as 
other structures such as the rotating pyramid structure (where a different borrower 
µµDWWKHWRS¶¶RIWKHS\UDPLGPRQLWRUVKHUSHHUVµµDW WKHERWWRP¶¶RIWKHS\UDPLGDUH
potentially more efficient. 
 
Banerjee et al (1994) constructed a simple model of an optimal credit cooperative. 
Using the historical German experience, they examined some implications of the 
peer monitoring view of credit cooperatives. They find qualified support for this 
model in the 19th century German data. However, the most important extension 
needed to be added to the model is to introduce heterogeneity in the cooperative's 
membership. 
 
Ghatak (1999) analyses how group lending programs use joint liability to utilize 
ORFDO LQIRUPDWLRQ WKDW ERUURZHUV KDYH DERXW HDFK RWKHU¶V SURMHFWV WKURXJK VHOI-
selection of group members in the group formation stage. These schemes are shown 
to lead to positive assortative matching in group formation. Faced with the same 
 119 
 
contract, this makes the effective cost of borrowing lower to safer borrowers: 
because they have safer partners, conditional on success their expected dues to the 
lender are lower than that of riskier borrowers. The resulting improvement in the 
pool of borrowers is shown to increase repayment rates and welfare. However, 
Ghatak argues that the empirical work on joint liability mechanisms has lagged 
behind the theoretical work. This empirical work could tell us whether joint-
liability-EDVHGPHFKDQLVPVFDQZRUNRQO\LQYHU\FRKHVLYHµUXUDO¶HQYLURQPHQWVRU
ZKHWKHU WKH\ FDQ ZRUN LQ PRUH µXUEDQ¶ HQYLURQPHQWV ZKHUH HYHQ WKRXJK VRFLDO
enforcement mechanisms are weaker, people still might have a lot of information 
about their neighbours or co-workers. 
 
Stiglitz (1990) says that, first, the members of the peer group must be provided with 
incentives to monitor the actions of their peers. In the Grameen Bank, this is 
provided by the fact that members of the peer group are jointly liable for repayment 
of loans, and by the fact that they cannot gain access to credit until the debts of the 
group are discharged. The denial of access to further credit can be an effective 
incentive device. The Grameen Bank employed small groups. The small size 
increased the risk from a single member's default but increased the incentives for 
peer monitoring. The impact of a single member defaulting in a small group is much 
greater than a single member in a large group. It is the risk of this impact that 
incentivises the small group to engage in strong peer monitoring in order to mitigate 
this risk. With large groups there is a free rider problem ± each would prefer that 
others expend the energy required to monitor and incur the ill will that would result 
from reporting offenders who have misused the funds lent to them. Moreover, the 
costs to each as a result of a default by any member are sufficiently small that 
incentives to monitor ±even apart from the free rider problem ± would be minimal.  
 
There are strong incentives for groups with similar risk characteristics to form. 
Because the group acts as a cooperative, if some individual is more prone to default 
than others, he is being subsidized. When groups are identical, there is no subsidy. 
Of course, those with high risks of default would like to join groups with a low risk 
of default. The assortative grouping comes about as those with the lowest risk of 
default recognize their mutual interest in grouping together; then those with the 
 120 
 
lowest risk among the ones remaining group together; and the process continues 
until the individuals with the highest risk are forced to group together. Villagers 
have an informational advantage over formal credit institutions not only in 
monitoring but also in selection. Having groups which are self-formed may thus be 
an important ingredient in the success of the Grameen Bank. 
 
Diagne (2000) found that microfinance institutions targeted to poor people can 
operate successfully and achieve high loan recovery rates if they develop lending 
WHFKQRORJLHV WKDW GR QRW UHO\ RQ FROODWHUDO EXW LQVWHDG FXOWLYDWH ERUURZHUV¶
expectations for higher and continuous access to credit, and establish an effective 
screening and monitoring system using their field staff 
 
Karim (2010) uses mechanism design theory to examine the role of joint liability 
and cross-reporting mechanisms in the loan contract designed by microfinance 
institutions. Doing this simplified the joint liability mechanism proposed by Ghatak 
(1999, 2000) and the cross-reporting mechanism by Rai and Sjostrom (2004). 
Karim says that through the joint-liability mechanism, the microfinance lender can 
minimize or avoid the adverse selection problem in the credit market through peer 
selection and peer screening. Adverse selection refers to a situation in which the 
0),VODFNJRRGLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHULVNLQHVVRIWKHERUURZHUV¶EXVLQHVVSURMHFWV
Therefore, the MFIs are unable to discriminate against the risky borrowers 
(Batabyal and Beladi, 2008, footnote 5). In the meantime, the joint liability 
mechanism is better than individual lending in terms of increasing the social welfare 
among poor borrowers, charging lower interest rates and generating high repayment 
rates.  
 
In contrast, Rai and Sjostrom (2004) argue that joint liability alone is not enough to 
efficiently induce borrowers to help each other. The cross-reporting mechanism is 
also important for lenders in order to minimize the problem of asymmetric 
information in the credit market. Rai and Sjostrom identify asymmetric information 
is the cause of adverse selection. The seminal paper by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
show how asymmetric information can cause credit rationing. The cross-reporting 
mechanism is also efficient because it can influence the borrower to be truthful-
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telling about the state of the project and subsequently can minimize the deadweight 
loss (punishment) among the borrowers. In comparison, without cross-reporting, the 
lending mechanism is inefficient because the borrower will be imposed harsh 
punishment from the bank and the bank can undertake auditing or verify the state of 
the project and punish accordingly. However, the focus of the Rai and Sjostrom 
paper was more on how efficient Grameen Bank was at lending than explaining how 
joint liability worked.  
 
Ahlin and Townsend (2005) tested four models of joint liability using data from a 
survey of 262 joint liability groups of the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives in Thailand and 2880 households in the same villages. Two of the 
models highlight moral hazard problems which joint liability lending and 
monitoring can mitigate: Stiglitz (l990) and Banerjee et al (l994). One focuses on an 
environment of limited contract enforcement and the remedy of village sanctions: 
Besley and Coate (l995). The fourth shows how adverse selection of borrowers can 
be partially overcome by joint liability contracts: Ghatak (l999). The data suggest 
that repayment rates are affected negatively by the rate of joint liability, outside 
credit options, and social ties, and positively by the strength of local sanctions, 
group productivity, and correlated returns. They also found that the Besley and 
Coate model (1995) stressing unofficial sanctions is supported in the low-
infrastructure northeast region, while the Ghatak (1999) model of adverse selection 
does best in the central region, closer to Bangkok, where commercial bank presence 
is more salient. 
 
Conning (1996) looks at making joint liability groups work better by solving for the 
terms of an optimal joint liability contract as the solution to a multi-task, principal 
multi-agent problem with moral hazard and limited liability. Conning argues for the 
use of social collateral to replace missing physical collateral can be created through 
group loans but only under particular circumstances. He aUJXHVWKDW6WLJOLW]¶V
results are limited somewhat by the fact that he proceeds under the full side-contract 
assumption that monitoring within a group is achieved perfectly and without cost. 
Besley and Coate (1995) examine the related but different question of how joint 
liability contracts can be used to create incentives for group members to apply social 
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SHQDOWLHVRQHDFKRWKHUWRDOWHUHDFKPHPEHU¶Vwillingness to repay a loan after the 
project outcomes have been observed (ex-post moral hazard or costly state 
YHULILFDWLRQ&RQQLQJ¶V IRFXV RQ WKHRWKHUKDQG LV WR ILQGDQ LQFHQWLYH VWUXFWXUH
that deters hidden actions before outcomes are observed and which therefore affect 
WKHERUURZHU¶Vability to repay (ex-ante moral hazard).  
 
The ability of the group to create social collateral rests on a version of collateral 
diversification effect identified previously by Diamond (1984). The economic 
principle is this: the total collateral requirement on two less than perfectly correlated 
projects will in general be set lower than on two perfectly correlated projects (or on 
single project twice the scale) because funding two projects simultaneously the 
lender in a sense allowing the borrower to pledge the expected returns from one 
project for the missing collateral for the other project and vice-versa. A successful 
project outcome from one project can cover the losses from a potential failure on the 
other project so the lender has effectively increased the expected returns he can 
capture in the failure state on any given project without increasing the physical 
collateral requirement. 
 
In another paper, Conning (2000) analyzes the conditions under which joint liability 
loans to encourage peer-monitoring would be offered and chosen ahead of 
monitored individual liability alternatives on a competitive loan market when 
production and monitoring activities are subject to moral hazard. In contrast to other 
analyses, the case for joint liability loans does not rest on an assumed monitoring or 
information advantage by borrowers but instead relies on an incentive 
diversification effect that cannot be replicated by outside intermediaries. 
 
Another looking at joint liability through the lens of moral hazard is Guttman 
(2006) which a model of the strategic interaction of borrowers in the framework of 
group lending, in an environment characterized by moral hazard. Unlike previous 
papers, monitoring by one group member of his or her peers is not a crucial feature 
of the model. Even without monitoring, repayment performance under group 
lending can compare favourably to such performance under individual liability. 
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Guttman found that the repayment rate for the group was about the same as if each 
member took an individual loan and there was no joint liability.  
 
Van Eijkel et al (2007) investigated the strategic monitoring behaviour within a 
group lending setting. They developed a theoretical model, showing that monitoring 
efforts of group members differ from each other in equilibrium, as a result of the 
asymmetry between these members in terms of the future profits they generate with 
their project. In particular, they show that the entrepreneur with the project that 
generates the highest future profits also puts in the highest monitoring effort. 
Moreover, monitoring efforts differ between group members due to free-riding: one 
member reduces her level of monitoring if the other increases her monitoring effort. 
This effect is also at play when they introduce a group leader in the model. The 
individual who becomes the group leader will supply more monitoring effort than in 
the benchmark case, because of the reduced per unit monitoring costs related to 
becoming the leader. They empirically test the model using data from a survey of 
microfinance in Eritrea and show that the group leader attaches more weight to 
future periods than non-leaders in group lending and that this may explain why a 
large part of total monitoring is put in by the leader. 
 
However, a number of researchers have found problems with the joint liability 
concept. Rahman (1999), using an anthropological approach which compared public 
and hidden transcripts, found great pressure being applied to borrowers for timely 
repayment rather than raising collective responsibility and borrower empowerment. 
Copestake et al (2001) found that group lending approach might be a simple shift of 
costs (screening, monitoring and enforcement costs) from the microfinance 
institutions to the clients.  
 
Kono (2006) found that microfinance institutions employ various kinds of incentive 
schemes but estimating the effect of each scheme is not easy due to endogeneity 
bias. He conducted field experiments in Vietnam to capture the role of joint liability, 
monitoring, cross-reporting, social sanctions, communication and group formation 
LQERUURZHUV¶UHSD\PHQW behaviour. He found, in contrast to those above, that joint 
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liability contracts cause serious free-riding problems, inducing strategic default and 
lowering repayment rates. When group members observe HDFK RWKHU¶V investment 
returns, participants are more likely to choose strategic default. Even after 
introducing a cross-reporting system and/or penalties among borrowers, the default 
rates and the ratios of participants who chose strategic default under joint liability 
are still higher than those under individual lending. He also found that joint liability 
lending often failed to induce mutual insurance among borrowers. Those who had 
been helped or who had repaid a little in the previous round were more likely to 
default strategically and repay a little again in the current round and those who paid 
large amounts were always the same individuals. 
 
Besley and Coate (1995) found both positive and negative effects for joint liability 
lending. The positive effect results from the possibility that successful borrowers 
may repay the loans of partners who obtain sufficiently poor returns to make 
repayment profitable. On the other hand, the negative effect arises if the entire 
group defaults when at least some members would have repaid had they not been 
saddled with the ZHLJKWRIOLDELOLW\IRUWKHLUSDUWQHUV¶ORDQV 
 
Diagne (2000) found that joint liability as an explanation for high repayment rates 
does not hold up universally. Empirical findings also suggest that joint liability can 
have a negative impact on loan repayment. This calls for microfinance institutions 
such as the Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC) to reconsider their inflexible 
full group joint liability policy (no new loans to any borrower until all loans are 
repaid), an arrangement generally disliked by the majority of its borrowers. It is 
recommended that MRFC adopt a limited group joint liability policy in which 
defaulters are excluded from the groups and non-defaulters are issued new loans 
when they pay a reasonable monetary penalty not tied to the total amounts of the 
defaulted loans.  
 
This more flexible group joint liability policy has the potential to yield both lower 
delinquency rates while retaining most of the cost-saving advantages of lending 
through groups. Diagne says it is important to note that the proposed limited joint 
liability policy is different from a simple relaxation of the full joint liability in that it 
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does not penalize non-defaulters in defaulting groups. Such simple relaxation²
which usually takes the form of a policy of issuing new loans to non-defaulters in 
groups with repayment rates above some threshold value²has been experimented 
with in Malawi under the SACA program during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
with poor results (Diagne, 2000). 
 
For Hermes and Lensink (2007), while joint liability group lending stimulates 
screening, monitoring and enforcement of contracts among borrowers which 
reduces or erases the agency costs of the lender, there has been surprisingly little 
empirical evidence of whether and how microfinance actually helps to reduce 
existing information asymmetries.  
 
Of course, the biggest problem with the joint liability theoretical approach as an 
explanation why the group methodology was successful, as was stated in the 
microfinance chapter, is that the very MFIs in Bangladesh that inspired this 
theoretical work say they no longer enforce joint liability contracts. Some 
researchers have noticed this and reported it.  
 
Van Bastelaer (1999) points out in his literature review that the claims of the 
viability of the joint liability theoretical explanation have been challenged. Jain 
(1996) has also raised the question about the enforcement of joint liability, pointing 
RXWWKDWWKH*UDPHHQ%DQN¶VDFFODLPHGSROLF\RIUHSODFLQJSK\VLFDOFROODWHUDOZLWK
group guarantees is not necessarily enforced. In addition, Jain does not believe the 
group guarantee actually exists. ,QVWHDG KH H[SODLQV *UDPHHQ¶V JRRG ILQDQFLDO
performance in terms of a managerial culture that helps enhance morale in the 
administrative sector and the borURZHUV¶ PRWLYDWLRQ WR UHSD\ (Ito, 2003). ,WR¶V
(1999) own field study in the Patuakhali District in Bangladesh in 1995±1996 also 
UHYHDOHG WKDW WKH *UDPHHQ %DQN VWDII DV ZHOO DV WKH %DQN¶V ERUURZHUV JHQHUDOO\
shared the assumption that it is more natural for members of the kinship group, and 
QRWRIWKHVROLGDULW\JURXSWREHKHOGUHVSRQVLEOHIRUDERUURZHU¶VGHIDXOW  
 
ASA did away with joint liability as soon as it found it was ineffective, and 
developed more practical methods to ensure good collection rates on loans. ASA 
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had discovered that the idea behind joint liability was flawed. The ASA managing 
director was the first microcredit leader to go public with this truth. Rutherford 
(2009) suggests that as a relative newcomer to microcredit, ASA had less 
institutional prestige and it cost it less to admit that what it had taken to be one of 
the very foundations of the industry had fatal cracks. ASA set joint liability aside 
and figured out more practical ways of making sure it collected on its loans. It was 
very much helped by the fact that microcredit clients usually want to make their 
repayments. They value the service and look forward to further loans. As a result, 
ASA harnessed peer pressure (Rutherford, 2009, Chapter 7, pages 1 ± 8).  
 
Matin (1998) agrees with Rutherford that ASA no longer practices the principle of 
Grameen-style solidarity group arrangements. They still organise borrowers into 
JURXSV EXW QRQH RI WKHJURXS PHPEHUV LV KHOG UHVSRQVLEOH IRU DQRWKHU PHPEHU¶V
repayment problems. This reflects the belief that what ensures timely repayment is 
not necessarily the threat of social or financial sanctions associated with the 
solidarity group arrangements, but rather the incentive of continual access to credit.  
 
Some of the claims based on joint liability have not been borne out in experience on 
the ground. For example, Karim (2010) claimed that based on joint liability theory, 
joint liability groups are better than individual lending in term of high repayment 
rates, lower interest rates and an increase social welfare. However, this has not 
always been the case on the ground. Ito (2003) points to the work of SafeSave, 
which operates in the slums of Dhaka, who has completely done away with groups.  
SafeSave has deposit collectors visit individual clients door to door every day. Ito 
agrees with Matin, Rutherford and others that continual access to credit, rather than 
the threat of social and/or financial sanctions associated with groups, may be the 
strongest incentive for timely repayment. 
5.3 The Importance of Social Relationships in Microfinance 
A number of researchers have pointed to the importance of social relationships 
among group members and others to theorise why groups in microfinance are 
successful. Marr focuses on the group dynamics and argues that microfinance can 
cause damage to social relationships when these dynamics are ignored. Marr (2003) 
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argues that microfinance not only has failed to solve the original problems of 
information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, it is disrupting the social 
fabric of communities, creating more poverty, and excluding the poorest and most 
vulnerable from any given group. Marr (2002) argues that group dynamics has been 
neglected in studying the impacts of microfinance and it is important to 
understanding how being part of a group impacts a member in their households, 
enterprises and communities. Marr (2006) discusses how tensions between financial 
and organisational sustainability can cause instability within groups and 
recommends actions to minimise these tensions. Incentives to strengthen groups are 
also recommended since the attainment of financial sustainability and reducing 
poverty is dependent on the sustainability of the groups themselves.  
 
Johnson et al (2009) found that one of the key reasons for belonging to informal 
groups was to provide social contact and networks. EDA Rural Systems Pvt. Ltd. & 
APMAS (2006) found that the SHG mobilisation of a number of women through 
village or cluster networks, or federations, was a significant feature of effective 
community action. Baland et al (2008) argue that informal networks, social capital, 
trust and other similarly vague concepts can encourage exchange in the presence of 
weak legal systems. They use theory and survey data to give content to the notion of 
social capital in the context of credit groups and distinguish it from other group 
characteristics that influence their functioning. M.P. Associates Pvt. Ltd. (2005) 
reported in a case study that the institutional strength of the SHG they were studying 
was augmented by linkage of the group to various government and NGOs. The 
concept of social capital will be discussed in detail below. 
 
Kugler and Oppes (2005) argue that the extent that rural communities tight knit 
hierarchical structures of information about borrowers is accessible and the 
enforcement of sanctions via social networks makes collateral superfluous for 
default mitigation. As stated above, Ahlin and Townsend (2005) affirm that their 
data suggest that repayment rates are affected negatively by the rate of joint 
liability, outside credit options, and social ties, and positively by the strength of 
local sanctions, group productivity, and correlated returns. Ghatak (2002) reports 
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that Karlan (2001) finds that groups whose members belong to the same social 
network are significantly more likely to repay their loans. 
 
Besley and Coate (1995) have shown how group lending may allow a bank to 
KDUQHVV³VRFLDOFROODWHUDO´8QGHUJURXSOHQGLQJDERUURZHUZKRGHIDXOWVPD\LQFXU
the wrath of other group members. If the group is formed from communities with a 
high degree of social connectedness, then this may constitute a powerful incentive 
device and hence may serve to mitigate any negative effects from group lending. 
&RQQLQJDOVRUHIHUVWR³VRFLDOFROODWHUDO´XVLQJLWWRUHSODFHPLVVLQJSK\VLFDO
collateral. This can be created through group loans but only under particular 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV &RQQLQJ SURSRVHV WKDW ³VRFLDO FROODWHUDO´ LV FUHDWHG E\ WKH ORDQ
contract and the collateral diversification effect identified by Diamond (1984).   
 
The use of the term social collateral by Besley, Coate and Conning appears to be 
very similar to the concept of social capital referred to above. However, with 
Conning it seems to refer to mechanisms such as loan contracts and collateral 
diversification rather than social relationships.  
 
As was stated in the microfinance chapter, many microfinance clients start low 
growth, low entry barrier businesses that hard to grow and do not generate enough 
poverty reduction. It is clear more than financial intermediation is needed. It is also 
clear that joint liability in microfinance has seemingly reached a theoretical dead 
end. In addition to financial intermediation, social intermediation is needed. The 
previous paragraphs indicate the importance of social relationships including the 
concepts of social collateral or social capital.  So, what is social capital, how does it 
work and how does it impact microfinance? 
5.4 Social Capital Theories 
This section will address three questions on social capital: 
1. What is social capital? 
2. How does social capital work? 
3. How does social capital impact microfinance? 
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5.5 What Is Social Capital? 
There does not seem to be consensus on what social capital is. Dowla (2006) says 
that despite wide acceptance of its value in solving numerous problems, there is no 
consensus as to what is a generally acceptable definition of social capital. Burt 
(2005, pg. 5) says that,  
³&lear-thinking observers can be frustrated with the vagaries of social capital left as 
a metaphor. Social capital is the Wild West of academic work. There are no skill or 
intellectual barriers to entry. Contributions vary from rigorous research to 
devotional opinion, from carefully considered to bromide blather. Research and 
theory in economics, political science, and sociology are distributed across loosely 
related perspectives and specialties, each a group of connected experts purporting to 
have a productive view across groups. The variety is as interesting and exciting as it 
is corrosive to cumulative work.´ 
An example of this, Falk and Kilpatrick (2000) quote Putnam et al (1993) that trust 
is an important dimension of social capital. Trust is variously described as the 
critical component of any social cohesion. They also say Coleman (1990) provides a 
way of viewing trust as comprising the three components of a developing system of 
action: mutual trust, intermediaries in trust and third-party trust. They also say that 
social capital is defined as an accumulation of the knowledge and identity resources 
drawn on by communities-of-common-purpose.  
However, Dowla then chooses to use the definition of Putnam et al (³IHDWXUHV
of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions´ 2WKHUV XVH WUXVW LQ WKHLU
definition of social capital. Anderson et al (2002) focus on the role trust plays in 
social capital.  Becchetti et al (2009) say that social capital is a multifaceted concept 
which includes at least five dimensions: trust, trustworthiness, willingness to pay for 
public goods, civic sense and trust on institutions. Larance (2001) suggests that, by 
attending weekly Grameen Bank centre meetings, members now have the 
opportunity to gradually change their social situation by building the trust and 
networks that will form their social capital. 
Others form their definition of social capital around the concepts of networks and 
linkages. Anderson et al (2002) say that social capital can be conceived of as 
networks of horizontal and vertical linkages. Horizontal linkages are generally those 
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positive social networks that contribute to the overall productivity of a community, 
such as volunteer associations. They quote the World Bank (1988) that social capital 
LV ³WKH LQVWLWXWLRQV WKH UHODWLRnships, the attitudes and values that govern 
LQWHUDFWLRQV DPRQJ SHRSOH DQG FRQWULEXWH WR HFRQRPLF DQG VRFLDO GHYHORSPHQW´
Woolcock (1998) says that social capital encompasses the norms and networks 
facilitating collective action for mutual benefit.  For Huda and Simanowitz (2008), 
social capital is a measure of the quality of social networks and relationships which 
HQKDQFHSHRSOH¶VSURGXFWLYLW\DQGFDSDFLW\WRFROOHFWLYHO\UHVROYHSUREOHPV 
&RQWLQXLQJ ZLWK WKH IRFXV RQ VRFLDO FDSLWDO HQKDQFLQJ SHRSOH¶V DEility to solve 
problems, Huda et al (2005b) drawing from relevant social capital literature, have 
defined effective social capital as constituting both access by the poor to individuals 
with the ability to catalyse change, as well as solidarity among the poor in order to 
mobilise and voice demands as a collective unit. Thus, while relationships of 
solidarity (horizontal relationships) among individuals of similar socio-economic 
standing is an important form of social capital, its effectiveness is limited by the 
ways such horizontal solidarity can be harnessed to then make demands of 
relationships with local elites (vertical relationships). Karlan (2005) also says that 
individual-level social capital can be defined as the social skills and networks that 
enable an individual to overcome imperfect information problems and form 
contracts with others. Trust and trustworthiness are two critical traits encompassed 
by individual social capital.   
According to Portes and Mooney (2002), social capital became defined as a source 
of social control, a source of family mediated benefits and a source of resources 
mediated by non-family networks. The last usage of social capital, exemplified by 
the personal connections that facilitate access to jobs, market tips or loans comes 
FORVHVWWR%RXUGLHX¶V9) original definition of the concept. They also state that 
the definition of social capital as the ability to secure resources by virtue of 
membership in social networks or larger social structures is the most widely 
accepted definition of the term in sociology at present. This definition is not without 
problems. First, there is a common tendency to confuse the ability to secure 
resources through networks with the resources themselves. Second, the literature on 
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this topic tends to emphasise the positive consequences of social ties to the 
exclusion of their less desirable consequences. 
5.6 How Does Social Capital Work? 
Falk and Kilpatrick (2000) say that social capital cannot be built unless 
opportunities for this to occur exist, or are provided and that if social capital 
originates in micro interactions which are in turn embedded in a macro social order, 
then these processes and connections should be observable. 
 
Anderson et al (2002) state it takes effort and energy to create social capital.  So 
how is it created and how does it work? Anderson et al show that group meetings 
and group lending techniques in microfinance produce social capital. Feigenberg et 
al (2010) argue that since economic theory suggests that repeated interactions 
among individuals can help build and maintain social capital encouraging 
interaction could be an effective tool for development policy. Social capital does not 
just exist innately in developing countries, but can be created through repetitive and 
cooperative group effort (Cassar and Wydick, 2009). Portes and Mooney (2002) 
claim there are two sources of instrumental social capital, simple reciprocity and 
enforceable trust. Coleman (1990) reminds us that social capital can produce 
negative as well as positive associations, depending on its function; a given form of 
social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even 
harmful for others. 
 
Cassar and Wydick (2009) suggest that, particularly in communities that are 
relatively homogeneous and close-knit, social capital may facilitate a general sense 
of trust and goodwill surrounding economic exchange. Social capital may also 
facilitate the flow of information, serving a screening function that curtails adverse 
selection. Further, it may help hold people more accountable for their actions, 
mitigating moral hazard as economic decisions are placed within the context of 
long-term relationships. Karlan et al (2008) propose a model where the social 
network influences how much agents trust each other. Cassar and Wydick say that 
sociologists such as Granovetter (1985), Coleman (1988) and Putnam (2000) have 
long argued that social networks play an important role in building trust. 
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But how does the social network influence trust, one of the key components of 
social capital? The literature suggests through social structure and context. Tonkiss 
(2000) suggests that social networks cannot simply create physical or financial 
capital where this does not already exist. Strong social ties become useless under 
GRPLQDWLRQRI µPDLQVWUHDP¶HFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOQHWworks. Brata (2004) says that 
µQHWZRUN SRYHUW\¶ LQ WKLV VHQVH UHIHUV QRW WR WKH DEVHQFH RU ZHDNQHVV RI VRFLDO
network, but to the difficulty of accessing opportunities or resources through these 
networks. He also suggests that the implementation of formal credit program in 
rural areas should consider not only the existing social capital but also the social 
structure of the rural society. 
5.7 How Does Social Capital Impact Microfinance?  
Cassar et al (2005) say that economists have developed numerous theories that seek 
to explain the high repayment rates frequently associated with group lending in 
developing countries. These theories can be roughly divided into three categories: 1) 
those that view the relational aspects of social capital as key to the performance of 
group lending; 2) those that view the informational aspects of social capital as key 
to the performance of group lending; and 3) those that view the merits of group 
lending (relative to individual lending) solely through its innate properties as a joint-
liability contract, where social capital plays little or no role. 
 
Both Anderson et al (2002) and Dowla (2006) mention that social capital generation 
is not the primary activity of microfinance but a by-product.  
 
The common impact of social capital on microfinance cited in the literature is the 
high repayment rates on loans despite no collateral. Examples of this are Narayan 
and Prittchett (1997), Cassar and Wydick (2009), Karlan (2001), Feigenberg et al 
(2010) and Hasegawa (2009). However, there have been those who have questioned 
this. Dowla (2006) shows that long-term borrowers of Grameen have lower 
repayment rates and cite this as an example of negative social capital. Ito (2003) 
argues that inasmuch as all microfinance programmes that are implemented by 
external agents inevitably involve some form of vertical structure, the social capital 
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that is thought to reside in this structure is bound to have some impact, either 
positive or negative, depending on the nature of the relations embedded within it. 
Seen in this light, social capital is neither positive nor negative in itself and may or 
PD\ QRW RSHUDWH WR VWUHQJWKHQ ERUURZHUV¶ FUHGLW GLVFLSOLQH &DVVDU HW DO 
argues that the traditional idea is that group lending is able to yield high repayment 
rates in part through its ability to leverage local information in forming self-selected 
groups of more-or-less socially homogenous borrowers. In the context of other 
research they believe that these factors merely enhance repayment rates, but may be 
insufficient in and of themselves to generate high repayment rates. 
 
Yunus (1994) says that social capital allows well-functioning joint liability groups 
and Bowles and Gintis (2000) state that social capital allows well-functioning 
community groups. Anderson et al (2002), Van Bastelaer (1999) and Brata (2004) 
all show how group meetings create social capital. Ostrom (1994) shows how social 
capital lowers the cost for MFIs. Cassar et al (2005), Cassar and Wydick (2009), 
Dowla (2006) and Karlan (2001) show that trust has a positive effect on group 
performance. On the other hand Cassar et al (2005) and Cassar and Wydick (2009) 
found only mild evidence that homogeneity improved group performance. Dowla 
(2006) indicates that Grameen created social capital by creating trust among the 
commercial banks, the Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, Islamic clerics and poor 
women. Dowla (2006), Larance (2001), Todd (1996) and Huda et al (2005b) show 
how microfinance can cUHDWH VRFLDO FDSLWDO E\ H[SDQGLQJ WKHLU FOLHQW¶V QHWZRUNV
vertically and horizontally.   
 
In the case of Tanzania, Narayan and Prittchett (1997) found that a larger fraction of 
households in villages with higher social capital report using credit for agricultural 
improvements. In the case of Indonesia, Grootaert (1999) concludes that households 
with higher social capital are better able to obtain credit. However, Cassar et al 
(2005) warns that social capital and its various components are notoriously hard to 
measure. 
There are those who doubt the benefit of social capital in microfinance. Tonkiss 
(2000) argues that social capital does not guarantee poor people to access formal 
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credit. Forms of social capital are not simply or necessarily conductive to economic 
development, in two respects. The first has to do with inequality, the second with 
questions of capacity. According to Tonkiss, where resources of social capital are 
unevenly distributed, social networks can be a basis for corruption, cronyism, or 
other forms of rent seeking behaviour. 
As Grootaert(1999) has mentioned, the role of specific village leader or other 
influential individual in the internal dynamic of community is acknowledged. In this 
situation, one may expect that social capital does not automatically increase the 
access to economic opportunities and resources such as formal credit. 
Cassar and Wydick (2009) state that the ability of people to monitor one other in 
group lending environments, and possibly in other situations such as work in teams, 
can yield negative as well as positive effects on individual behaviour. When 
information is imperfect, non-contributions of capital (or effort) are not as 
contagious within a group because other may attribute them to unavoidable shocks. 
However, with perfect information, such behaviour may trigger either retaliation or 
optimal defections by other agents, quickly unravelling group trust and 
performance. 
Directionality is very important when looking at social capital. For Huda and 
Simanowitz (2008), constituting effective social capital generally means combining 
two basic forms of relationships. First are horizontal relationships between members 
and peers. Second are vertical relationships with elites and those of a higher socio-
economic status. Coleman (1988) also recognises both vertical and horizontal social 
structures as constituting social capital. Ito (2003) locates social capital in the 
vertical social relationship between lenders and borrowers. Ito concludes that the 
presence of vertical social capital, negative or positive, has little to do with the 
group-based design of these microfinance programmes and that almost all financial 
transactions, successful or otherwise, involve some elements of vertical social 
capital. How poor microentrepreneurs, who tend to be marginalised, can use the few 
vertical links they have to access the relevant information and the networks of those 
above them in order to benefit their businesses will be explored later.   
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Nelson (2004) states that networking is at the core of social capital ± one of its 
principal sources or tools ± EHFDXVHQHWZRUNLQJRIDOOW\SHV³JURZV´VRFLDOFDSLWDO. 
For Nelson, social capital is important for entrepreneurs because it is the intangible 
asset that helps entrepreneurs to close the gaps in knowledge and experience, to find 
potential partners and pursue new ideas. At the very least, social capital saves time 
by facilitating access to information but it also can lead to innovation and growth. 
This especially important for microentrepreneurs who are often tentative and 
isolated and have less social capital than business people with mature businesses 
particularly relationships that will help them build a business. 
In summary, while there is no definitive definition of social, the consensus seems to 
view social capital as a resource created via social relationships. These social 
relationships may be used to apply social pressure mentioned in the microfinance 
WKHRU\VHFWLRQRIWKHFKDSWHUDVDQH[SODQDWLRQIRUWKHKLJKUHSD\PHQWUDWHV%XUW¶V
(2005) argument on closure, discussed later in this chapter, builds on this by 
showing how social capital can bring a group together and limit innovation. 
Networks were mentioned several times as way to gain and transmit social capital, 
access individuals who are catalysts for change and a way to secure resources 
needed for change. Nelson says that networking is critical for the 
microentreprenuers often created using microfinance. The example of the trash 
collector from Banerjee and Duflo (2011) in the microfinance chapter illustrates 
these points. But, in order to help clients gain social capital in connection with 
networks, MFIs will need to do more than financial intermediation. They will also 
need to do social intermediation. 
5.8 Social Intermediation in Microfinance 
Until recently, however, social intermediation was seen in microfinance as primarily 
a way to prepare clients for financial intermediation. For some, the most important 
element of social intermediation is that it helps to build social capital. Edgcomb and 
Barton (1998) define social intermediation as the process through which 
investments are made in the development of both human resources and institutional 
capital, with the aim of increasing the self-reliance of marginalized groups and 
preparing them to engage in formal financial intermediation. They also say that 
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social intermediation involves the building of social capital in the form of groups 
WKDWFDQJHQHUDWHDQ³LQIRUPDWLRQDVVHW´IRUWKHLUPHPEHUV7KH\VHHDVWKHFDSDFLW\
building component of financial intermediation. Ngehnevu and Nembo (2010) also 
agree that social intermediation is the process of building social capital needed to 
create sustainable financial intermediation for the poor. For Ledgerwood (1999, pg. 
76 ± 77) social intermediation prepares clients to enter solid business relationships 
with MFIs and can also be understood as the process of building the human and 
social capital needed for sustainable financial intermediation with the poor. 
According to Singh (2003) micro-finance is an intervention based on social 
intermediation in which poor people can mobilize their savings, link it with credit 
and finally become self-employed. It results in building social capital. 
 
For Szabo (1999), microfinance can contribute to social capital through social 
intermediation. Interaction within MFI groups can create cooperation and trust that 
also contribute benefits beyond loan access itself. Such benefit may include a 
greater sense of community, trust and reliance on the group in time of crisis, sharing 
of valuable social and market information, more positive social practices, etc. The 
networks and norms created by groups are thereby said to be a positive form of 
social capital, which in turn, can lay building blocks for other social capital 
development in a community. These forms of social capital, moreover, are 
accessible to those generally excluded from or disadvantaged by existing norms and 
relationships.  
 
Hans (2009) argues that MFIs by releasing the true potential of its members through 
social intermediation can ensure building an inclusive society. Hans calls for a 
symbiotic relationship between financial intermediation and social intermediation, 
to remove the economic and socio-cultural barriers to empowerment, inclusion and 
development. Inclusive growth requires not only physical, natural and human 
capital, but also social capital. He also states that through social intermediation 
MFIs can ensure a certain minimum of social capital in the first phase of economic 
growth, and enhance its quantity and quality subsequently and sequentially. He says 
that social intermediation is unlikely to be financially sustainable. 
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Hulme and Mosley (1996) say social intermediation is the process which combines 
the functions of social organisation and financial linkage carried out through an 
NGO, or local government organisation, though self-help groups or through 
individuals, as locally appropriate. Ledgerwood (1999,  pages 76 ± 77) says that in 
addition to financial intermediation, some MFIs provide social intermediation 
services such as the formation of groups, development of self-confidence and the 
training of members in that group on financial literacy and management which 
prepares clients to enter solid business relationships with MFIs. Jain (1996) argues 
that iWLVVRFLDOLQWHUPHGLDWLRQ¶VFUHDWLRQRIDVRFLDOPHFKDQLVPWKDWLQVWLOVDFUHGLW
repayment culture that ensures high repayment rather than the much-discussed 
contractual element of joint liability. 
 
Edgcomb and Barton (1998) says that there are two strategies, which they call 
³OLQNLQJ´ DQG ³SDUDOOHO´ WKDW D PLFURILQDQFH LQVWLWXWLRQ FDQ IROORZ LQ VRFLDO
intermediation. A linking strategy may involve one institution providing the social 
intermediation services, linking the organized poor to a mainstream bank or other 
formal financial institution providing the financial intermediation services. 
³3DUDOOHO´V\VWHPVDUHVR-called because they create alternative financial systems to 
the formal ones. Parallel models are often group-based. 
 
Others focus on the benefits that social intermediation can bring to MFIs and 
clients. Cohen et al (2000) state that social intermediation also may contribute to an 
increase in social assets, such as networks, group memberships, relationships of 
trust, and access to wider institutions of society. Sa-Dahn (2002), the Indian 
microfinance network, says that the most significant reasons SHG/federations 
delinquencies were low was because of peer pressure and good social 
intermediation. Legerwood (1999) describes some microfinance institutions provide 
services such as skills training, marketing, bookkeeping, and production to develop 
enterprises. Social services such as health care, education and literacy training are 
also provided by some MFIs and both enterprise development and social services 
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can improve the ability of the low-income earners to operate enterprises either 
directly or indirectly. 
 
Zohir and Matin (2002) recognise that the wider impact outcomes of social 
intermediation by a MFI may thus involve much more than preparing the poor for 
formal financial intermediation. Zohir and Matin say that the impacts of social 
intermediation to result in social mobilization however would require the leveraging 
power of groups and is predicated on the idea that through their groups and its 
linkages with higher bodies, members have a greater ability to enact change due to 
their co-operation and strength in numbers. They argue that the sustainability of 
social intermediation impacts at the levels of culture, creating information networks 
or spurring social mobilization is another important issue that needs addressing 
under the theme of wider impacts pertaining to the social intermediation role played 
by microfinance.  
 
Outside of the recognition by Zohir and Matin on the importance of creating 
information networks, most of the discussion on social intermediation focused on 
using it as preparation for financial intermediation or the benefits it can bring by 
building social capital. If the Banerjee and Duflo (2011) example of the trash 
collector shows the importance of access to relevant information and networks, then 
social intermediation should be helping microfinance clients to do these things. 
However, microfinance theory has a gap on how clients can access information 
relevant to their businesses, use existing networks and build networks that will 
improve their businesses and help reduce their poverty. In order to fill this gap, this 
research will turn to the theories of social network analysis to make its original 
contribution.   
5.9 Social Network Theories 
,W LV *UDQRYHWWHU¶V (1973) theory of the strength of weak ties is the theoretical 
contribution to microfinance that points the way to how poor microentrepreneurs 
can access the relevant information they need to improve their businesses and 
reduce their poverty. However, the problem is, as Granovetter recognises, that poor 
people tend to rely on strong ties. This means that microfinance institutions will 
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need to socially intermediate to assist their clients in establishing weak ties. In 
addition, %XUW¶V(1992) theories on structural holes, brokerage and closure will also 
be explored. The poor in India get closure from their families, jatis and possibly 
their SHGs but because of the hierarchy and power distance problem makes it 
difficult for the poor to establish a position of broker. In fact, Krackhardt (1999) 
argues WKDWWKLVEURNHU¶VSRVLWLRQFRXOGEHWies that torture for the broker if there is a 
misalignment of interests among the alters in the ego network. For the poor in the 
Indian context, especially with large power distance index, these could also be ties 
for torture for the poor in a similar position of broker. +RZHYHU %XUW¶V QHWZRUN
spillover effect working when a network insider presents an outsider as another 
insider points to another way MFIs can socially intermediate for their clients.  
 
5.10 The Strength of Weak Ties 
 
*UDQRYHWWHU¶VPDLQIRFXVRQWKHUROHRIVRFLDOQHWZRUNVLVRQWKHUROHRIZHDNWLHV
In a seminal paper, Granovetter (1973) identified the strength of weak ties in a 
network. The key strength of weak ties is that weak bridging ties are transmission 
routes for non-redundant information. The important point is only weak ties that are 
bridges, connections that carry information, add strength to a network. Before 
Granovetter, the work of Wirth (1938) saw weak ties as a source of alienation 
(Granovetter, 1983). Granovetter (1983) points to research done by Coser (1975) 
that suggests that bridging weak ties, since they do link different groups, are far 
more likely than other weak ties to connect individuals who are significantly 
different from one another 
Granovetter (1973) conducted a thought experiment to show why strong ties do not 
serve as transmission routes for non-redundant information. If there is a triad of 
people called A, B and C, if A has strong ties to both B and C, then it is very likely 
B and C has a strong tie between them. This is because the stronger the tie between 
A and B or A and C, the more similar A and B or A and C will be. The logic then 
leads to B and C being similar and they having a strong tie between them. 
*UDQRYHWWHUVD\VWKDWWKLVLVFRQILUPHGE\+HLGHU¶VWKHVLVRIFRJQLWLYH
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balance where non-similarity among people with strong ties would introduce stress 
into the relationships. This is also shown by the transitivity of interpersonal choices 
where if P chooses O and O chooses X then P chooses X. This is most likely where 
the ties between P and O are strong and O and X are strong. The more similar 
people are, the more probable it is that these people have the same or redundant 
information. Therefore, except in unlikely conditions, strong ties are not bridges. It 
is for this reason that Granovetter (1973) says that the removal of an average weak 
tie will do more damage to transmission probabilities than the removal of an 
average strong tie. 
Granovetter (1973) found empirical evidence for the strength of weak ties from a 
random sample of technical, professional and managerial job changers who found 
jobs through contacts. By using the number of times the job seeker saw the contact 
recently as a measure of the strength of the tie, Granovetter (1973) found that most 
of the job seekers found jobs through their weak ties. The reason for this is that 
those to whom we are weakly tied are more likely in circles different from our own 
and will thus have access to information different from that which we receive.    
*UDQRYHWWHU  DUJXHV WKDW ZHDN WLHV KDYH D VSHFLDO UROH LQ D SHUVRQ¶V
opportunity for mobility that there is a structural tendency for those to whom one is 
only weakly tied to have better access to job information one does not already have. 
Acquaintances, as compared to close friends, are more prone to move in different 
circles than oneself. Those to whom one is closest are likely to have the greatest 
overlap in contact with those one already knows, so that the information to which 
they are privy is likely to be much the same as that which one already has. 
 
Interestingly, Granovetter (1983) points to research done by others which shows 
that poor people rely more on strong ties than others do. Ericksen and Yancey 
(1980, pg. 24) found that less-well-educated respondents were those most likely to 
use strong ties for jobs. They also found that in a study of Philadelphia in the USA, 
that the: 
 
 "structure of modern society is such that some people typically find it advantageous 
to maintain strong networks and we have shown that these people are more likely to 
be young, less well educated, and black" (Ericksen and Yancey, 1977 pg. 23).  
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Two ethnographic studies demonstrate the same point: Stack (1974) studied a black, 
urban American, Midwestern ghetto, Lomnitz (1977) a shantytown on the fringes of 
Mexico City. Both found the poor relying on networks of strong ties with a focus on 
reciprocal relationships.  Granovetter (1983) concludes that this pervasive use of 
strong ties by the poor and insecure is a response to economic pressures; they 
believe themselves to be without alternatives, and the adaptive nature of these 
reciprocity networks is the main theme of the analysts. He also suggests that the 
heavy concentration of social energy in strong ties has the impact of fragmenting 
communities of the poor into encapsulated networks with poor connections between 
these units; individuals so encapsulated may then lose some of the advantages 
associated with the outreach of weak ties. This may be one more reason why 
poverty is self-perpetuating. 
 
Granovetter (1973) argues that when a man moves jobs, he is not only moving from 
one network of ties to another, he is also establishing a link between the two 
networks. This and the previous idea of strong ties fragmenting the communities of 
WKHSRRUOHDGWR%XUW¶VLGHDVRIVWUXFWXUDOKROHVDQGEURNHUDJH 
5.11 Network Brokerage and Closure 
 
Network structure can also impact the creation of social capital. Burt (2000b) says 
that there are two network structures that have been argued to create social capital. 
The closure argument is that social capital is created by a network of strongly 
interconnected elements. The structural hole argument is that social capital is 
created by a network in which people can broker connections between otherwise 
disconnected segments. Burt draws from a comprehensive review elsewhere (Burt, 
2000a) to support two points: there is replicated empirical evidence on the social 
capital of structural holes and the contradiction between network closure and 
structural holes network can be resolved in a more general network model of social 
capital. Brokerage across structural holes is the source of value added, but closure 
can be critical to realising the value buried in bridging structural holes. Burt also 
argues that network closure creates advantage by lowering the risk of cooperation. 
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Network closure also facilitates sanctions that make it easier for people in the 
network to trust one another. Brokerage across structural holes creates advantage by 
increasing the value of cooperation.  
 
Burt (2005) goes into greater detail on how network brokerage, network closure and 
social capital are related.  Burt explains that social capital is the contextual 
complement to human capital in explaining advantage. Social capital explains how 
people do better because they are somehow better connected with other people. 
7KHUHIRUHRQH¶VSRVLWLRQLQ WKHVWUXFWXUHRIWKHVHH[FKDQJes can be an asset in its 
own right (Burt 2005, pg. 4).  
 
Four facts describe the mechanism and returns to network brokerage, which is about 
the value of increasing variation in a group. Informal relations form a small world of 
dense clusters separated by structural holes. The first fact is that brokers do better. 
The second fact is that improved vision is the mechanism responsible for returns to 
brokerage. Information is more homogeneous within groups such that people who 
bridge the holes between groups have the benefit of having creative ideas and more 
likely to see a way to implement ideas. The next two facts describe the mechanism 
and returns to network closure, which is about the value of decreasing variation in a 
group. Third, closure increases the odds of a person being caught and punished for 
displaying belief or behaviour inconsistent with preferences in the closed network. 
In so doing, closure reinforces the status quo. Fourth, closure protects against decay 
in new relations between friends of friends, and amplifies strong relations to 
extremes of trust and distrust. Facilitating the trust and collaborative alignment 
needed to deliver the value of brokerage, closure is a complement to brokerage such 
that the two together define social capital in a general way in terms of closure within 
a group and brokerage beyond the group (Burt, 2005, pg. 7). 
 
Informal organization consists of dense social clusters, or groups, between which 
there are occasional bridge relations when someone in one group has a friend, 
acquaintance, or former colleague in another group. Opinion and practice vary more 
between than within groups due to structural holes in the flow of information across 
groups. A person whose network spans structural holes has contacts in multiple 
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groups, and that contact across holes can be an advantage in terms of breadth of 
knowledge, early knowledge, and opportunities for strategically coordinating across 
groups. A hole-spanning network that provides these advantages is social capital. 
The social-capital advantage of brokerage is manifest in recognition and resources 
(Burt, 2005, pg. 55). 
 
Brokerage impacts creativity and learning. Ways of thinking and behaving are more 
homogeneous within than between groups, so people connected to otherwise 
segregated groups are more likely to be familiar with alternative ways of thinking 
and behaving, which gives them the option of selecting and synthesizing 
alternatives. Vision is the active ingredient in brokerage. It exposes the individual to 
variation; variation in his/her own work, and variation in related kinds of work 
(Burt, 2005, pg. 90). 
 
Burt associates brokerage with good ideas and offers four pieces of evidence to 
support this association. First, there is anecdotal and aggregate evidence of the 
association. Second, the association is apparent at the level of individuals in an 
example supply-chain organization he cites. Managers whose networks more often 
spanned structural holes were more likely to express their ideas, less likely to have 
their ideas dismissed by senior management, and more likely to have their ideas 
evaluated as valuable. Third, bridge relations are the channels through which 
discussion changes opinions and behaviour. Ideas are more contagious across bridge 
relations than they are through relations inside a group (peer pressure within the 
group makes ideas contagious whether or not peers talk directly to one another). 
Fourth, brokerage can facilitate adaptive implementation. Established ideas have 
constituency and budget. New ideas typically have neither. Network brokers help to 
implement new ideas by mobilizing support from people who will benefit from the 
idea despite those people having allocated their budget to other tasks (Burt, 2005, 
pg. 91). 
 
Burt says that trust is the Achilles heel to the brokerage argument. You trust 
someone when you commit to a relationship before you know how the other person 
will behave. The more unspecified, take-for-granted, the terms of a relationship, the 
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more trust is involved. The social capital of structural holes depends on trust in as 
much as the value created by brokers involves new, and so incompletely 
understood, combinations of previously disconnected ideas. The trust issue is moot 
if brokers confine themselves to trusted contacts, but that would limit brokerage to 
long-standing networks, which would leave the bulk of brokerage value untapped 
(Burt, 2005, pg. 162). 
 
Closure is manifest as a dense network (in which the two people are surrounded by 
interconnected third parties) or a hierarchical network (in which the two people 
share a strong connection with the same central figures). The more closed the 
network, the more likely that misbehaviour will be detected and punished. Not 
wishing to lose reputation accumulated in a long-term relationship, or built up 
within a group of colleagues, people cooperate with other people in the network. 
Their reputation incentive to cooperate lowers the risk otherwise associated with 
trust, and so increases the probability of trust. Trust is more likely in a strong than a 
weak relationship, especially if the strong relationship is embedded in a closed 
network (Burt, 2005, pg. 162 ± 163). 
 
Closure is at once contradictory to, and interdependent with, brokerage. The social 
capital of structural holes depends on trust, but trust is a feature of closed networks, 
precisely the condition that brokers rise above. There are three elements to the 
brokerage ± FORVXUHWHQVLRQ)LUVW LQFORVXUH¶VUHSXWDWLRQPHFKDQLVPWKLUGSDUWLHV
create social capital by improving information flow, making it possible to detect and 
punish bad behaviour, thereby facilitating trust. In brokerage, social capital is 
created by bridge relations that coordinate across groups with complementary 
resources, knowledge, or practice. Network bridges are defined by the lack of third 
parties. Second, brokerage creates value by exposing people to variation in 
LQIRUPDWLRQ &ORVXUH¶V YDOXH FRPHV IURP GULYLQJ YDULDWLRQ RXW RI WKH FORVHG
network. In the brokerage argument, information is valuable when it is non-
redundant. That is what constitutes access to variation. In the closure argument, 
information is valuable when it is redundant. Third, in brokerage, the object of 
DFWLRQ LV WKHSHUVRQ LPSURYLQJ WKHSHUVRQ¶VYLVLRQDQGKHOSLQJ WKHSHUVRQHVFDSH
the demands of other people. Brokerage forces the person to see alternatives by 
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exposing the person to the diversity of opinion and practice across groups. The 
conflicting demands of multiple groups free the person from excessive demands in 
any one group. Closure, on the other hand, is about forcing other people to behave 
LQ SUHVFULEHG ZD\V &ORVXUH¶V FRQWURO SRWHQWLDO LV WKH UHDVRQ IRU FORVXUH¶V XVH LQ
contemporary organizations as a replacement for, or complement to, traditional 
vertical chains of command in a bureaucracy. Network closure forces people to 
collaborate by linking reputation to alignment with others in the network (Burt, 
2005, pg. 163). 
 
&ORVXUH¶VWHQGHQF\WRGHWHFWDQGSXQLVKPLVEHKDYLRXULGHQWLILHVWKHPHFKDQLVPWKDW
generates the peer pressure that several commentators believe is responsible for the 
high repayment rates within microfinance groups (Arora, 2008; Manan, 2009; 
Rahman, 1999; Rutherford, 2009, Chapter 7, pages 1 ± 8; Sa-Dhan, 2002; Yunus, 
 SDJH  &ORVXUH¶V WHQGHQF\ WR YDOXH UHGXQGDQW LQIRUPDWLRn and forcing 
people to behave in prescribed ways limits innovation and as a result would limit a 
SRRUSHUVRQ¶VSRWHQWLDOWRHVFDSHIURPSRYHUW\ 
 
Burt proposes three options to deal with the brokerage-closure tension. The first 
option is to reject the mechanism less supported by empirical evidence. Burt argues 
this would mean choosing brokerage over closure as social capital. However, where 
a set of people are cross-cut by numerous differences, any of which could function 
as a structural hole, closure could give them an advantage in coordinating despite 
their differences, whereupon closure would be the proximate cause of advantage ± 
HYHQ WKRXJK WKH VXEVWDQFH RI WKH DGYDQWDJH LV FORVXUH¶V EULGJH DFURVV WKH SUH-
existing structural holes. In terms of proximate cause, closure can be the more 
accurate definition of social capital, so it would be inaccurate to reject closure in 
favour of brokerage.  
 
A second option is to hide from the brokerage-closure tension by segregating the 
mechanisms, saying that they are equally valid but different. For example, one could 
say that closure defines when it is safe to trust, while brokerage defines when it is 
valuable to trust. Safety and popularity notwithstanding, the segregation option is in 
its own way inaccurate in light of evidence supporting the third option. A third 
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option is to integrate the mechanisms in a broader model, which is the option, 
proposed in the concept of structural autonomy. Brokerage is about coordinating 
people between whom it would be valuable, but risky, to trust. Closure is about 
making it safe to trust. The key to creating value is to put the two together. Bridging 
a structural hole can create value, but delivering the value requires the closed 
network of a cohesive team around the bridge (Burt, 2005, pg. 164). 
 
Burt (2005, pg. 244) argues that the equilibrium image that emerges is one of local 
balance, between closure pulling groups in on themselves, and brokerage pulling 
them apart into new combinations. Closure is the more obvious force. People 
advantaged by barriers between insiders and outsiders have no incentive to bring in 
outsiders. People too long in their closed network have difficulty coordinating with 
people different than themselves. Echo within closed segments of the structure 
reinforces boundaries between us and them, deepening the structural holes that 
segregate groups. The echo hypothesis ± based on the social psychology of selective 
disclosure in informal conversations ± says that closed networks do not enhance 
information flow so much as they amplify existing opinion (Burt, 2005, pg. 214) 
Burt says that brokerage is the source of endogenous change. 
 
+RZHYHU WKHUH LV RQH ZHDNQHVV LQ %XUW¶V DUJXPHQW %XUW Dssumes a person can 
select the type of network, flat or hierarchical, they are involved with. This may be 
true in the context of American multinationals and banks among which Burt did his 
research but this is not true of poor entrepreneurs in India (Burt, 1992, pg. 157 ± 
163). The poor entrepreneurs of India will need assistance in bridging the structural 
holes in their networks and escape the clutches of network closure.  
 
Portes and Mooney (2002) cite the negative aspects of closure noting that under 
certain conditions, community closure may prevent the success of business 
initiatives by enforcing excessive claims on entrepreneurs. They also note that Burt 
has yet to describe how one finds the connection that will bridge the structural hole. 
 
Portes and Mooney (2002) try to reconcile the network closure vs. network 
brokerage argument by focusing on asset value. They say the social collateral model 
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can reconcile these views by identifying a trade-off between trust and access, which 
implies that the relative benefit of high or low closure depends on the value of the 
assets being transacted. Closure is more attractive when agents tend to exchange 
valuable assets, because it maximizes trust among a small number of individuals. In 
contrast, when the network is mainly used to exchange small favours such as giving 
information or advice, large and loose neighbourhoods are better because they 
maximize access to these resources. These results also provide foundations and 
network-EDVHGPHDVXUHVIRU3XWQDP¶VFRQFHSWVRIERQGLQJYHUVXVEULGJLQJ
social capital, and have implications for the design of organizations. 
 
The other way network structure can influence the operation of social capital is if its 
orientation is horizontal or vertical. Putnam et al. (1993) state that networks can be 
horizontal, connecting agents of the same status and power as well as vertical, 
connecting unequal agents in uneven relations of hierarchy and dependence.  
Putnam also noted a critical difference between horizontal and vertical networks:  
 
³$ YHUWLFDO QHWZRUN QR PDWWHU KRZ GHQVH DQG QR PDWWHU KRZ LPSRUWDQW WR Lts 
participants, cannot sustain social trust and cooperation. Vertical flows of 
information are often less reliable than horizontal flows, in part because the 
VXERUGLQDWHKXVEDQGV LQIRUPDWLRQ DV DKHGJHDJDLQVW H[SORLWDWLRQ´ Putnam et al., 
1993, p. 167).  
 
This will certainly be true of the poor entrepreneurs in microfinance. Dasgupta 
(1999) agrees by saying that information about new economic opportunities is more 
likely to be shared among members of horizontal networks.  
 
Another example of the effect of RULHQWDWLRQ LV *UDQRYHWWHU¶V  DQDO\VLV RI
/RFNH¶V  ZRUN RQ ,WDOLDQ WH[WLOH LQGXVWU\ to understand why the widely 
heralded success of small-firm networks in Italy seemed subject to sharp regional 
variations. These networks failed in some areas while flying high in others. Locke 
says it depends on its compatibility with the local social and political networks. It 
turns out that polarised and hierarchical networks are much less fertile ground than 
SRO\FHQWULFDUHDV*UDQRYHWWHUWKHQORRNVDW³VRFLDOFDSLWDO´EXWWKHSX]]OHIURPWKH
point of view of the Putnam et al (1993) argument is that all these cities had a rich 
associational life, supposedly the progenitor of the norms, networks and trust that 
 148 
 
compose this capital. The difference was that Turin¶VDQG3UDWR¶VDVVRFLDWLRQVZHUH
structured vertically with few ties across to other types of association but with 
further vertical ties reaching out of the region to national parties or other 
organisations. Milan and Biella, by contrast, were richer in horizontal ties of the sort 
that mute conflict in the one case and facilitate the myriad details of inter-firm 
cooperation in the other. So, it is not just the density of associational life that 
matters for economic (or political) outcomes but the structure of its ties.   
 
Another important factor in how social capital works is context. Cassar and Wydick 
(2009) found that the effects of different types of social capital are highly 
contextualized. For example, acquaintanceship with other members of the group and 
the number of years subjects lived in an area had strong effects in some countries, 
and weak or even negative effects in others. Furthermore, much of the evidence 
from their study points to the danger of over-generalizing about the nature of social 
capital in developing countries and its effect on economic behaviour. That different 
aspects of social capital appear to exhibit diverse effects across cultures suggests 
that the external validity of work in behavioural economics and social capital 
carried out in a single context may be quite limited. Falk and Kirkpatrick (2000) 
suggest that trust is only understandable in its socio-cultural situation. Trust inheres 
in the situated, observable and accountable reciprocity of every micro interaction. 
They also say that historicity and futuricity are shown to have a fundamental role in 
the processes that transmit social and cultural norms which is a part of social capital. 
Their study makes clear how past learning needs to be reconciled with the present, 
in the conWH[WRI WKHNQRZOHGJHDQG LGHQWLW\ UHVRXUFHRID IXWXUHJD]HRUµYLVLRQ¶
and that the results of that reconciliation need to be passed on to the next generation.  
 
Portes and Mooney (2002) say there are three key aspects of social capital as bonds 
of solidarity and trust within a community. First, in conjunction with other factors, 
this economic and political mechanism can lead to successful, grassroots-led 
outcomes. Second, it is quite difficult to bring about. Third, unexpected 
consequences often emerge in the process of building the required preconditions. 
)RUWKHPRVWSDUWWKHUHVHDUFKOLWHUDWXUHKDVQRWIRXQGVXFFHVVIXODWWHPSWVDW³VRFLDO
HQJLQHHULQJ´WKDWVHHNWREXLOGVROLGDULVWLFQHWZRUNVZKHQIHZRUQRQHH[LVW 
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Therefore, in the Indian context of the present research, the microentrepreneurs in 
their SHGs are probably generating social capital with their frequent meetings and 
lending. They are definitely generating closure within their family and jati networks. 
However, does the social structure around them impede or assist in the creation of 
social capital and accessing opportunities? Theory indicates the importance of both 
closure and brokerage in creating social capital. The question is if what the business 
is selling is a low or high value asset. If it is low value then theory predicts 
brokerage is more important in creating social capital than closure. Theory seems to 
suggest that getting information from vertical links in the network is difficult. Does 
this mean that the poor entrepreneur who needs to bridge the structural holes around 
her in the network using vertical ties because they live in a hierarchical society face 
a near impossible task? Especially if there are few or no solidarity networks exist in 
their area? These are key questions especially if what Gomez and Santor (2001) 
posit is true that social capital is essential for microentrepreneurial success. They 
also recognise that the neighbourhoods they live in play a role.  
 
Burt (2010, pages 192 -218) offers a way out of this theoretical conundrum. Burt 
argues that normally there is no such thing as second hand brokerage or network 
spillover. In other words, one cannot connect to a network broker and then passively 
wait for the network to deliver the benefits. It requires personal engagement to get 
the benefits of network brokerage. However, Burt says there is one exception. This 
happens when a network insider presents an outsider as another insider. In this case, 
the outsider will benefit from second hand network brokerage. It is unlikely that a 
poor entrepreneur running a low growth, low barrier to entry business will be able to 
connect vertically to a broker in their industry network to be presented as an insider. 
But, a microfinance institution is much more able to connect to these industry 
network brokers and represent their clients as industry insiders and therefore gain 
second hand brokerage.  
 
Theory now presents three ways to help microfinance clients, who run low entry 
barrier businesses to establish weak ties in order to get relevant information on 
things such as finance, suppliers, market information and information on potential 
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customers that will improve their businesses and help reduce their poverty. First, 
following Burt, a MFI can act as a broker between the clients and the industry they 
are involved in to produce a network spillover to benefit the clients. Second, 
following Granovetter, the MFI can help these poor entrepreneurs to establish weak 
ties among other poor entrepreneurs in the same industry. The tendency of the poor 
to depend on strong ties has the effect of fragmenting networks. Helping these 
people to connect horizontally bridging the structural holes in their networks using 
weak ties will be much easier than trying to establish vertical weak ties in the Indian 
context. Finally, if as Granovetter says, insecurity is the reason the poor depend on 
strong ties then reducing their insecurity will make it more likely for them to start 
establishing more weak ties and gain access to more non-redundant information. 
But, the biggest cause of their insecurity is their poverty. Therefore, reducing their 
poverty reduces their insecurity leading to more weak ties giving more access to 
relevant information that improves their businesses. In this way, it is hoped that a 
virtuous circle will be established rather than the vicious circles the poor usually 
find themselves in.  
5.12 Research Questions 
This leads to two research questions that this research will attempt to answer to 
verify empirically if this theoretical framework of the strength of weak ties, 
brokerage and network spillover holds for microfinance clients who are poor 
entrepreneurs who own low growth, low entry barrier businesses in the Tamil 
context: 
1. How does a MFI help its clients bridge structural holes? 
2. How can MFIs socially intermediate to help clients establish weak bridging 
ties? 
 
5.13 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has described how various network theories around the strength of 
weak ties, structural holes, brokerage and network spillover can help poor 
entrepreneurs who own low growth, low barrier to entry businesses can find the 
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non-redundant information needed to improve their businesses and reduce their 
poverty. These theories also explain how the needed vertical connections can be 
established despite the obstacles the poor face in doing so in the Tamil context. 
There is currently no theory in microfinance that can explain how to do this.  The 
next chapter will describe the methods used to answer the research questions.  
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6 Chapter Six ± Methodology  
6.1 Chapter Summary 
This chapter will describe the methodology used to answer the research questions. 
First, the research population will be defined as sari sellers who are BWDA clients 
and the reasons given for the choice.  To give context, the sari industry will be 
described along with what BWDA has done for the sari sellers in the past. The 
social network mapping method will be described along with the software used to 
analyse the networks. The reverse small world method that will try to make the 
reported networks more complete will be described. After describing how data on 
network spillover, finance and caste, the choices on poverty level measuring will be 
and the decision to use Progress Out of Poverty Index will be explained. All of this 
is for the first two research field trips. 
The third research field occurred during May 2011. The purpose of this field trip 
was to collect higher quality network data that would establish a baseline for the 
network intervention. This allowed a comparison to be done before and after the 
network intervention. 
In order to set this network baseline, the key questions this chapter answers were 
there any sari sellers with more weak than strong ties in their networks? How did 
that affect the probability of poverty? What did the data show about the sizes of the 
VDULVHOOHUV¶HJRQHWZRUNV":KDWGid the data show about the strength of the ties in 
WKH VDUL VHOOHUV¶ HJR QHWZRUNV" :KDW Gid the data show when comparing the sari 
VHOOHUV¶HJRQHWZRUNVE\ORFDWLRQVDULVHOOHUW\SHOHDGHUVKLSW\SHDQGFDVWH? Can all 
the ego networks collected be combined into one whole network? If so, who were 
the most central players in this network? Did this vary by the type of centrality 
used? Who were the most central players in each BWDA branch and did this answer 
the question of whom best to connect a weak bridging ties in the branch? How 
fragile were the whole and branch networks and if fragile, what role could weak 
bridging ties play in strengthening these networks? 
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Finally, this chapter describes the network intervention into the social networks of 
the 111 BWDA sari sellers in order to try to add weak bridging ties to these 
networks with the aim of improving their businesses by increasing the Diwali sari 
sales of 2011 over 2010. This will be followed by the limitations and ethical 
consideration of this research. 
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Trip Population Focus Findings 
1st 
July 
2009 
178 
members of 
10 SHGs, 9 
female 
SHGs, 1 
male SHG 
Exploratory research on the 
businesses of SHG 
members 
While a majority (53.45%) 
had started agricultural 
businesses, sari selling offered 
the most interesting case 
because of the gap in the 
literature and the potential of 
interesting value chains 
2nd 
Oct. 
2010 
111 sari 
sellers, all 
female  
Mapped the ego networks 
used for their businesses by 
identifying links to 
suppliers, financiers, 
customers and market 
information. Also, collected 
PPI, financial information 
on business and caste 
Sari sellers overwhelmingly 
relied on their strong ties for 
their businesses. Structural 
holes were also identified in 
their networks.  
3rd 
May 
2011  
83 of the 111 
sari sellers 
interviewed 
in Oct 2010 
Acquired better network 
data  using the technique 
Hogan by identifying 
person-to-person links only 
to suppliers, financiers, 
customers and market 
information and then placed 
these on a target diagram to 
indicate how close they 
were and show the links, if 
any, between the alters. 
Also setup the network 
intervention.  
Almost all of the networks 
were small and most relied on 
strong ties. When the ego 
networks are combined into a 
whole network, it is shown 
that this network is 
fragmented and contains a 
number of structural holes. 
Weak ties should be able to 
bridge the structural holes and 
help stabilise the network 
4th 
Oct. 
2011 
51 sari 
sellers, all 
female with 
30 from the 
original 83 
interviewed 
in May 2011  
Mapped the social 
networks, financial 
information and PPI to see 
if there were changes after 
intervention and to see if 
there was any correlation to 
the introduction of weak 
bridging ties.  
Only 8 members of the 
treatment group responded 
this time. No financial data 
was captured. One case of 
increased sales due to weak 
bridging ties was observed and 
a case of a group of sari sellers 
establishing weak bridging 
ties to obtain bulk discounts.   
Table 8 ± Summary of Field Trips 
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6.2 Research Population 
The Bullock Cart Workers Development Association (BWDA) based in 
Villupuram, Tamil Nadu in India agreed in 2009 to participate in the research 
project. The associated MFI BFL has over 400,000 clients and over 200,000 have 
loans out at any one time. There were over 21,000 SHGs associated with BWDA.  
In July 2009, during the first research field trip, which was mainly exploratory, 178 
members of 10 SHGs were interviewed individually. This method was chosen 
because the answers to the network questions were believed to be more honest than 
using the more traditional focus group approach. There were 9 female SHGs and 1 
male one. The SHGs were both rural and urban. The goal was to identify the most 
popular businesses started by SHG members so that the research would have impact 
on a significant number of clients. For the interview questions, see Appendix A ± 
SHG Member Questionnaire.   
The interviews took place in the Villupuram District in the state of Tamil Nadu and 
the Union Territory of Pondicherry. The reasons for choosing this area were the 
difficulties with travel in India and by limiting the research to this area made it 
possible to reach all of this area in a day trip from WKH %:'$¶V KHDGTXDUWHUV LQ
Villupuram. 
 The respondents were asked if they had started a business since joining the SHG 
and what type of businesses they were. Over 80% had started businesses. In Table 9, 
the top five types of businesses started are listed. 
Businesses Started By 
SHG BWDA Members 
Business Type Number 
Dairy Animals 58 
Tailoring 36 
Farm 35 
Food Products 23 
Sari 22 
Table 9 
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As can be seen from Table 9, all of these businesses had low barriers to entry. These 
businesses also tended to be low growth. According to Banerjee and Duflo (2011), 
these were typical of the businesses started by microfinance clients.  
The purpose of identifying which businesses were started and the number was to 
identify a business where the strength of weak ties could be used to improve the 
businesses of a significant number of BWDA¶V FOLHQWV The other purpose was to 
identify a business that could help this research make an original contribution to 
knowledge. While the most popular, a lot of research was already being done on 
agricultural networks and value chains of dairy and agricultural farming. These 
businesses were not chosen because it would be harder to make an original 
contribution to knowledge here. Tailoring and food product sales had very short 
value chains and were not very interesting from a network point of view. Saris, on 
the other hand, potentially had very interesting value chains and networks and 
additionally not much research has been done on the sari industry in India. One sari 
seller verified that sari selling is a low entry barrier business by complaining that 
her sales remained flat because three new sari sellers were now operating on her 
street. 
Because of the portability of saris, sari sellers had the potential to develop rich and 
interesting networks that were able to test the theoretical framework. For these 
reasons, the decision was made to focus the research on sari sellers who were clients 
of BWDA.  
BWDA was asked to identify all SHG members who sold saris in the Cuddalore and 
Villupuram Districts in the state of Tamil Nadu and the Union Territory of 
Pondicherry. Again, the reason for choosing this area were the difficulties in travel 
in India and limiting the research to this area made it possible to reach all of this 
DUHD LQ D GD\ WULS IURP WKH %:'$¶V KHDGTXDUWHUV LQ 9LOOLSXUDP $ YHU\ ODUJH
percentage of these were expected to be interviewed. So there was a good chance 
that all key members of the network were captured even if some peripheral players 
were missed. 
BWDA has assisted their sari seller clients by offering training including sari 
selling, sari embroidery, sari painting (adding designs to plain saris), business 
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development, accountancy and set up a sari exhibition 5 years ago to help the sari 
sellers to increase sales. This came as a response to BWDA noticing in 2002-03 that 
SHG members had high expenditure around various local festivals. Members 
increased their borrowings at that time but felt short changed as everyone rushed to 
buy similar material at the same time and the demand pushed up prices in local 
markets. BWDA introduced and distributed different packages of commonly 
purchased materials. Due to bulk purchase and advance orders (up to two months 
before the festival), BWDA used advance bulk purchasing to supply these packages 
at prices no local trader could match. For example, BWDA charged Rs.500 for the 
package, which would cost Rs.550-620 in the local market. When the logistics of 
this became onerous, BWDA started exhibitions for the SHGs members to sell and 
buy their products including saris. To ease transactions, a Rs. 30,000 credit limit 
was set for each SHG and SHG members could purchase from any seller in the 
exhibition. The seller was able to increase his/her sale and either took cash from 
BWDA at 5% discount to sale value or took payment after 15 days. The buyers 
either repaid the credit availed within 10 days without interest or paid 24% annual 
interest on borrowed amount. During November 2004, seven such exhibitions 
generated sales of Rs. 3.44 million. But BWDA discontinued this product as sellers 
sensing monopoly arrangements started over charging borrowers and BWDA was 
worried about the risks to its reputation (Arora, 2008).  
Figure 4 ± Woman Wearing Sari 
6.3 Sari Background 
(Sari Photos from Google Images) 
But, before going further, it would be helpful to 
provide some background to the sari industry in 
India.  
A sari was a strip of unstitched cloth, worn by 
females, ranging from four to nine yards in length 
that was draped over the body in various styles. The 
most common style was for the sari to be wrapped 
around the waist, with one end then draped over the 
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shoulder baring the midriff. The sari was usually worn over a petticoat with a blouse 
known as a choli forming the upper garment (Banerjee and Miller, 2003, pp. 4 and 
24). Because it was unstitched cloth, a sari was a one size fits all garment (Banerjee 
and Miller, 2003, page 72). 
 
In Indian culture, saris were more than just clothing. Saris were kept in a steel 
almirah wardrobe in the cities and in the villages the equivalent is the steel trunk or 
box.  The saris that were kept in these trunks and almirahs reflect a web of kin 
relationships and emotions (Banerjee and Miller, 2003, pages 47 ± 48). The trunks 
could be objects of power struggles. There was a story of woman leaving the village 
of her husband whose own clothes remained under the control of her mother-in-law 
who held the key to her trunk (Tarlo, 1996).  
 
Cultural norms helped determine which saris were bought and how they were worn. 
For this reason, market researchers and anthropologists saw WKH ZRPHQ¶V VDUL 
SUHIHUHQFHV DV KLJKO\ SUHGLFWDEOH JLYHQ WKH ZRPHQ¶V VRFLDl positions and 
educational backgrounds (Bourdieu, 2010). In rural areas, many rules applied to sari 
wearing. For example, in a village in Madhya Pradesh the women of one jati wore 
only printed saris, a variety forbidden to all other jatis. There were rules that dictate 
colours, patterns and materials 
of saris worn for ceremonial 
occasions such as weddings or 
prayers. Middle class women 
abided by conventions and 
family traditions (Miller, 
1985).  
 
Figure 5 ± Silk Sari 
 
Weddings were one of the 
most important reasons to buy 
saris. Traditionally, Indian 
marriage was an alliance 
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between two families that was marked by a mutual exchange of many gifts. The 
bride herself was the precious climax of these exchanges. Cloth, which was held in 
great esteem in India, was a vital part of the exchange. For this reason, weddings 
were engulfed in a cascade of sari giving and receiving (Bayly, 1956, Pages 285-
321, Cohn, 1986, Werbner, 1990). For example, a JURRP¶V IDWKHU LQ D 0XVOLP
YLOODJHKDG WREX\D VDUL IRU WKHEULGH¶Vmother, one for the maid and five for the 
bride. He had to buy a shalwar kamiz, a traditional dress consisting pyjama-like 
trousers and a tunic (Banerjee and Miller, 2003, pg. 267), IRUWKHEULGH¶VXQPDUULHG
sister. He had to buy saris for his mother and aunt and clothing for his father. This 
was so expensive that he cRXOG QRW EX\ D JLIW IRU KLV ZLIH RU KLV VLVWHU¶V IDPLO\
because he had run out of money. Other major occasions for sari gift giving are 
major religious festivals (Banerjee and Miller, 2003, pages 96 ± 99). In Tamil Nadu, 
these would be Diwali, the Hindu festival of lights, and Pongal, the harvest festival 
tied to the winter solstice.  
 
 
Figure 6 ± Sari Shop Owned By BWDA Sari Seller 
 
Generally, sari buyers had three retail options. First was the peddler or door-to-door 
salesperson, second was the high street sari shop and third was the sari emporium 
with its well-lit showrooms. The skills of shopkeepers and the larger personal 
relationship between buyers and sellers remain important since in this still largely 
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unregulated and unbranded market, issues of trust and persuasion remain the critical 
factors in linking the industry with its consumers (Banerjee and Miller, 2003, pages 
173 ± 186). The BWDA sari sellers were either peddlers or own high street sari 
shops (See Figure 3).  
  
On the production side, textile production has been the second largest sector of the 
Indian economy after agriculture. It was hard to verify but it was believed it 
employs somewhere between 20 million and 25 million people. Handlooms were 
the most traditional means of sari production. The skilled weaver used pre-prepared 
cotton yarn usually cotton spun in cotton mills. The majority of weavers worked for 
middlemen. After World War I and the lifting of British restrictions on Indian 
textile production, large mills grew up in Bombay and Western India. These were 
integrated production units which bought raw cotton, spun it into yarn, wove it into 
IDEULF SULQWHG LW DQG FXW LW XS LQWR ILQLVKHG VDULV )URP WKH ¶V PLOOV EHJDQ 
LPSRUWLQJ V\QWKHWLF \DUQ IURP -DSDQ ,Q WKH ¶V PLJUDWHG IURP VSXQ \DUQ WR
100% polyester filament which allowed for much sharper printing and high colour 
saturation and combined a low maintenance wash and wear practicality with silk 
look-alike dressiness (Banerjee and Miller, 2003, pages 195 ± 198). 
 
The mass market was now dominated by the power loom. These use electric power 
to run the loom faster producing more saris in the same time as handlooms and mills 
do. The government preferred handlooms and mills but with the textile import 
barriers being lifted in 2004, there ZHUHIHDUV,QGLD¶VZHDYHUVZRXOG have struggled 
to compete in world markets. Today handlooms have 10% of the market and mills 
only 5% of the market. The rest belong to power looms. The power loom sector has 
both extremely large operations with hundreds of modern machines and small rural 
houses containing just two machines. The power loom sector was anarchic but 
extremely flexible able to quickly respond to market trends and demand. It was 
subject to little regulation and often exploited its workers. All manner of networks 
of production were being created by diverse entrepreneurs who cut their own deals 
linking spinning, designing, weaving and dyeing. No one was able to hold or 
enforce copyright or patent (Banerjee and Miller, 2003, page 199). 
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Kanchipurum in Tamil Nadu was a town renowned for its heavy traditional silk 
saris worn at ceremonial occasions such as weddings. The industry here was centred 
on house weavers who had large hand looms in their houses. The power loom 
threatened the Kanchipuram weavers (Banerjee and Miller, 2003, page 202). 
 
The Tamil Nadu state ran the textile corporation Co-optex. The firm had software 
that with the press of a button and a click of the mouse allowed a woman to design 
the sari of her dreams. The customer was able to sketch her own design in a centre 
in Chennai and Co-optex weavers weaved it to her specifications. In London, many 
shops now offer this bespoke design facility with garments made up in India 
(Banerjee and Miller, 2003 page 208). 
 
On the marketing side, the entry of beauty queens into Bollywood cinema meant 
they served as advertisement for designers and their films served as fashion shows. 
One-off designer pieces worn in films were quickly and illicitly copied and then 
mass-produced by the power loom operators (Banerjee and Miller, 2003, page 205). 
Film stars used to drive sari sales but no longer do. In terms of mass sales of 
everyday wear, it was the television soaps that now exert the dominant influence. 
Nim Sood, who selected the clothing for the major Star TV soaps (Kyunki Saas Bhi 
Kabhi Bahu Thi (KSBKBT), Kahin Kissii Roz) which had the highest viewing 
figures on Indian television, put her into a position of determining the sari designs 
that were the most popular. KSBKBT had a strong influence on the retail market. 
For example, a character on the show was wearing Bandani saris and caused them to 
sell out (Banerjee and Miller, 2003, pages 222 ± 227; Sinniah, 2010). 
6.4 Social Network Mapping 
The question was what methods to use in order to answer the research questions 
among the population of BWDA sari sellers. The first decision was whether to 
pursue a qualitative or quantitative approach to the research. In order to do proper 
quantitative research good quality quantitative data was required. However, at the 
beginning of the research there was a suspicion that that would be a problem with 
obtaining good quantitative data from these low growth, low barrier to entry sari 
businesses. Later interviews with the sari sellers showed that these fears were 
justified. Most of the sari sellers did not keep good business records and therefore 
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had little idea of their turnover and margins, making it very difficult to correlate any 
financial improvement in the business with changes to their networks. Therefore, 
the decision was made to pursue a qualitative approach. The emphasis for this 
research is that it will be interpreting a broad range of partial evidence rather than 
seeking to test a formal model.  
Obviously, the social networks of the sari sellers needed to be mapped. Because 
structural hole measurements were only for ego networks, only the ego networks of 
the sari sellers were mapped. Ego networks were from the point of view of the 
respondent and contain links to the respondent and the connections between those 
linked to the respondent that the respondent was aware of. It was not the global 
network around the respondent. 
 The sari sellers were asked about connections to their suppliers, financial sources, 
market information sources and customers. The sari sellers were asked the questions 
in Appendix B ± Questions for Sari Seller Interviews.  
A popular SNA software package UCINET (Borgatti et al, 2002) was used to map 
and analyse the networks of the sari sellers. Its companion software component 
NetDraw (Borgatti, 2002) was used to visualise the networks.  
 
6.5 Defining Strong and Weak Ties 
To quantify the strength of the relationship, those relationships based on a large 
amount of trust were considered strong while those that were not will be considered 
weak. This was based on the discussion on trust developed in the theoretical 
framework. For financial sources, if collateral was required for loans, this implied a 
lack of trust and therefore was identified as a weak tie. Non-collateral loans were an 
indicator of trust and therefore were identified as strong ties. For suppliers, the 
provision of credit to the sari sellers, whether or not it was used, was an indicator of 
trust and was identified as a strong tie. Therefore, ties to suppliers that do not offer 
credit were identified as weak ties. For market information sources, links to family 
members were identified as strong ties because of the emotional attachments. Using 
the distinction of Granovetter (1973), market information sources that were 
identified as friends were marked as strong ties while those identified as 
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acquaintances were marked as weak ties. For customers, an arbitrary time of a year 
of service was used to distinguish strong versus weak ties. 
6.6 Reverse Small World Technique 
It was often the case that respondents may not remember all of the relevant 
connections when asked. In order to get a more complete ego network other 
methods were used. One such method was the reverse small world method 
(Killworth and Bernard, 1978 and Bernard et al, 1990). In this technique, 
respondents were asked to name people who can carry information to persons 
outside their network. This was conceived as a way to estimate the number and type 
of people known to the respondent. While it was conceived as a way identifying the 
global network of the respondent, the work of Freeman and Thompson (1989) made 
it clear that reverse small world techniques only captures part of the global network.    
 
In this research, reverse small world questions were asked about market information 
sources, obtaining more customers, improving the business and selling a very 
expensive sari. These were framed around the question of who would you talk to 
first? There was the risk that they could mention the same ties as before.  
 
For market information, the respondents were asked who they would talk to first to 
find out about weddings, festivals or to contact a professional auntie. An auntie was 
a form of kindly address to an older woman to whom one was not related 
(Dictionary.com, 2011). A professional auntie was an older woman who serves as 
an advisor to younger woman on how to tie and wear saris. Many of them can be 
found running beauty parlours (Banerjee and Miller, 2003, pg. 77-78). These 
women served as natural sources of market information. 
 
The very expensive sari the question refers to were those made in Kanchipuram, 
Tamil Nadu in India. Kanchipurum was a town renowned for its heavy traditional 
silk saris worn at ceremonial occasions such as weddings. The industry here was 
centred on house weavers who have large hand looms in their houses (Banerjee and 
Miller, 2003, pg. 77-78). The question assumed the price was 25,000 Indian rupees 
which was significantly above the yearly income of those earnings average US$1 
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per day. It was highly unlikely the sari sellers would have anyone in their ego 
networks that would be able to afford a Kanchipuram silk sari therefore forcing 
them to go outside their network to find someone to sell this sari to.  
 
The reverse small world network information was obtained through questions 7, 8, 9 
and 10 in Appendix B ± Questions for Sari Seller Interviews.   
6.7 Measuring Network Spillover 
To see if the sari sellers were taking advantage of any network spillover effect 
(Burt, 2010), respondent were asked if the person they were linked to had any 
special influence in the sari business to determine if this person was considered to 
be an insider or outsider to the Tamil sari business network. See questions 2 and 4 
in Appendix B ± Questions for Sari Seller Interviews. 
 
6.8 Financial Status of Business 
To understand the financial status of each sari seller, the seller was asked how many 
saris they have sold in the past year, what the price range was and what margin they 
made on each sari. This made it possible to get understand the financial side of the 
business of those women who did not possess good business records. However, 
there was a high risk of inaccurate data. See question 11 in Appendix B ± Questions 
for Sari Seller Interviews. 
 
6.9 Caste 
To measure social status of each sari seller, they were asked what jati or caste the 
VDULVHOOHU¶VIDPLly was in. The respondent was also asked to place the nodes of her 
network on a 5 layer pyramid that represents the Tamil social structure. See 
question 11 in Appendix B ± Questions for Sari Seller Interviews. 
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6.10 Poverty Level Measurement 
One of the key measurements needed to be taken was the level of poverty of the 
respondents. This will establish a baseline poverty level. A network intervention, to 
be described in Section 6.13, was done and this allowed the measurement of any 
possible change in the poverty level as a result. 
 
There were several poverty impacts tools available to use. Comim (2007, pages 53 ± 
54) describes five of these. First was the CGAP Poverty Assessment Tool. This 
used observable household characteristics that correlate well with levels of income 
to create a score to infer the poverty status of individuals using target and control 
groups. This had the advantage of establishing rigour with target and control groups 
but the target and control groups mean it was too expensive and time-consuming for 
this research. 
 
The second tool was the Prizma Poverty Scorecard.  This tool used eight non-
monetary indicators such as education, residence, employment status, family size, 
consumption of meat, consumption of sweets, household assets (such as TV or CD 
player) and possession of family vehicle. The score determined the relative and 
absolute poverty of households. However, PRVW RI WKLV VFRUHFDUG¶V SRZer came 
from a single indicator which specified how often a client ate meat. This had a 
WHQGHQF\WRRYHUVWDWHWKHFOLHQW¶VSRYHUW\6FKUHLQHUHWDO.  
 
The third tool was the Index of Fulfilment of Basic Needs.   This was developed in 
Bolivia and uses 10 indicators that focus on four characteristics of households such 
as housing, education, access to health services and access to public services. 
Proxies are used to determine access to public services. The issue with this tool was 
that it used subjective decisions on the welfare value of each component of the tool 
(Falkingham and Namazie, 2001). 
 
The fourth tool was the CASHPOR Housing Index. It used three characteristics to 
classify housing: size, physical condition and building or roofing materials. It made 
the assumption that housing characteristics had a strong correlation to poverty. If the 
area had government housing schemes for the poor, this assumption no longer 
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holds. Tamil Nadu had government housing schemes for the poor. There have been 
studies that have shown that this tool had a poor correlation between the index and 
poverty (Falkingham and Namazie, 2001). 
 
The fifth tool was Freedom from Hunger Food Security Survey.  This tool assessed 
absolute poverty by using four food security scales.  It used a 17 question survey to 
determine the level of food insecurity. USAID did not use this tool because it was 
not a reliable proxy for daily expenditure which was a standard measure of poverty 
(USAID, 2011). 
 
To measure the poverty level of each sari seller, the decision had been made to use 
the Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI), an instrument created by the Grameen 
Foundation (Schreiner, 2008). Using data from the national household surveys of 
India, PPI created an easy to use scorecard that estimated the likelihood that a 
household in India had expenditure below a given poverty line. The PPI scorecard 
used 10 simple criteria. If there was a major change in household conditions in India 
such as through natural disasters or war, the PPI would have been invalid. Political 
programmes could have also interfered with the validity of the PPI. In Tamil Nadu, 
the state government had recently given away televisions and liquefied petroleum 
gas (LPG) stoves to the poor as a result of an election promise. To mitigate this, 
respondents needed to be asked if the television or LPG stove came from the state 
government and then not given that respondent the score for those two criteria.  For 
PPI scorecard questions see question 13 in Appendix B ± Questions for Sari Seller 
Interviews. All of these questions were asked at the respondents¶ home to verify the 
answers. Appendix E holds the PPI Probability Table.  
6.11 Change in Methodology Due to Problems with Sari Seller 
Social Network Data 
Because of problems with the network data collected during the second field trip to 
be described in the next chapter, the methodology was changed. The problem was 
caused by the inclusion of organisations in the ego networks. Sari sellers could have 
relationships with different people in the same organisation. The implication is that 
these sari sellers shared a relationship when in fact none existed. Ego networks were 
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designed for recording relationships between people. Therefore the change was to 
collect only those network ties that connected named person to another named 
person. 
6.12 Methodology for Third Field Trip 
The purpose of the third field trip was to obtain better network data by focusing on 
person-to-person links. If the sari seller identified an organisation as a link on the 
second field trip, she was asked to name a person in that organisation that she 
usually worked with. If she was unable to name an individual, the link was dropped. 
This left the individuals identified during the second research field trip and 
individuals from organisations identified during the third research field trip. Using 
the technique created by Kahn and Antonucci (1980) and also used by Hogan 
(Hogan et al, 2007), respondents were asked to place these individuals or alters they 
were linked to on a target diagram indicating how close they were to them by the 
distance they were placed from the central circle which represents the sari seller. 
They were then asked to connect those alters who know each other by drawing a 
 168 
 
line between them.  An example of a target diagram is shown in Figure 7. 
  
Figure 7 ± Example of Sari Seller Target Diagram   
The target diagram was generously provided by Dr. Paola Tubaro of the University 
of Greenwich. For interview questions, see Appendix C ± Sari Seller Questionnaire 
II.  
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6.13 Description of Intervention 
The network data collected during the third research field trip suggested that a 
network intervention could possibly have introduced weak bridging ties to the social 
networks of the sari sellers. So, how could a MFI do social intermediation to help 
their clients develop the weak, bridging ties they needed to improve their businesses 
and reduced their poverty? This research investigated two approaches in order to 
answer this question with this case study. 
First, the MFI could have acted as a broker between the sari sellers and the sari 
industry. One suggestion consistently made by the sari sellers was for the MFI to 
buy the saris for them in bulk.  This would have generated a large discount on the 
price of the saris. This discount would be passed onto the sari sellers which would 
have increased their profits. The MFI could have brought the latest market 
information and how-to information from sari industry insiders to the sari sellers. 
This would require MFI to establish its own weak ties with the sari industry.  This 
task would be made much easier if the sari industry was a small world network or a 
scale free network. Small world networks were characterised by local clustering 
which indicates dense pockets of interconnectivity. There are bridges, however, that 
connected these subgroups. A scale free network was a network that was dominated 
by a few hubs with a large number of connections. If the sari industry was a small 
world network, BWDA could link to any subgroup with the knowledge that 
bridging would allow it to connect to any other subgroup in the industry in a 
relatively few steps. If the sari industry was a scale free network, BWDA would 
only need to establish weak ties with hubs to be able to reach most of the sari 
industry.    
It was important for all of the above that the MFI has someone who knew the sari 
business negotiating on its behalf. The reason for this was shown in a case study 
IURP 0DOFROP +DUSHU¶V ERRN Inclusive Value Chains: A Pathway Out of Poverty 
(2010). In the case study, an Indian MFI formed a partnership with a large 
PXOWLQDWLRQDO WR SURYLGH SRWDWRHV JURZQ E\ WKH 0),¶V FOLHQWV WR LWV SRWDWR FKLS
factory. While initially successful, the partnership suffered serious strains because 
the MFI did not understand how the multinational conducted its business. Inside 
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knowledge of the sari industry is needed if the MFI was to build a successful 
inclusive value chain that included its sari seller clients.     
If the MFI was successful in building sustainable weak ties to the sari industry, it 
would EHDEOHWRWDNHDGYDQWDJHRI0LFKDHO3RUWHU¶VLGHDVRQKRZ1*2VFDQ
sustain themselves. The basic idea was that NGOs should choose commercial 
partners whose business strategy was compatible with its purposes. For example, 
the sari industry could have paid IRUWUDLQLQJWKH0),¶VVDULVHOOHUVDQGFUHDWHDORDQ
fund for the sari sellers. Why would they have done this? Because both of these 
actions would help the sari industry make more money by the sari sellers selling 
more saris.  
The second approach was for the MFI to help its sari seller clients establish weak 
WLHVZLWKHDFKRWKHULQVLGHWKH0),¶s network. The basic idea here was that the MFI 
established a mechanism where sari sellers can find each other in order to share 
information and knowledge. Sari sellers identified information and knowledge they 
were willing to share and information and knowledge they wanted to learn. Ideally 
it would have worked like a classified section that will allow the sari sellers to 
contact each other and negotiated with each other. The assumption was that BWDA 
provided a safe and secure place to do an intervention like this. As Granovetter 
(1983) said, the main reason the poor people rely on strong ties is insecurity.  
The MFI identified those sari sellers that were willing to train and connected them 
with those who want training. The MFI could have encouraged mentorship 
relationships where sari sellers were experts in a particular area could mentor 
another sari seller in this area. BWDA has agreed to do an intervention. 
6.14 Purpose of intervention 
The intervention tested the second approach to see if weak bridging ties among the 
sari sellers can be established and as a result the sari sellers see an improvement in 
their business. All the sari seller clients of BWDA in the Cuddalore and Villipuram 
Districts in Tamil Nadu and the Union Territory of Pondicherry were asked if they 
were willing to share information and/or skills with other BWDA sari sellers. They 
were allowed to put constraints on who they were willing to share information with. 
For example, they may not have wanted to share with sari sellers that were nearby 
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because they may have been seen as competitors. However, they may have been 
more willing to share with those further away. This information was collected 
during the 3rd research field trip in May 2011.   
 
A list of all those sari sellers willing to share along with their contact details was 
assembled. This list was given to the sari sellers in the Villipuram District only. 
Villupuram was chosen EHFDXVH %:'$¶V KHDG RIILFH ZDV WKHUH DQG LW ZRXOG EH
relatively easy for them to keep an eye on the sari sellers here. The sari sellers in the 
other districts effectively served as a control group. Because what was being offered 
were information and skills, contacts should have formed weak bridging ties. It was 
also assumed that the typical social hierarchy issues will not come up. Of the 111 
sari sellers, only two were Brahmin. The overwhelming majority of the sari sellers 
were in the backward castes, other backward castes or most backward castes.  
 
6.15 Intervention Details 
 
During the 3rd research field trip in May 2011, the sari sellers were asked the 
questions to create the list needed for the intervention. The BWDA sari seller clients 
in the Villupuram District of the state of Tamil Nadu and in the Union Territory of 
Pondicherry were asked if they are willing to pass on their knowledge to other 
BWDA sari sellers on how to find more customers, the latest information on sari 
designs, the most popular saris and who the best sari painters and embroiderers are. 
Sari painting did not mean actually painting the sari but adding already made 
SDWFKHVDQGGHVLJQVWRUHODWLYHO\SODLQVDULVDVDZD\WRLQFUHDVHWKHVDUL¶VYDOXH 
 
The sari sellers were asked if they were willing to train other BWDA sari sellers on 
any of the skills below: 
x How to successfully negotiate with sari shops 
x How to buy saris in bulk with other sari sellers and still be competitors 
x How to set up your own sari shop 
x How to be successful in running a sari shop 
x How to get customers into your sari shop 
x How to price saris to maximise your profit 
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x How to use embroidery to increase your profits 
x How to create a successful business strategy 
x How to develop the business 
x How to do marketing 
x How to hire and manage employees 
x How to successfully get credit from sari shops 
x Accountancy training 
x General sari seller training 
x How to sell silk saris 
x How to do sari painting and sari embroidery 
 
For all of the sari sellers who answered yes to the above questions, there was a need 
to find out if these sari sellers had any restrictions on passing on knowledge or 
training. For example, they may have been willing to do this for sari sellers further 
away but not those who live in the same neighbourhood because they may have 
been potential competitors. There was also be a need to get the contact details for 
these sari sellers. See Table 10 below for an example of document.  
 
Name Contact 
Details 
Information 
Offered 
Skills 
Training 
Offered 
Restrictions 
     
     
     
Table 10 ± Sari Sellers Information and Training Offer Document 
 
This document was written in Tamil and distributed to the 47 sari sellers in or near 
the city of Villupuram interviewed in 2010. If the sari seller cannot read, 
arrangements were made to have the document read to that sari seller. The 47 sari 
sellers were told they could contact any sari seller in the document, without 
violating the restrictions, who had information or training they want.  
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In order to improve the quality financial information on the sari sellers, a financial 
diary sheet was provided to each of the 111 sari sellers. The sari sellers were asked 
to record their sari sales on it. See Table 11 below to see the details captured. The 
financial diary sheet was also written in Tamil.  
 
 
 
 
Sari Type 
(Silk, Non-
Silk) 
Sari Price Sari Cost Customer 
Jati 
Date of Sale 
     
     
     
Table 11 ± Financial Diary Sheet 
 
The sari seller information and training offer document and financial diary sheets 
were prepared during the 3rd research field trip in May 2011. BWDA was instructed 
to distribute the financial diary sheets to all 111 sari sellers in early July 2011. 
BWDA was also instructed to send sari seller information and training offer 
document to the 47 sari sellers in the Villupuram branches.  
6.16 Fourth Research Field Trip Questions 
The purpose of the 4th research field trip starting in late October 2011 after Diwali 
was to remap the social networks of the sari sellers, to see if there were any changes 
to the PPI score and to see if the sari sales for Diwali in 2011 were higher, lower or 
the same as the sari sales for Diwali 2010 as a result of the intervention. The 
financial diaries were also collected.  
 While not directly connected to the intervention, the opportunity was taken during 
the 4th research field trip to collect additional data. In order to understand how 
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important the sari seller income was to the family, the sari seller was asked what 
percentage of household income is sari selling. The sari sellers were also asked how 
optimistic they felt about the future of their sari selling business. See Appendix G ± 
Network Intervention Questionnaire.  
6.17 Limitations 
2QH RI WKH PDLQ OLPLWDWLRQV RI WKLV PHWKRGRORJ\ ZDV WKH UHVHDUFKHU¶V LQDELOLW\ WR
speak Tamil which is the language of Tamil Nadu. Translators needed to be used to 
communicate with the respondents. The main weakness of using translators was that 
a lot of the conversations were lost because the translators used did not translate 
word for word. The translator for the first research field trip was a Tamil researcher 
also doing research at BWDA. For the second, third and fourth research field trips 
BWDA employees were used. The main translator was a lawyer for BWDA  
assisted by a finance clerk and a new employee running a water project. It should be 
noted that the sari sellers felt free to criticise BWDA to the translators and the 
translators translated these criticisms.  
 
6.18 Ethical considerations 
Borgatti and Molina (2003) identify the key ethical issues using social network 
analysis in research. First, it was not possible to have anonymity at the data 
collection stage because it was necessary to know who the respondent was. Second, 
a person who did not participate in the research could still be included because they 
were named by other respondents as part of their social networks. Borgatti and 
Molina stress that respondents did have the right to their own perceptions of their 
relationships to others. It was these perceptions that were being reported by 
respondents. Third, in an employment setting, questions on how employees 
socialise with each fall into a grey area between scrutiny and spying. Fourth, 
visualising the networks showed raw data that displayed who was linked to whom. 
One can make the respondents anonymous by replacing their names in the 
visualisations but there was still the risk that the names can be deduced from the 
network position. Finally, since social network analysis was a relatively new way of 
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doing research for most people there was the possible risk that respondents will not 
realise the consequences of identifying the people in their social networks.  
The sari sellers did report non-participants in their social networks but they were 
being asked about their perceptions of their relationships. Since this was not an 
employment settinJ %RUJDWWL DQG 0ROLQD¶V FRQFHUQV GLG QRW DSSO\ KHUH When 
reporting results to BWDA, no personal names were used.  Anonymised sociograms 
were presented to only the top management of BWDA. While it was possible that 
respondents could have been identified by network position, it was felt to be very 
unlikely that BWDA top management would be able to do so from among their 
400,000 clients. All of the visualisations used in this thesis have been anonymised.  
Finally to get informed consent, all interview sessions started with the translator 
explaining to respondents what was be asked and explaining the research to them 
based on the information sheet. (See Appendix J ± Information Sheet for 
Microfinance Beneficiaries)  
This research received ethical approval from the University of Greenwich Research 
Ethics Committee in May 2009. 
6.19 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has explained how the research questions were answered. Sari sellers 
were chosen as the focus because they represented the low growth, low entry barrier 
businesses typical of microfinance clients (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). The focus 
was on mapping and understanding the social networks of the sari sellers. To verify 
if Granovetter (1983) was correct that poor people depend on strong ties, the 
strength of the network ties were measured with trust as the measure. Financial 
information was collected to see if sari sellers who had access to weak bridging ties 
had stronger businesses. 7R VHH LI DQ\ VDUL VHOOHU ZDV WDNLQJ DGYDQWDJH RI %XUW¶V
(2010) network spillover, sari sellers were asked about connections to sari industry 
insiders. The reverse small world method was used to make the reported social 
networks were as complete as possible. The Progress Out of Poverty Index was used 
to measure the poverty level of the sari sellers. In the next chapter, the data on the 
sari sellers and their social networks from the second, third and fourth research field 
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trips will be described and analysed along with a major problem with the network 
data. The results of the intervention will also be described and analysed.  
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7 Chapter Seven ± Data Findings and Data Analysis  
7.1 Chapter Summary 
This chapter will analyse the data collected on the second, third and fourth research 
field trips and identify the key findings. It will look at the sari seller attributes 
revealed and what the network data says through various analytical techniques. This 
DQDO\VLVLVDEOHWRFRQILUP*UDQRYHWWHU¶VDUJXPHQWDERXWWKHSRRUDQGVWURQJ
ties. The analysis also reveals a serious problem with the network data. But, this 
problem presents an opportunity to answer the question of how poor sari sellers can 
build weak bridging ties in a highly hierarchical society using an intervention.    
This chapter will then look at the ego networks collected from the sari sellers in 
May 2011 and then analyse the whole networks formed from the combination of the 
ego networks. For the ego networks, first the average size of the networks and the 
number and strength of ties will be examined. It will be shown that on the whole 
sari sellers have small ego networks and rely on strong ties.   The ego networks will 
be compared by location (urban, suburban, rural), sari seller type (shop owners, full 
time sari sellers, part time sari sellers), leadership type (animators, non-animators) 
and by caste. It will be shown that shop owners are the only type of sari sellers who 
have more weak ties than strong ties and it can also be shown that these weak ties 
could be weak bridging ties. The data to show that businesses outperform those of 
the other types leading to a much lower probability of poverty is missing.  
The chapter will also show how all the ego networks can be combined into a whole 
network using the connections to BWDA staff.  The same technique is used to 
create a network for each branch. Given there is only one link connecting each 
branch to the BWDA headquarters in the centre, the whole networks turns out to be 
very fragile and easily fragmented. The Girvan-Newman technique is used to 
analyse the fragility of the networks and optimum network fragments are identified.   
As a result, there are a number of structural holes in the network which opens 
opportunities for weak bridging ties to connect the BWDA branches and make these 
networks more robust.  Betweeness, degree and eigenvector centrality is calculated 
to identify the network nodes that would be the best anchors for the weak bridging 
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ties transporting new information about the sari business to the sari sellers in each 
BWDA branch.  
The intervention mentioned above identified sari sellers who were willing to offer 
information and training to other sari sellers. Despite the low response rate, there 
were two cases that gave indications that weak bridging ties not only brought non-
redundant information but that information increased Diwali sales. This indicates 
WKDW *UDQRYHWWHU¶V  VWUHQJWK RI ZHDN WLHV FDQ ILOO WKH VRFLDO QHWZRUN JDS LQ
microfinance theory.  
7.2 SHG Data Description (First Field Trip) 
As was described in the previous chapter, in July 2009, during the first research 
field trip, 178 members of 10 SHGs were interviewed individually. There were nine 
female SHGs and one male SHG. The SHGs were rural, urban and areas that were 
neither rural nor urban that will be designated suburban. As a result, the decision 
was made to focus on sari seller among the five most popular businesses started by 
SHG members as an example of the low growth, low barrier to entry businesses 
typically started by microfinance clients.  
7.3 Sari Seller Data Description (Second Field Trip)  
During the second research field trip, lasting from October to December 2010, 111 
sari sellers were interviewed in their homes.  These sari sellers were all BWDA 
clients from the Cuddalore and Villupuram Districts in the State of Tamil Nadu and 
the Union Territory of Pondicherry. They lived in urban areas such as Villupuram 
and the city of Pondicherry, rural areas and in towns and built-up areas along major 
highways that were neither urban nor rural. 
 
One interesting result was the number of animators among the sari sellers (see Table 
12). In BWDA, each SHG has one animator (group leader) and one or two 
representatives (deputy group leader) with the rest of the SHG consisting of 
members. Each SHG holds around 20 members. Therefore, one would expect that 
animators would be around 5% of the sari seller sample, representatives a little more 
than 5% of the sample with the rest just being SHG members. However, the 
breakdown of the sample of sari sellers by SHG role is as follows: 
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SHG Roles Number % 
Animator 60 54.1 
Representative 6 5.4 
SHG Member 43 38.7 
Non-SHG Member 2 1.8 
 Table 12 ± Breakdown of Sari Sellers by SHG Roles 
 
The big surprise is that that 54.1% of the sample were animators. No definitive 
explanation has been found yet to explain why so many animators are in the sample. 
BWDA says that what sets animators apart from the other SHG members is the 
amount of training they receive. As described in the BWDA section of the 
microfinance chapter, animators play a key role in the SHG. They manage the SHG 
and its finances, the relationship with the bank and the relationship with BWDA. 
Also, as described before, the role of animator brings additional stature to the 
individual in the role. This may result in animators being approached to help with 
problems in the community. One animator told of being approached to organise and 
lead the demonstration every time the village had a problem with the government in 
addition to her SHG and family duties. Therefore, one possible explanation for why 
there are so many animators in the sample is that animators find sari selling a rather 
easy business to fit into their busy lives since they determine when they need to sell. 
In addition, some reported that they had no interest in growing the business because 
WKH\FRXOGQ¶WKDQGOHany more customers.   
 
The number of representatives in the sample is about the expected number. The 
number of SHG members in the sample is down because of the number of 
animators. Of the two non-SHG members, one was the animator of a just disbanded 
SHG who had an individual loan from BWDA and the other is a member of a joint 
liability group. A joint liability group, unlike a SHG, is run by the MFI and has only 
five members. This is a new microfinance methodology for BWDA. This is very 
similar to the methodology used by ASA, BRAC and Grameen in Bangladesh.  
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Jati # Avg. 
PPI 
Prob. 
Below 
$2/day 
Hindu Brahmin 2 89 12.9% 
Chettiar 2 65.5 50% 
Hindu Raddiar 4 83.25 15.5% 
Yadava 4 73.5 42.9% 
Hindu OC 2 76.5 27.3% 
Avg.  BC 26 73.19 42.9% 
Avg. OBC 5 79.67 27.3% 
Avg. MBC 44 73.83 42.9% 
Avg. SC 7 64.125 55.2% 
Avg. Muslim 10 68.25 50% 
Table 13 ± Average Sari Seller Attributes by Jati  
 
Table 13 shows the breakdown of the population by jati. There are seven jatis with 
only one sari seller that have been admitted. The overwhelming majority of the sari 
sellers are in low caste jatis such as backward castes (BC), other backward castes 
(OBC), most backward castes (MBC) and scheduled castes (SC) which include 
Dalits. Muslims are technically considered part of the scheduled castes but have 
been broken out because they are a distinct community. The Brahmins and Raddiars 
in the sample do not have a significant probability of living below the US$2/day 
poverty line. The Hindu OC (Other Castes) and OBC sari sellers have a slightly 
significant probability of living below the US$2/day poverty line. All of the rest of 
the sari sellers have at least a significant probability of living below the US$2/day 
poverty line. This indicates these sari sellers do need significant amount of poverty 
reduction.  
 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of PPI scores in the research population. The 
average PPI for the population is 72.05 which have a 42.9% probability of the sari 
seller living below the US$2/day poverty line. As can be seen, this sample does not, 
for the most part, include the poorest of the poor, with the bulk of the population 
being between the PPI scores of 60 and 94.  
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Figure 8 ± Distribution by PPI Scores 
Type # 
Avg. 
PPI 
#Saris 
Sold / 
Year 
Shop Owners 12 76.25 570.00 
Full Time 55 70.23 706.23 
Part Time 45 73.64 185.30 
    Urban 70 74.91 426.55 
Suburban 22 71.86 676.67 
Rural 19 61.68 444.21 
 
   Urban No SO & PT 36 73.69 570.28 
Sub. No SO & PT 10 63.20 1164.00 
Rural No SO & PT 9 56.22 577.78 
    Saris Only FT 15 68.33 1392.00 
Saris & Maybe FT 19 70.63 1327.895 
All Others 92 72.34 297.59 
    Animators 60 71.68 465.50 
Non-Animators 51 72.47 501.54 
Table 14 ± Sari Seller Attributes 
 
Table 14 analyses the sari sellers by organising them into several categories. The 
first trio compares sari shop owners, full time sari sellers and part time sari sellers. It 
should be noted that full time here means that sari selling is the only business they 
own. It does not mean they spend the entire time sari selling. Household and 
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animator duties may take up considerable time. There are only 12 shop owners but 
their probability of living below US$2/day is significantly less than the full time and 
part time sari sellers even though on average they sell 135 saris a year less than the 
full time sari sellers. Two shops on the main road between Villupuram and 
Pondicherry on the border between the state of Tamil Nadu and the Union Territory 
of Pondicherry have the bulk of the shop sales because of the large amount of traffic 
they receive. If these two shops are taken out, it shows that the other 10 shops are 
not selling very much. It is no surprise that the part time sari sellers have sold the 
least. It should also be noted that because very few sari sellers had good records, 
they were asked to estimate how many saris they sold in the past year. If they gave a 
range, the mean was used. Needless to say, the accuracy of these numbers leaves a 
lot to be desired.  
 
The next trio of categories compares urban, suburban and rural sari sellers. The 
overwhelming majority of the sari sellers are urban. The suburban sari sellers sell 
250 more saris a year due to the two shops on the main road to Pondicherry. The 
PPI scores of the urban and suburban are similar probability of 42.9% of living 
below the US$2/day poverty line. However, the rural sari sellers have a 55.2% 
probability of living below the US$2/day poverty line. This matches what Harper 
(2010) said about rural India being much poorer.  
 
The next trio of categories compared urban, suburban and rural full time sari sellers 
by stripping out the shop owners and part time sari sellers. The number of saris sold 
for the suburban is too high because it includes the two shops on the main 
Pondicherry road. Again, the overwhelming number of sari sellers is urban. 
However, this time the PPI scores show the poverty worsening as one goes from 
urban to suburban to rural. Urban full time sari sellers have a 42.9% probability of 
living below the US2$/day poverty line, suburban full time sari sellers have a 55.2% 
probability of living below the US2$/day poverty line and rural full time sari sellers 
have a 69.9% probability of living below the US2$/day poverty line. Once again, 
the rural area is much poorer than the urban areas.  
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The next trio of categories tries to isolate those who spend most of their time sari 
selling DQGFRPSDUH WKHP WR WKHRWKHUV7KH³6DUL2QO\)7´VDUL VHOOHUVDUH WKRVH
ZKRVSHQGPRVWRIWKHLUWLPHVHOOLQJVDULV7KH³6DULV	0D\EH)7´DOVRLQFOXGHV
those who are likely to spend much of their time selling saris but cannot be 
confirmed from the data. There is an overlap between these two categories. There is 
QRVXUSULVHWKDW WKH³6DUL2QO\)7´VDULVHOOHUVVHOORYHUZKHOPLQJO\PRUHWKDQWKH
RWKHUV +RZHYHU LW LV VXUSULVLQJ WKDW WKH ³6DUL 2QO\ )7´ VDUL VHOOers have 50.0% 
probability of living below the US2$/day poverty line while the others have a 42.9% 
probability of living below the US2$/day poverty line. This illustrates the point that 
Banerjee and Duflo (2011) make about the small profits made by businesses started 
by microfinance clients. 
 
Since animators form a significantly large part of the sample, the last comparison in 
Table 14 compares animators against non-animators. There are no significant 
differences found between the two.  
7.4 Sari Seller Social Network Data Analysis 
A key finding is that the sari sellers relied mostly on strong ties (For an example, 
see Figure 6 below). These are ties to people they have strong emotional bonds 
with. In Figure 6, all of the financial sources for the sari seller (coloured black) are 
providing non-collateral loans which indicate a high degree of trust making these 
strong ties. Both sari suppliers (coloured blue) are providing credit which again 
indicates a high degree of trust making these strong ties. While this sari seller does 
not get credit from the supplier in Surat, Gujarat in India, she depends on the 
connection with her husband and his good friend to get the saris from Gujarat. Both 
of these links are based on strong emotional bonds which are indicators of strong 
ties. This sari seller gets her market information from family, friends and customers 
which she has strong emotional ties with. The strong tie with customers is based on 
serving her base of 50 customers for at least 5 years.  She depends on the strong t ies 
with BWDA, her self-help group and her family and the link through her husband to 
his friend in Gujarat to help get more customers.  
Granovetter (1983) showed how the poor often rely on strong ties. If the sari sellers 
are depending on mostly strong ties, then Burt predicts that they are surrounded by 
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structural holes. A structural hole is a gap between nodes in a network that represent 
lost opportunity. This will tend to lead to exploitation as the poor have few ties and 
options around these. This research has found what appears to be a number of 
VWUXFWXUDOKROHVZLWKLQ0),¶VQHWZRUN)RUH[DPSOHDJURXSRIVDULVHOOHUV LQRQH
part of town who do not buy saris together because they are competitors do not 
know that another group of sari sellers in another part of town have figured out how 
to buy in bulk together and still be competitors. There are sari sellers who want to 
open sari shops who do not know sari sellers not far away who operate sari shops. 
Almost all sari sellers buy the saris in large sari shops. They do not know about a 
sari seller who used to work in a large sari shop who could pass them the tricks of 
the trade. A lot of sari sellers want training but do not know that there are two of 
them who want to train them. 
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Figure 9 
Strong and Weak Ties in a Sari Seller Ego Network 
Red=Sari Seller Black=Financial Sources Blue=Suppliers Grey=Other 
Contacts 
Bold Lines=Strong Ties, Non-Bold Lines=Weak Ties 
 
Other analysis was done on the sari seller ego networks. Table 15 breaks out the sari 
seller ego network data by jati. Besides all jati categories having on average more 
strong ties than weak ties, the sizes of the ego networks tend to be small after 
excluding individual customers. The effective size measure, which comes from Burt 
(1992), takes the number of alters or those not ego in an ego network and subtract 
the average degree of the alters not counting the connections to ego. This measures 
how well connected the alters are in an ego network. In general, the effective size is 
somewhat smaller than the number of alters indicating that these are not generally 
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well connected networks. Another indication of this is the network density measure. 
This takes the number of links in a network and divides it by the total possible 
number of links.  The densities range from 9% to 13% which indicates a number 
missing connections and structural holes. According to Burt (1992), this presents a 
brokerage opportunity but in the Indian context given the power distance it is 
unlikely that a poor sari seller will be able to, for example,  broker between a major 
bank and a large sari shop in Chennai.  
 
Jati # Avg. 
PPI 
Avg. Ego 
Strong 
Avg. Ego 
Weak 
Avg. 
Density 
Avg. 
Effsize 
Hindu Brahmin 2 89 4.5 3 0.11235 7.4655 
Chettiar 2 65.5 4 2 0.11805 5.9585 
Hindu Raddiar 4 83.25 5 1.25 0.13083 6.2345 
Yadava 4 73.5 7.5 2.75 0.098025 10.016 
Hindu OC 2 76.5 4 3.5 0.1037 7.5 
Avg.  BC 26 73.19 4.61 2.59 0.1167 7.14 
Avg. OBC 5 79.67 5.17 3.17 0.1040 8.2425 
Avg. MBC 44 73.83 6.26 1.75 0.1069 7.7656 
Avg. SC 7 64.125 4.75 1.625 0.1060 6.2588 
Avg. Muslim 10 68.25 5.83 3 0.1075 8.6722 
Table 15 ± Sari Seller Ego Networks by Jati 
 
Other analysis was done by category as shown in Table 16. Once again all 
categories have more strong ties than weak ties. Again, the network densities 
indicate that these ego networks are not very well interconnected. However, when 
comparing effective size against network size, all categories have effective sizes 
slightly smaller than the network size with one exception. That exception is the 
effective size for the ego networks of animators. This is significantly lower than the 
network size. This indicates that the alters in the ego networks of animators are 
much more interconnected than those of non-animators. This may be a result that 
because of their position, animators know more people who know each other than 
non-animators.  
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There were two other analyses done on the sari seller ego networks. First was the E 
± I Index test. The question to be answered is how much families took part in the 
ego networks of the sari sellers. UCINET was given a file which indicated whether 
or not an alter was a family member. The E ± I Index calculation was done with 
index ranging from 1 to -1 with -1 indicating that the entire ego network consisted 
of family members. As can be seen in Table 16, the ego networks are dominated by 
non-family members. Shop owners used the fewest family members in their ego 
networks while sari sellers selling full time used the most family members. 
 
The final analysis was done to see if there was any correlation with the shape of the 
network and any of the variables in Table 16. The shapes looked at were stars, 
simply modified stars, complex modified stars, two stars, boxes, diamonds and 
cliques. A clique is a network where all of the members are connected to every 
other member of the network. No significant correlations were found. See Appendix 
I ± Sari Seller Network Shapes Comparison.  
 
There was an attempt to measure closure within the SHG the sari seller by asking 
what percentage of time they spent socialising with each other, who they go to for 
advice on important matters and do they recommend the sari sellers to their friends. 
Because the meetings with the sari sellers took place when many SHG members 
were not available, the decision was taken to choose times the sari seller was 
available rather than the SHG. As a result of this decision, SHG closure data was 
not collected.  
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Type # 
Avg. 
PPI 
Avg. 
Ego 
#Strong 
Avg. 
Ego 
#Weak 
Avg. 
Density 
Avg. 
EffSize  
#Saris 
Sold / 
Year 
Avg. 
E-I 
Index Size  
Shop Owners 12 76.25 4.33 2.33 0.12 6.64 570.00 0.77 6.75 
Full Time 53 70.23 5.38 2.26 0.11 7.47 706.23 0.64 7.66 
Part Time 45 73.64 5.11 2.18 0.11 7.18 185.30 0.73 7.29 
          Urban 70 74.91 5.33 2.26 0.11 7.44 426.55 0.69 7.60 
Suburban 22 71.86 5.82 1.77 0.11 7.45 676.67 0.74 7.59 
Rural 19 61.68 4.11 2.58 0.12 6.61 444.21 0.65 6.74 
 
         Urban No SO 
& PT 36 73.69 5.47 2.36 0.11 7.64 570.28 0.63 7.86 
Sub. No SO & 
PT 10 63.20 6.70 1.10 0.11 7.65 1164.00 0.65 7.80 
Rural No SO 
& PT 9 56.22 4.22 2.89 0.12 6.98 577.78 0.63 7.11 
          Saris Only FT 15 68.33 6.00 2.53 0.10 8.34 1392.00 0.56 8.53 
Saris & Maybe 
FT 19 70.63 5.95 2.79 0.10 8.57 1327.89 0.60 8.74 
All Others 92 72.34 5.07 2.10 0.12 7.04 297.59 0.70 7.18 
          Animators 60 71.68 5.25 2.32 0.11 5.47 465.50 0.70 7.60 
Non-
Animators 51 72.47 5.18 2.10 0.11 7.16 501.54 0.66 7.27 
Table 16 ± Sari Seller Ego Network Data 
7.5 Problems with Sari Seller Social Network Data 
An analysis done by organisation revealed there was some serious problems with 
the network data collected during the second research field trip. What the analysis 
does is to see which organisations the sari sellers share. The more organisations a 
sari seller shares with other sari sellers, the more likely they have a personal 
connection with each other. In this way a hidden structure can be revealed. This 
analysis did not work because many of the sari sellers belonged to the same 
organisations and showed connections between sari sellers that were known not to 
be correct. For example, a number of SHGs all over the Tamil Nadu and 
Pondicherry used the State Bank of India. This did not mean that a sari seller in 
Villupuram who took a loan from the State Bank of India knew a sari seller who 
took a loan from the same bank in Cuddalore. It turns out that when identifying the 
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nodes in their ego networks, persons and organisations were identified. This turned 
out to be comparing apples and oranges. What would be needed was network data 
that indicated the person the sari seller knew in these organisations. The person-to-
person networks would provide much more solid network data.  
7.6 Hypotheses to be Tested 
The hypotheses below will be tested on the new person-to-person network data for 
two purposes. First is to verify that the key results of the second research trip are 
confirmed by the new improved network data. Second is to verify the need for weak 
bridging ties in the social networks of the sari sellers.   
According to Granovetter (1983), the poor rely more on strong ties than weak ties. 
Granovetter posits that this is because of the level of insecurity experienced by the 
poor. Therefore, it is expected that the poor will have more strong ties than weak 
ties in their ego networks. This would confirm the results from the second research 
field trip. If the hypothesis is confirmed, the answer to the first research question is 
for the MFI to help introduce weak bridging ties to the social network of heir sari 
seller clients.  
Hypothesis 1: The sari sellers will have more strong ties than weak ties in their ego 
networks.    
Burt (1992) argues that the more non-redundant links in an ego network, the more 
structural holes this social network will have. The measure Burt uses to measure 
redundancy of ties is effective size. The higher the effective size, the more non-
redundant ties there are in the ego network which implies an increasing number of 
VWUXFWXUDO KROHV  %XUW¶V PHDVXUH RI HIILFLHQF\ GLYLGHV WKH HIIHFWLYH VL]H E\ WKH
number of alters in the ego network. This gives a rough percentage of the number of 
alters that have non-redundant ties to ego. The expectation is that their business 
based ego networks, unlike their family based ego networks, will have large 
percentage of non-redundant ties to their alters.  If this hypothesis is confirmed, this 
would agree with the results from the second research filed trip where most sari 
sellers had the effective size of their social networks only slightly smaller than the 
size.  
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Hypothesis 2: An overwhelming majority of sari sellers will have efficiencies of 
least 0.60 (60%) indicating access to a significant number of structural holes. 
Granovetter (1983) also posited that the reliance of the poor on strong ties will lead 
to fragmentation of their networks. This means that the removal of just one person 
from the combined network of all the ego networks at either the BWDA level or 
branch level could lead to a loss of access to information for the sari seller.  If this 
hypothesis is confirmed, this would mean that the sari seller social network for the 
business is susceptible to fragmentation if key people leave the network. This would 
interrupt the flow of information to the sari seller. However, the introduction of 
weak bridging ties will strengthen the network and help prevent fragmentation.   
Hypothesis 3: The maximum Girvan-Newman Q value will indicate the full and 
branch networks are highly fragmented. 
7.7 Ego Networks Data Analysis 
Of the 111 sari sellers interviewed in October 2010, 83 were interviewed in May 
2011.  The resulting ego networks were analysed to see if any patterns emerged. 
The two obvious findings were that the business networks of these sari sellers were 
VPDOODQGUHOLDQWRQVWURQJWLHV7KHDYHUDJHVL]HWKHVDULVHOOHU¶VEXVLQHVVQHWZRUNV
excluding customers was 6.18. The average number of strong ties in these networks 
was 3.88 and the average number of weak ties was 1.58. It is probable that the 
number of strong ties is higher. Some of those who collected the data put the alters 
at a constant distance from ego rather than a distance that indicated the true 
emotional closeness to ego. Some of these were corrected but there remain some 
uncorrected.  
To illustrate how ties were analyzed using a diagram based on Kahn and Antonucci 
(1980), Figure 7 below will be used as an example. The six aOWHUVRIWKHVDULVHOOHU¶V
business network are represented by dots. The lines between the dots represent 
relationships between the alters.  The four alters in the light grey area very close to 
ego, represented by the white circle in the centre, are treated as strong ties since they 
are so emotionally close to ego. The alter in the dark grey area is a supplier and 
treated as a weak tie. The alter outside the dark grey circle is a local government 
minister. The sari seller identified him as someone who could help her sell a 
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hypothetical Kanchipuram silk sari worth 25,000 rupees (around £340). Previously, 
the sari seller had shown photos of herself and this local government minister at 
several events. When asked why the local government minister was placed so far 
away, her reply was that in the latest elections, he was just voted out of office! 
 
Figure 10 ± Example of Network Data Collected on Third Research Field Trip 
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However, one must be careful to not always assume that every alter placed in the 
dark grey is a weak tie. There may be cases, for example, where a family member  
may be placed in the dark grey area but still be a strong tie especially if no other 
alters are placed closer.  
Type Sample# PPI Size Ties Density 
Full Data 83 73.11 6.18 13.49 46.03 
Table 17 ± Averages for All Sari Sellers Part 1 
 
Type EgoBet NEgoBet EffSize Efficiency Constraint Ego#Strong Ego#Weak 
Full 
Data 15.52 45.02 4.17 0.64 0.52 3.88 1.58 
Table 18 ± Averages for All Sari Sellers Part 2 
Tables 17 and 18 show the average values for the 83 ego networks. PPI stands for 
the Progress Out of Poverty Index created by Grameen Foundation. The average PPI 
for the 83 sari sellers is 73.11. Appendix E holds the PPI Probability Table which 
shows the probabilities of someone with this PPI being below various poverty lines.  
The PPI indicates there is a small probability that the sari sellers earn below 
$1.25/day, a large percentage of sari sellers are either earning between $1.50/day to 
$2.00/day or earning more than $2.00/day. This means that extra income earned 
could put the sari seller above the $2.00/day threshold or if already earning above 
$2.00/day, the extra income could provide an extra safety margin in case of 
financial shocks to the household.  
In Table 17, the average size of 6.18 and average ties of 13.49 indicate that on 
average each sari seller has around 6 alters in their business networks with an 
additional 7 ties between the alters.  However the average density of 46.00 indicates 
that these business networks have room for many more additional ties between the 
nodes of the networks. The density is the ratio of existing ties in the network to the 
total number of possible ties in the network.    
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In Table 18(JR%HWZHHQHVV(JR%HWLVHJR¶VSURSRUWLRQRIWLPHVHJROLHVRQWKH
shortest path between each pair of alters.  The more often ego is the only way to 
connect the alters, the higher the ego betweeness score. The more interconnected the 
alters are, the lower the ego betweeness score. The normalised ego betweeness score 
(NegoBet) is normalised by a function of the number of nodes in the ego network. 
Both of these averages will be used as a baseline to compare the different categories 
of ego networks.  
Effective Size (EffSize), Efficiency and Constraint comes from the structural hole 
calculations. Effective size is an indication of how interconnected an ego network 
is. The more interconnected the network is, the smaller the effective size. An 
effective size equal to the size of the network indicates that none of the alters are 
connected to each other which means all ties are non-redundant. Efficiency is the 
HIIHFWLYHVL]HGLYLGHGE\WKHQXPEHURIDOWHUVLQHJR¶VQHWZRUN&RQVWUDLQWLQGLFDWHV
KRZPXFKDSHUVRQ¶VQHWZRUNLQKLELWVWKDWSHUVRQLQUHDFKLQJRWKHUVLQWKHEURDGHU
network (VDOHQWH  SJ  7KLV EDVHG RQ D WKHRU\ RI %XUW¶V  SJ 
where he posits that the more interconnected the network, the more constrained ego 
is because the alters can collude to keep information from ego.  These three average 
values will also be used as a baseline to compare different categories of ego 
networks. 
Finally, on average, the sari sellers have over twice the number of strong ties than 
weak ties. This is an indication that there is reliance by the sari sellers on strong ties. 
This data supports Hypothesis 1. The average efficiency of 0.64 indicates that 
roughly 64% of the ties to alters are non-redundant which signifies that these sari 
sellers do have access to structural holes. This supports Hypothesis 2. 
7.8 Comparison of Ego Networks Data Analysis 
Below are the comparisons among different categories of sari sellers.  The 
categories are either by location (Urban, suburban, rural) or by time commitment 
(Shop Owner, Full Time, Part Time). Urban areas include cities and towns such as 
Villupuram, Pondicherry, Tindivanam and Cuddalore. Rural indicates agricultural 
areas dedicated to farming and livestock. For the purposes of this research, suburban 
refers to towns along the major roads in the area that are outside of urban areas but 
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are not rural such as Koliyanur, Viliyanur and Madagadipet. For the time 
commitment categories, shop owner indicates a sari seller who owns a shop that 
sells saris. Full time sari seller indicates that there is no indication that she has any 
other job or source of income besides selling saris. Part time sari sellers do have a 
job or other source of income besides sari selling. 
Type Sample# PPI Size Ties Density 
Urban 49 74.88 6.82 16.51 45.36 
Suburban 15 74.93 5.53 9.53 49.03 
Rural 13 63.00 5.54 8.77 35.17 
Table 19 ± Urban, Suburban and Rural Ego Network Comparison Part I 
 
Type EgoBet NegoBet EffSize Efficiency Constraint Ego#Strong Ego#Weak 
Urban 19.98 45.15 4.59 0.64 0.51 3.94 2.14 
Suburban 8.82 43.10 3.72 0.62 0.52 4.00 0.87 
Rural 13.36 60.53 4.04 0.72 0.48 3.08 1.92 
Table 20 ± Urban, Suburban and Rural Ego Network Comparison Part II 
 
In Tables 19 and 20, are the comparisons between the urban, suburban and rural sari 
sellers. The striking thing is the urban/rural divide that shows up in the data. A 
number of commentators, such as Harper (2010, pgs. 1 - 15), have remarked on the 
urban/rural divide in India. First, in Table 19, there are more sari sellers in the urban 
areas than in the suburban or rural areas combined.  Most striking is the difference 
in the PPI between urban, suburban and rural areas. The PPI score for suburban and 
rural are very close to 75. This means that there could be almost a 28% difference 
on average in the probability between an urban/suburban sari seller living below 
$2.00/day and a rural sari seller. Urban sari sellers have one more person in their 
business networks than their suburban or rural counterparts.   However, urban sari 
sellers have on average 10 ties between their alters versus 4 for suburban sari 
sellers. This is probably because the urban sari sellers have access to more possible 
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network contacts than their suburban or rural counterparts.  The average density of 
WKH XUEDQ VDUL VHOOHU¶V QHWZRUNV LV VOLJKWO\ VPDOOHU WKDQ WKH VXEXUEDQ RQHV PDLQO\
because the suburban networks are smaller than the urban ones. But, the average 
rural network is significantly less dense than either urban or suburban. If theory is 
FRUUHFW WKHUH FRXOG EH D VLJQLILFDQW LPSDFW RQ WKH UXUDO VDUL VHOOHU¶V 33, VFRUHV LI
their business networks become larger and denser especially with the addition of 
weak bridging ties.   
In Table 20, urban and suburban sari sellers have almost the same number of strong 
ties. However, urban sari sellers have twice the number of weak ties on average than 
the suburban sari sellers which could be related to urban sari sellers having access to 
more possible network contacts. Rural sari sellers have one less strong tie compared 
to their urban and suburban but just somewhat smaller of weak ties compared to 
their urban counterparts. It is clear that the rural sari sellers do not seem to benefit 
from this extra weak tie as evidenced by the average PPI score but it is not clear 
why this is so from the data. It could be the overall smaller network sizes for rural 
sari sellers or the lack of access to more possible network contacts. It may be that 
their urban counterparts have a wider choice of weak ties and can connect to weak 
ties that have more bridging opportunities than the rural sari sellers can.  The ego 
betweeness values confirm that the urban sari sellers have bigger and more 
interconnected networks putting them more at the centre than their suburban and 
rural counterparts. The surprise is that suburban sari sellers ego betweeness is so 
small. But, the normalised ego betweeness values show that size difference of the 
networks is a factor. The normalised ego betweeness is normalised as a function of 
the number of nodes. This value shows that the suburban sari sellers are almost as 
central as their urban counterparts but that rural sari sellers are shown to be even 
more central in their networks. By comparing the effective size against size, an 
indication of how interconnected the networks is achieved.   
The bigger the difference between size and effective size, the more interconnected 
the network is.  Urban sari sellers have the biggest difference of 2.23 followed by 
the suburban difference of 1.81 and the rural one of 1.5. The wider access to 
QHWZRUN FRQWDFWV DQG WKH XUEDQ VDUL VHOOHU¶V SURSHQVLW\ WR FRQQHFW WR SHRSOH ZKR
already know each other explains the larger difference for them between size and 
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effective size. There is little difference between efficiency and constraint values. 
Even if there were significant differences in the constraint values, it is not clear if 
%XUW¶V  pg. 54) theory that the more interconnected the network, the more 
constrained ego is because the alters can collude to keep information from ego 
which results in ego not reaching out of the network is a valid explanation in the 
context of Tamil Nadu. Since all but a few of the original sari sellers are low caste 
women, the social context may be a better explanation for ego not getting 
information.  
For the urban, suburban and rural sari sellers, all of them have more strong ties than 
weak ties, which support Hypothesis 1. They have efficiencies ranging from 0.62 to 
0.72 indicating they have access to structural holes. This supports Hypothesis 2. 
Type Sample# PPI Size Ties Density 
Shop 
Owners 9 79.56 5.89 11.00 51.00 
Full Time 34 71.88 6.56 15.29 40.57 
Part Time 35 73.97 6.31 12.94 44.89 
Table 21 ± Ego Network Comparison by Sari Seller Role Part I 
Type EgoBet NegoBet EffSize Efficiency Constraint Ego#Strong Ego#Weak 
Shop 
Owners 13.65 44.14 3.97 0.61 0.56 2.33 3.17 
Full 
Time 14.90 49.85 4.45 0.67 0.46 4.65 1.19 
Part 
Time 19.35 47.55 4.40 0.65 0.52 3.33 2.03 
Table 22 ± Ego Network Comparison by Sari Seller Role Part II 
Tables 21 and 22 are comparisons between part time sari sellers, full time sari 
sellers and sari sellers who own shops.  The most interesting findings involve the 
shop owners. They have the highest PPI score and network density. The average PPI 
score is almost 80 which means that a number shop owners will have a low 
probability of earning below $2.00/day. But, they have the smallest network among 
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the three, the lowest betweeness, and the least interconnected network but are the 
only category of sari sellers who have more weak ties than strong ties. The question 
is, are these weak ties weak bridging ties? Of the nine shop owners, there is 
evidence for 6 of them that these are weak bridging ties.  Sari seller#11 gets market 
information through her weak tie. Sari seller#19 and sari seller#75 have suppliers as 
weak ties who would considerable information about the sari business and therefore 
could act as bridges. Sari seller#70 has a moneylender as a weak tie. Moneylenders 
traditionally know a lot of information about the neighbours and can serve as a 
weak bridging tie to information about potential customers. Sari seller#10 and sari 
seller#21 have BWDA as weak ties and it is possible that useful information may 
pass through this tie. This is evidence that could show that weak bridging ties are 
being used by the shop owners in a way that brings new information to them that 
could help them to improve their businesses which increases their PPI score 
compared to the other sari sellers. Unfortunately there is no direct, reliable data on 
the performance of their businesses to confirm this.  The weak ties for the shop 
owners tend to be either financial sources (moneylenders or pawnbrokers) or 
suppliers.  
On the one hand, full time sari sellers have the biggest and most interconnected 
networks of the three categories of sari sellers which show in the full time sari 
sellers having the biggest difference between size and effective size. But, full time 
sari sellers tend to have lowest density networks and seem not to be as central in 
their networks as part time sari sellers as evidenced by the ego betweeness values. 
However, when normalised by the number of nodes, full time sari sellers 
betweeness centrality is slightly higher than the part time sari sellers. The most 
significant difference between the full time and part time sari sellers is the number 
of strong and weak ties they have in their networks. As shown in Table 22, full time 
sari sellers have four strong ties in their networks while having only one weak tie. 
Part time sari sellers have a three-to-two ratio of strong to weak ties instead. This 
indicates that adding weak bridging ties to the networks of the full time sari sellers 
could have a significant impact.  
Both the full time and part time sari sellers have more strong ties than weak ties, 
which supports Hypothesis 1. The shop owning sari sellers have more weak ties 
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than strong ties which does not support Hypothesis 1. All three categories have 
efficiencies ranging from 0.61 to 0.67 indicating they have access to structural 
holes. This supports Hypothesis 2. 
Type Sample# PPI Size Ties Density 
Animators 48 74.54 6.40 13.46 45.76 
Non-
Animators 53 71.14 5.89 13.54 46.41 
Table 23 ± Ego Networks Comparison by SHG Role Part I 
 
Type EgoBet NegoBet EffSize Efficiency Constraint Ego#Strong Ego#Weak 
Animators 16.18 45.39 4.43 0.65 0.51 3.70 1.80 
Non-
Animators 14.62 44.50 3.82 0.64 0.52 4.09 1.32 
Table 24 ± Ego Networks Comparison by SHG Role Part II 
Despite being only 5% of the overall population of BWDA clients, animators (SHG 
leaders) make up over 54% of the sari seller population in the third research field 
trip. The purpose of this comparison is to see if there is any significant difference 
between sari sellers who are animators and those who are not. Animators have a 
slightly higher PPI score than Non-Animators but both range of poverty 
probabilities (see Table 23). Animators have somewhat bigger networks than Non-
Animators but have slightly smaller density and number of ties.  Animators have a 
markedly higher centrality betweeness but this disappears when normalised. Non-
Animator ego networks are more interconnected than the ones for the Animators 
based on the effective size. Based on the difference between the number of strong 
and weak ties in their ego networks, Animators are less reliant on strong ties than 
Non-Animators.  
Both Animators and Non-Animators sari sellers have more strong ties than weak 
ties, which supports Hypothesis 1. Both categories have efficiencies ranging from 
0.64 to 0.65 indicating they have access to structural holes. This supports 
Hypothesis 2. 
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7.9 Comparing Category Data against the Full Data Set 
When comparing the averages in Table 17 and 18 to the values in Tables 19, 20, 21, 
22, 23 and 24, two things stand out. Rural sari sellers have significantly lower PPI 
scores and smaller network sizes, number of ties, network density and number of 
strong ties. The only place where the rural sari sellers greatly exceeded the average 
is in the normalised ego betweeness which indicates the rural sari sellers are very 
central to their networks, despite being smaller, when normalised for the number of 
nodes. This may indicate that the rural sari sellers require more general support in 
building their overall business networks and not just in the addition of weak 
bridging ties. Full time sari sellers and especially suburban sari sellers have 
significantly smaller number of weak ties in their networks than the overall average. 
This may indicate that adding weak bridging ties to their business networks may 
have a significant impact. The key would be finding effective mechanisms for doing 
so.  
7.10 Caste Categories 
Caste is one of the most important social features of India. The data has been 
analysed to see what impact caste has on the business networks of the sari sellers.  
The caste designators are the ones used by the sari sellers themselves are in 
common usage in Tamil Nadu. 
Type PPI Size Ties Density EgoBet NEgoBet 
Labbay Muslim 88.25 4.25 11.00 70.00 0.73 12.09 
Muslim 47.67 6.00 8.00 14.07 15.17 84.26 
Muslim Sheikh 70.50 4.50 11.00 65.00 1.25 19.17 
Muslim 
Average 70.78 4.89 10.00 50.25 5.66 37.72 
Table 25 ± Ego Networks Comparison by Muslim Jatis Part I 
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Type EffSize Efficiency Constraint Ego#Strong Ego#Weak 
Labbay 
Muslim 2.17 0.50 0.68 4.00 0.25 
Muslim 5.07 0.88 0.31 4.67 0.00 
Muslim 
Sheikh 2.15 0.49 0.63 4.50 0.00 
Muslim 
Average 3.13 0.63 0.55 4.33 0.11 
Table 26 ± Ego Networks Comparison by Muslim Jatis Part II 
Caste is such an essential part of the social structure in India it seems to permeate 
everything. Unlike Hinduism, Islam does not have caste system but Muslim sari 
sellers were easily able to answer the question of what jati they belonged to.  
Comparing the averages for the Muslim sari sellers in Tables 25 and 26 to the 
averages for all 83 sari sellers in Tables 17 and 18, the Muslim sari sellers had more 
strong ties, slightly more constraint and a denser network. In all other areas, the 
Muslim sari sellers were smaller. However, the most interesting differences are 
among the Muslim jatis. These sari sellers, who call themselves just Muslim, stand 
from those in the Labbay Muslim and Muslim Sheikh jatis. Compared to Labbay 
Muslims, who have only a 12.9% probability of living on US$2.00/day, the Muslim 
sari sellers have a 79% probability of living on US$2.00/day (see Appendix E). 
Muslims have a slightly bigger network size than the Labbay Muslims and the 
Muslim Sheikhs. However, the alters of the Muslim networks are not as well 
interconnected as those of the Labbay Muslims and Muslim Sheikhs which explains 
why the effective size of the Labbay Muslim and Muslim Sheikh networks are much 
smaller. As a result, the network density of the Muslim sari seller networks is much 
smaller on average than those of the Labbay Muslims and Muslim Sheikhs. All 
three Muslim jatis are extremely reliant on strong ties and all three have almost no 
weak ties in their networks. Compared to the Labbay Muslim and Muslim Sheikh 
sari sellers, the Muslim sari sellers have a relatively low constraint value. According 
WR %XUW¶V DUJXPHQW  SJ  WKRVH ZLWK ORZ FRQVWUDLQW YDOXHV DUH OHVV
inhibited by their network connections to form ties that will bring information from 
the outside. This is in the context of a network inside U.S. multinationals, banks and 
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law firms constrains the entrepreneurial opportunities where a large amount of time 
and energy to reach the network and the network is surrounded by few structural 
holes that provides the leverage to negotiate a favourable return on investment. 
However, this is not happening for these sari sellers. They have no weak ties in their 
networks which would indicate a bridge where information can travel over. All 
three Muslim women mentioned they were uncomfortable operating outside of their 
Muslim community in Villupuram. Their business networks have been shaped 
around the contours of the social context they live in and that is acting as the major 
constraint. These sari sellers did not have to expend a lot of time and energy to 
reach this network. In this case, the constraint factor for the business networks of 
the Muslim sari sellers does not indicate much as the social context and social 
network of the Muslim community in Villupuram is a much more important factor 
in how their business networks are shaped. 
All the Muslim sari sellers have more strong ties than weak ties, which supports 
Hypothesis 1. Both Labbay Muslims and Muslim Sheikhs have efficiencies ranging 
from 0.49 to 0.50 indicating they have below average access to structural holes. 
This does not support Hypothesis 2. The sari sellers that simply identify themselves 
as Muslim have one of the highest efficiencies at 0.88 that indicates significant 
access to structural holes that supports Hypothesis 2.  
Type PPI Size Ties Density EgoBet NEgoBet 
Hindu Brahmin 
Average 89.00 7.00 7.00 15.60 16.75 79.17 
Table 27 ± Hindu Brahmin Ego Networks Data Part I 
 
Type EffSize Efficiency Constraint Ego#Strong Ego#Weak 
Hindu Brahmin 
Average 6.04 0.87 0.34 2.00 3.00 
Table 28 ± Hindu Brahmin Ego Networks Data Part II 
The Brahmin sari sellers have a well above average PPI score that indicates a low 
probability of living on US$2.00/day. Their average network size is slightly larger 
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than the average for the 83 sari sellers but they have smaller than average number of 
ties, network density and a relatively high effective size due to the low level of 
interconnectedness in the networks. Brahmins were among one of four jatis where 
they had more weak ties than strong in their business networks. One may expected 
them to have networks that are more robust. However, it may be that these sari 
sellers depend on unreported Brahmin networks to support their sari business. One 
of the Brahmin sari sellers told that her brother owns a lorry business with 17 
trucks. Whenever she needed to buy saris from Surat in the state of Gujarat, her 
brother would arrange for his lorries to bring the saris back from Gujarat. If his 
trucks were not available, he would use his contacts to see if others in the lorry 
business could carry the saris. This access to Brahmin networks and being 
significantly better off than most of the other sari sellers may explain why these 
Brahmin sari sellers do not suffer the insecurity that Granovetter (1983) says drive 
the poor towards strong ties.   
The Brahmin sari sellers have more weak ties than strong ties, which does not 
support Hypothesis 1. They also have an efficiency of 0.87, which indicates 
significant access to structural holes and supports Hypothesis 2.  
 
Type PPI Size Ties Density EgoBet NEgoBet 
Hindu 
Agamuthalier 56.00 10.00 32.00 35.56 29.00 64.44 
Hindu Vathavar 71.00 10.00 31.00 34.44 58.33 64.81 
Hindu Komudur 24.00 7.00 14.00 33.33 14.00 66.67 
Table 29 ± Ego Networks Comparison of Three Jatis Part I 
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Type EffSize Efficiency Constraint Ego#Strong Ego#Weak 
Hindu 
Agamuthalier 6.80 0.68 0.33 4.00 6.00 
Hindu 
Vathavar 6.90 0.69 0.33 0.00 10.00 
Hindu 
Komudur 5.00 0.71 0.36 2.00 4.00 
Table 30 ± Ego Networks Comparison for Three Jatis Part II 
There are 7 jatis that have only 1 sari seller in it. The three highlighted above are 
ones where the sari seller had more weak ties than strong ties. For the Hindu 
Agamuthalier sari seller, four of the weak ties are to BWDA staff in the Villupuram 
branch office. Unlike most other sari sellers, she saw BWDA staff as weak rather 
than strong ties. The Hindu Vathavar sari seller ten weak ties is probably a mistake. 
The person who recorded her ties put all of the alters just beyond the boundary 
defining weak and strong no matter close they were to ego. The most interesting 
case is that of the Hindu Komudur sari seller. Two of her weak ties were suppliers 
while the other two were BWDA staff. Two other BWDA staff members were 
identified as strong ties. What makes this so interesting is that at a PPI score of 24, 
she is the poorest of the sari sellers interviewed. She has a 98% probability of living 
on US$2.00/day. So why does the poorest sari seller have more weak ties than 
strong ties when such poverty is expected to generate an insecurity that leads to a 
reliance on strong ties? She does have a contract with the state government of Tamil 
Nadu to stitch uniforms that may give her enough security to allow her to depend on 
weak ties.  
All three castes have more weak ties than strong ties, which does not support 
Hypothesis 1.  The three castes have efficiencies that range from 0.68 to 0.71, which 
indicates access to structural holes. This supports Hypothesis 2. 
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Type PPI Size Ties Density EgoBet NEgoBet 
Hindu Reddiar 
Average 83.25 6.25 9.00 39.82 12.25 56.61 
Hindu OC Average 76.50 5.50 9.00 27.39 7.09 63.49 
BC Average 74.82 7.09 15.91 38.16 22.93 53.09 
OBC Average 82.33 4.67 12.00 71.11 1.05 11.30 
MBC Average 71.58 5.97 13.94 52.24 15.47 37.88 
Table 31 ± Ego Networks Comparison for Five Jatis Part I 
Type EffSize Efficiency Constraint Ego#Strong Ego#Weak 
Hindu Reddiar 
Average 4.63 0.69 0.56 3.00 1.67 
Hindu OC 
Average 4.11 0.77 0.46 3.00 3.00 
BC Average 5.12 0.69 0.46 4.16 1.89 
OBC Average 2.10 0.45 0.69 4.33 0.33 
MBC Average 3.81 0.60 0.56 3.79 1.61 
Table 32 ± Ego Networks Comparison for Five Jatis Part II 
The Reddiar jati are landowners and rent collectors (Sinniah, 2010). Other Category 
(OC), Backward Caste (BC), Other Backward Caste (OBC) and Most Backward 
Caste (MBC) are categorisations of castes created by the Indian government 
(Kishor,2011). Other category is mainly comprised of three of the highest classes in 
the Varna system, which are the Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Vaishyas. Backward 
castes are deemed to be from the economically and backward classes of the society. 
Other backward castes, consisting around 30% of the population of India, are 
considered similar to scheduled tribes. These are tribes that have traditionally lived 
in the forests, making up 7 ± 8% of Indian population. They have traditionally been 
marginalized and not in the mainstream of the society. Most backward castes are the 
ones considered by the Indian government the most economically and socially 
deprived (Kishor, 2011). 
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Tables 31 and 32 hold the data for the castes discussed above. Except for the MBC, 
the other caste groups have above average PPI scores. The MBC PPI score is just 
below average. OBC sari sellers networks on average are significantly above the 
average for all sari sellers. Only the OBC and MBC sari sellers have network 
densities that are above average. The MBC sari sellers above average network 
density is due to slightly higher than average network connectivity. The OBC sari 
sellers above average density is due to its relatively small network size.  With 
exception of the Hindu OC sari sellers, the rest have more strong ties than weak ties. 
Since Hindu OC includes the higher order castes, these sari sellers may have more 
access to weak ties for the reasons discussed above.  
With the exception of Hindu Other Castes (OC), the other four castes have more 
strong ties than weak ones, which support Hypothesis 1. The support of the Hindu 
OC data for Hypothesis 1 is inconclusive. With the exception of Hindu Other 
Backward Castes (OBC), the remaining castes have efficiencies ranging from 0.60 
to 0.77 indicating access to structural holes and supports Hypothesis 2.  The Hindu 
OBC sari sellers have an efficiency of 0.45, which indicates a much lower access to 
structural holes. The reason for this is that the Hindu OBC sari sellers have a 
relatively high network density of 71.11 indicating there are relatively few non-
redundant ties.   
Type PPI Size Ties Density EgoBet NEgoBet 
Dalit 57.00 5.00 12.00 60.00 4.00 40.00 
Hindu SC 84.50 5.00 16.50 82.50 1.59 7.92 
Dalit & Hindu SC 
Average 75.33 5.00 15.00 75.00 2.39 18.61 
Table 33 ± Ego Networks Comparison for Scheduled Castes Part I 
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Type EffSize Efficiency Constraint Ego#Strong Ego#Weak 
Dalit 2.60 0.52 0.53 5.00 0.00 
Hindu SC 1.70 0.34 0.70 5.00 0.00 
Dalit & Hindu 
SC Average 2.00 0.40 0.65 5.00 0.00 
Table 34 ± Ego Networks Comparison for Scheduled Castes Part II 
Hindu Scheduled Castes (SC) are the castes that were in earlier times considered as 
untouchables comprising 16-17% of the total population of the country (Kishor, 
2011). Originally the untouchables were considered below the caste system. Today 
the untouchables are called Dalits. While the Dalit sari seller has a PPI score of 57 
giving her a 69.9% probability of living below the US$2.00/day poverty line, the 
two Hindu SC sari sellers have an average PPI score of 84.50 giving them only a 
15.5% probability of living below the US$2.00/day poverty line. They all have 
smaller than average effective sizes and larger than average network densities due to 
the network connectivity. What stands out is that none of these sari sellers have any 
weak ties in their ego networks. These sari sellers are at the bottom of the pyramid 
in India and the lack of weak ties supports the argument Granovetter (1983) made 
about insecurity being the reason the poor are reliant on strong ties. While the Hindu 
SC sari sellers may not be as relatively poor as the Dalit sari seller, the insecurity 
associated with being at the bottom may be enough to induce the reliance on strong 
ties.  
Each caste has no weak ties, which supports Hypothesis 1. For these castes, the 
efficiencies range from 0.34 to 0.52, which does not support Hypothesis 2. The 
reason the Hindu Scheduled Caste (SC) sari sellers have a network efficiency of 
0.34 is because of their very high network density of 82.50 which indicates there are 
very few non-redundant ties in their networks and therefore, little access to 
structural holes. 
7.11 Summary of Category Support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 
There were twenty-two categories analysed overall. Of these, sixteen categories 
supported Hypothesis 1, five did not support Hypothesis 1 and one category was 
inconclusive. Similarly, seventeen categories supported Hypothesis 2 and five 
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categories did not support Hypothesis 2. In general, Hypotheses 1 and 2 found 
support in the ego network data with some exceptions.  
7.12 Discussion on Access to Structural Holes 
The data shows that most of the sari sellers have access to structural holes in their 
ego networks. However, to get the benefit of this, one must either build a weak 
bridging tie to access non-redundant information or use the access to this non-
redundant information to create a brokerage opportunity. The sari sellers do not 
seem to be doing either. They do not seem to recognise the opportunity that natural 
networks in their lives present. For example, two sari sellers have husbands who 
work for the Indian Railways. They both work at Villupuram Junction, which is a 
major station on the main line from Chennai to Madurai in Tamil Nadu. This social 
network of the southern railway of Indian Railways offers potential connections to 
thousands of employees who will know people who want to buy saris. However, the 
sari sellers have never explored this. The strong closure evident in all the ego 
networks studied explains why the sari sellers did not explore this depending instead 
on the strong ties that generated the closure. It is important to remember the social 
context in which Burt (1992) did his research. This is among managers of big 
American banks and high technology firms where managers can easily create weak 
ties, identify, and take advantage of the structural holes around them. There is a very 
different social context operating in Tamil Nadu especially among poor sari sellers.  
The biggest difference between these two social contexts is the stronger and more 
rigid social hierarchy in Tamil Nadu. Unlike the low power distance countries like 
the United States (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005), where building weak bridging ties 
is much easier, the poor sari seller in Tamil Nadu will often need to build weak 
bridging ties to those higher in the social hierarchy.  The power distance between 
the sari seller and the alter makes building a weak bridging tie more difficult. The 
power distance between the sari seller and the alter means that the presence of a 
non-redundant tie does not automatically offer the sari seller a brokerage 
opportunity. Therefore, the data and the social context  indicates that sari sellers will 
need help in accessing the potential of structural holes to bring them the non-
redundant information needed to improve their businesses.    
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7.13 Full Network Data Analysis 
By using the connections between the BWDA staff members, a whole network can 
be created from all the ego networks of the sari sellers. The perspective of this 
whole network is from the bottom up or that of the sari sellers. If the network is 
created from a top down perspective, it is very likely a very different network would 
emerge.  
When the ego networks are combined into a whole network (see Figure 8 below), it 
is shown that this network is fragmented and contains a number of structural holes. 
The major indication of fragmentation is that there are no ties between branches 
accept through BWDA head office in the network. In reality, there are ties between 
the branch staff but there are none from the perspective of the sari sellers. In this 
way, the full network resembles command and control structures where the silos 
join at the top. However, at the level of the sari sellers, the reality is that there are 
almost no ties between sari sellers of different branches. Weak ties should be able to 
bridge the structural holes and help stabilise the network. Looking at the network 
diagrams, it is easy to visualise the various places where the network could be 
fragmented.  
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Figure 11 ± BWDA Full Sari Network Coloured by Branches 
7KH GDWD LQGLFDWH WKDW WKH VDUL VHOOHU¶V QHWZRUNV DUH VPDOO DQG WKDW WKH\ UHO\ RQ
strong ties. The average size the sari selOHU¶VEXVLQHVVQHWZRUNVH[FOXGLQJFXVWRPHUV
was 6.18. The average number of strong ties in these networks was 3.88 and the 
average number of weak ties was 1.58.  
Centrality is an important concept in social network analysis. This is because people 
occupying the central positions in networks often occupy important positions of 
prestige and visibility and may be influential in the spread of ideas and behaviours 
(Valente, 2010). Network analysts have developed numerous ways to measure 
centrality (Borgatti and Everett, 2006). The analysis of the whole networks will 
focus on three types of centrality; degree, betweeness (Freeman, 1979) and 
eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1987). Degree centrality is a measure of the 
number of links connecting a node. Betweeness centrality measures the frequency a 
person lies on the shortest path connecting everyone else in the network. 
Eigenvector centrality of a node is a measure of the centrality of its neighbouring 
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nodes. It is important to note that each centrality can produce a different set of 
central players.  
The senior manager of Villupuram Branches 1 and 2 is the only person in the 
BWDA Full Sari Group that shows up as a central player in all three types of 
centrality. He is the manager of the largest subgroup in the network, the one with 
the most interconnections and he is senior manager with the most direct connections 
to the sari sellers in his branch. This is why he has the highest degree centrality in 
the network. He shows up in red in the Figure 9 below. 
 
Figure 12 ± BWDA Full Sari Group by Degree Centrality 
Red=7<C, Yellow=6<C<7, Green=5<C<6, Orange=4<C<5 
These interconnections are why Villupuram has five central players with high 
degree centrality where as the most any other branch has is three. This may make it 
easier to develop weak bridging ties within the Villupuram branches than in the 
other branches.  
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Another reason the Villupuram branches may be able to develop weak bridging ties 
within themselves is the high degree of eigenvector centrality. Figure 10 below 
shows how all of the nodes in the network with a high degree of eigenvector 
centrality are in the Villupuram branches. This shows that all of the nodes in colour 
are connected to nodes that have high centrality. The senior manager of Villupuram 
Branches 1 and 2 has the highest eigenvector centrality score because he has high 
degree centrality connected to nodes that have high centrality themselves.  
 
Figure 13 ± BWDA Full Sari Group by Eignevector Centrality 
Red=50<C, Orange=40<C<50, Yellow=20<C<40, Green=10<C<20 
The BWDA MD has the highest betweeness centrality because he is the only person 
in the network who connects the six branches. The senior manager of Villupuram 
Branches 1 and 2 shows up with a high betweeness centrality because he connects 
the Villupuram branches to the rest of the network. Those with high betweeness 
centrality tend to occupy the most strategic positions in the network (Valente, 2010 
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pg. 87). Therefore, it is not surprising that those with the highest betweeness 
centrality BWDA MD, the senior managers of the largest branches and some of 
their deputies, as shown below in Figure 11. Another implication of high 
EHWZHHQHVV FHQWUDOLW\ IURP *UDQRYHWWHU¶V  ZRUN LV WKDW WKRVH ZLWK KLJK
betweeness centrality act as bridges. It is obvious why the BWDA MD has the 
highest betweeness centrality. He is the one who connects the six branches. 
However, it should be noted that there are some without high betweeness centrality 
who act as bridges. The senior managers of Cuddalore and Mettapattu branches are 
definitely bridges but do not have a high betweeness centrality because their branch 
networks are so small. 
 
Figure 14 ± BWDA Full Sari Group by Betweeness Centrality 
Red=70<C, Orange=50<C<70, Yellow=30<C<50, Blue=20<C<30, 
Green=10<C<20 
The networks of each of the branches were also analysed. The densities of the 
networks for the Villupuram (0.0266), Tindivanam (0.0587), Pondicherry (0.0724) 
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and Madagadipet (0.1365) branches are very low. Since network density is the ratio 
of the number of network ties over the possible number of network ties, these low 
densities is an indication low number of cross network ties. The Mettapattu (0.2105) 
and Cuddalore (0.4381) branches have higher densities but this is mainly because 
the branch networks are significantly smaller than the other four branches. 
7.14 Villupuram Branches Network Data Analysis 
 
 
Figure 15 ± BWDA Villupuram Branches Network by Eigenvector 
Centrality 
5HG &2UDQJH &<HOORZ &*UHHQ & 
The Villupuram branch network has 152 nodes in it. Figure 12 emphasises how 
interconnected the central core of the Villupuram network is. Mr Sankar, in red in 
this diagram, has the highest eigenvector centrality is surrounded by those with 
relatively high eigenvector centrality who in turn are surrounded by others with 
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relatively high eigenvector centrality. The senior manager of Villupuram branches 1 
and 2 also has the highest degree and betweeness centrality. Of the 152 nodes in this 
network, 22 have relatively high eigenvector centrality. Sixteen of these nodes are 
BWDA staff. This suggests one possible way for weak bridging ties to be created 
between the sari sellers in this network is when a sari seller in one arm of this needs 
help, the BWDA staff member she is connected to will enquire among his or her 
colleagues to see if they know any sari sellers who could help. If so, the two sari 
sellers would be introduced. If a weak tie brought new information about saris to 
any of the central players in the Villupuram branch network, this suggests that this 
new information could spread quickly throughout the network.   
7.15 Tindivanam Branch Network Data Analysis 
 
Figure 16 ± BWDA Tindivanam Branch Network by Degree Centrality 
5HG &<HOORZ &*UHHQ & 
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The Tindivanam branch network has 80 nodes. Unlike the Villupuram, the 
Tindivanam network is centred on two BWDA staff members each of which have a 
very high degree centrality. These are marked in red at the centre of Figure 13. The 
node between them is the senior manager for the Tindivanam branch. Note that he is 
nowhere as central to this network as the senior manager of the Villupuram 
branches is to his. The most central members of the network are in the upper left 
hand part of the Figure 13. This is even more pronounced in the eigenvector 
centrality Figure 14 of the network below. In Figure 14, the most central nodes in 
the network are in the upper left hand side connected to a cluster coordinator 1, a 
BWDA staff member, who has the highest eigenvector centrality. If a weak tie 
brought new information about saris to a cluster coordinator of BWDA Tindivanam, 
this suggests that this new information will spread more quickly in the upper left 
hand part of the network than anywhere else in the network.  This is because cluster 
coordinator 1 has high degree, betweeness and eigenvector centrality. Her 
colleague, cluster coordinator 2, also has high degree and betweeness centrality. 
But, because her links aUHQRWDVFHQWUDODVFOXVWHUFRRUGLQDWRU¶VKHUHLJHQYHFWRU
centrality is significantly lower.  
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Figure 17 ± BWDA Tindivanam Branch Network by Eigenvector Centrality 
5HG &2UDQJH &<HOORZ &*UHHQ & 
7.16 Pondicherry Branch Network Data Analysis 
In a similar way to the Tindivanam branch network, the Pondicherry branch 
network has more central players on the right side of the network (see Figure 15 
below). The cluster coordinator has the highest degree, betweeness and eigenvector 
centrality in the network.  This suggests that the best place to put the Pondicherry 
end of a weak bridging tie bringing in new information on saris will be with the 
cluster coordinator.  
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Figure 18 ± BWDA Pondicherry Branch Network by Eigenvector Centrality 
Red &2UDQJH &<HOORZ &*UHHQ &
%OXH & 
7.17 Madagadipet Branch Network Data Analysis 
The Madagadipet branch network is centred on the cluster coordinator. She has the 
highest degree, betweeness and eigenvector centrality in the network. Unlike the 
branch networks at Tindivanam and Pondicherry branches, the central players in 
this network are more evenly distributed. The obvious choice to anchor the 
Madagadipet end of a weak bridging tie that brings in new information on saris is 
the cluster coordinator.  See Figure 16 below. 
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Figure 19 ± BWDA Madagadipet Branch Network by Eigenvector 
Centrality 
Red=C2UDQJH &<HOORZ &*UHHQ & 
7.18 Mettapattu Branch Network Data Analysis 
The Mettapattu branch network is very small with only 19 members in it. This 
makes it easier to reach all parts of the networks from any node. The network 
member with the highest betweeness, degree and eigenvector centrality is sari 
seller#49. She has mentored another sari seller in the area. Sari seller#49, as the 
most central node of the Mettapattu branch network, is the place to link a weak 
bridging tie that brings in new information on saris.  See Figure 17 below. 
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Figure 20 ± BWDA Mettapattu Branch Network by Eigenvector Centrality 
Red=60&2UDQJH &<HOORZ &*UHHQ & 
7.19 Cuddalore Branch Network Data Analysis 
The Cuddalore branch network is the smallest and contains only one sari seller with 
a much interconnected network. The smallness and the interconnections lead to a 
number of nodes being central players. Some of these are neither sari sellers nor 
BWDA staff. The cluster coordinator, BWDA staff member, has the highest degree 
and betweeness centrality but a somewhat lower eigenvector centrality than some of 
the other nodes. The sari seller#87 has the same degree centrality as the cluster 
coordinator and the highest eigenvector centrality but has a significantly lower 
centrality than the cluster coordinator. Looking at Figure 18, a weak bridging tie 
could go to either cluster coordinator or sari seller#87. However, since Cuddalore 
has a number of BWDA clients who are sari sellers, the cluster coordinator would 
probably be the better choice.   
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Figure 21 ± BWDA Cuddalore Branch Network by Degree Centrality 
5HG &2UDQJH &<HOORZ &*UHHQ & 
7.20  Network Fragmentation Analysis 
As was mentioned above, there are no ties between the branches except at senior 
manager level. This can lead to network fragmentation which the Girvan-Newman 
technique and the Geodesic Distance calculations confirm for these networks. The 
Girvan-Newman (2002) technique calculates how many parts a network can be 
broken into starting with removing the most central nodes. This technique generates 
a value called Q. The value of Q indicates the percentage of ties in the network that 
occur within the groupings found by the algorithm (Newman and Girvan, 2004). 
This technique can break the network into many parts. There are two ways to use Q 
to do this. First is to look at the number of network partitions that maximises the 
value of Q. Table 36 shows the results of this use of Q for the full network and 
branches. The numbers highlighted in yellow show the maximum Q value for each. 
The much denser Cuddalore and Mettapattu branches have maximum Q values at 
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three network partitions. The less dense network of the Madagadipet branch can be 
broken into five partitions, the network of the Tindivanam branch can be broken 
into six partitions and the network of the Pondicherry branch can be broken into 
nine partitions. Both the Villupuram and the full BWDA networks are extremely 
fragile. The Villupuram branch network can be broken into nineteen partitions and 
the full BWDA network can be broken into twenty-two partitions.  
The second way, which is a more efficient way to fragment the network, is where 
the focus is on the largest increase in the value of Q.  Table 37 shows the results of 
using the largest increase in the value of Q. For all the networks except the 
Villupuram branch, the most efficient way to fragment is into three parts. For the 
Villupuram branch, the most efficient way to fragment is into five parts.  
The percentage of fragmentation for the full network and the branches is seen in 
Table 34. Fragmentation and density are almost a perfect negative correlation         
(-0.9309) which indicates the more dense the network is, the less fragmented it is. 
This is another indication of the need to add more ties to the networks to stabilise 
them and make them more robust. Adding weak bridging ties for each of the sari 
sellers would definitely do this. The diagrams below show the optimum Girvan-
Newman fragmentation for the full network and each branch.  
The importance of network fragmentation is that it interrupts the flow of 
information across the network. In order to strengthen these networks, weak 
bridging ties need to be added.  
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Network Fragmentation % Density 
Villupuram 78.5 0.0266 
Tindivanam 65.6 0.0587 
Pondicherry 62.9 0.0724 
Madagadipet 51.6 0.1365 
Cuddalore 31.0 0.4381 
Mettapattu 47.1 0.2105 
BWDA Full Sari Network 83.2 0.012 
     Table 35 ± Network Fragmentation by Branch  
 
 
 
 
Branch Q Part 
3 
Q Part 
5 
Q Part 
6 
Q Part 
9 
Q Part 
19 
Q Part 
22 
Villupuram  0.468 0.521 0.630 0.741 0.736 
Tindivanam 0.530 0.625 0.677 0.664 0.591 0.546 
Pondicherry 0.575 0.643 0.685 0.700   
Madagadipet 0.400 0.568 0.558 0.511   
Cuddalore 0.230 0.176     
Mettapattu 0.343 0.324   -0.077  
BWDA Full Sari 
Network 0.652 0.737 0.762 0.782 0.854 0.856 
Table 36 ± Q Maximum Values by Branch 
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Branch Q Part 
3 
Q Part 
4 
Q Part 
5 
Q Part 
6 
Q Part 
7 
Q Part 
8 
Villupuram    0.321 0.053 0.009 0.056 
Tindivanam 0.061 0.047 0.048 0.052 -0.006 -0.003 
Pondicherry 0.105 0.055 0.013 0.042 0.003 0.005 
Madagadipet 0.185 0.090 0.078 -0.010 -0.019 -0.008 
Cuddalore 0.033 -0.031 -0.023   -0.088   
Mettapattu 0.013   -0.019   -0.042   
BWDA Full Sari 
Network 0.177 0.065 0.020 0.025     
Table 37 ± Q Values Jump by Branch 
Figure 22 ± BWDA Villupuram Branches Network Coloured by Girvan-
Newman Parts 
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Figure 23 ± BWDA Tindivanam Branch Network Coloured by Girvan-
Newman Parts 
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Figure 24 ± BWDA Pondicherry Branch Coloured by Girvan-Newman 
Parts 
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Figure 25 ± BWDA Madagadipet Branch Network Coloured by Girvan-
Newman Parts 
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Figure 26 ± BWDA Cuddalore Branch Network Coloured by Girvan-Newman 
Parts 
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Figure 27 ± BWDA Mettapattu Branch Network Coloured by Girvan-Newman 
Parts 
7.21 Summary of Category Support for Hypothesis 3 
The use of the maximum Q values shows that the full BWDA network and the 
Villupuram branch network are extremely fragile and can fragmented into many 
pieces. The Madagadipet, Pondicherry and Tindivanam branches are not as fragile 
but can also be fragmented into several pieces. This indicates that it will not take 
much to interrupt the flow of information to the sari sellers. The data for these 
networks supports Hypothesis 3. The Cuddalore and Mettapattu branch networks, 
being smaller and much denser than the other networks, fragments into only three 
fragments. This data does not support Hypothesis 3. 
7.22 Intervention results 
The intervention was timed to take advantage of the Dewali sales. Diwali, the Hindu 
festival of lights, is one of the biggest sari selling seasons in Tamil Nadu along with 
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Pongal, the Tamil harvest festival, usually held in the middle of January. The hope 
was that this big selling season would encourage the sari sellers maximise their sales 
and encourage them to contact other sari sellers to establish weak bridging ties to 
get information to increase their sales.  
Unfortunately, it was not possible to collect the definitive data during this research 
WULS 2I WKH  VDUL VHOOHUV LQ WKH WUHDWPHQW JURXS RQO\  VKRZHG XS DW %:'$¶V
head office on the first day and only a total of 8 responded by the end of the 4 th 
research field trip. Of the 64 in the control group, 22 sari sellers responded. The 
reason for this was a staffing change at BWDA. The BWDA lawyer who was 
serving as translator during the 2nd and 3rd research field trips was also responsible 
for coordinating the BWDA response to research requests. During the summer of 
2011, he left to start a consultancy. No one replaced him in the coordinating role. 
Therefore, despite several e-mails between the two research trips, the sari sellers 
ZHUHQ¶W WROG WKH GDWHV WR DSSHDU DW WKH %:'$ RIILFHV XQWLO WKH VWDUW RI WKH th 
research field trip. The Sari Seller Information and Training Offer document was 
distributed late and there was no follow up on the financial diaries. This resulted in 
no financial diaries being ready for collection. He did return to do some of the 
interviews during the 4th research field trip with a new manager handling the 
translation when he could not make it. There were 21 other sari sellers who were 
interviewed who had not had their social networks mapped before. The Rs. 100 
incentive payment helped to draw them in. However, because these sari sellers did 
take part in either the 2nd or 3rd research field trips, their data will not be included in 
this discussion.  
The proxy for the improvement in the sari selling business was a year on year 
improvement of the number of saris sold for Diwali. Of the 30 sari sellers in the 
UHVSRQGHQW¶VJURXSRQO\VDZDQ LQFUHDVHDQGDOOZHUH LQ WKH WUHDWPHQWJURXS
An increase in the number customers was the explanation for all 3 sari sellers. Only 
2 sari sellers saw a year on year decrease in Diwali sales. These two were also in the 
treatment group. Sari seller S005 said that the state elections were reasons for the 
decline in sales. However, sari sellers S011, S012 and S045 were able to increase 
their sari sales during the same state election. Sari seller S008 said that this was 
because the designs of the saris her supplier sells is unpopular. She said she did not 
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know of another supplier that sells more popular designs. This situation seems to 
cry out for a weak bridging tie so that she can access the information on suppliers. 
But, she did not have one. All the other sari sellers saw little change in the number 
of saris sold in 2011 compared to Diwali 2010.  
 The sari sellers were asked about the percentage of household income that comes 
from sari selling. The rationale behind the question was that the higher the 
percentage, the more effort would be put into the business. Of the 30 sari seller 
interviewed, 20 had 50% or less of their household income coming from sari selling. 
Therefore two thirds of the sari sellers were either supplementing household income 
or had other businesses or jobs thus matching what Bannerjee and Duflo (2011) said 
about the inability of microentrepreneurs to focus on one business. Eastwood (2004) 
also mentions the impact of family commitments on female microentrepreneurs. See 
Figure 25 for details on percentage household income of sari selling.  
 
Figure 28 - Distribution of % of Household Income Due to Sari Selling  
The proxy for the reduction of poverty was an increase in the PPI score from 2010 
to 2011. Of the 30 sari sellers interviewed, 6 had increases in their PPI scores, 4 had 
a decrease in their PPI scores in the same time period and the rest had no change. 
With two exceptions, all the changes were either up or down one level of probability 
in the PPI tables (See Appendix E ± PPI Probability Tables for India).  
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In the treatment group, sari seller S012 had her probability of living under 
US$2/day reduced to 27.3% because she could now afford another electric fan. Sari 
seller S045 had her probability of living under US$2/day reduced to 15.5% because 
she could now afford another pressure cooker. Sari seller S017 saw her probability 
of living under US$2/day increase to 55.2% because she no longer had a scooter and 
could not afford to replace it. 
In the control group, sari seller S058 had her probability of living under US$2/day 
reduced to 50.0% because she moved into an all pucca house. Sari seller S062 had 
her probability of living under US$2/day reduced to 93.7% because one of her 
children grew up and left home. Sari seller S071 had her probability of living under 
US$2/day reduced to 15.5% because she could now afford a scooter. On the other 
hand, sari seller S083 saw her probability of living under US$2/day increase to 
42.9% because of the discovery that her LPG stove was from the Tamil Nadu state 
government. Her ability to afford a new pressure cooker kept her probability from 
increasing further. Sari seller S087 saw her probability of living under US$2/day 
increase to 42.9% because she gave birth to another child during the year.  
In the control group there were two cases of sari sellers moving two levels on the 
PPI table both up and down. Sari seller S073 saw her probability of living under 
US$2/day reduced to 4.4% because main occupation of the household now is real 
estate and she was able to afford a new sewing machine. Sari seller S085 saw her 
probability of living under US$2/day increase to 42.9% because the main 
occupation of the household is labourer. See Appendix H ± Sari Seller Data from 
the 4th Research Field Trip for details.  
In the treatment group both sari sellers S012 and S045 saw an increase in their year 
on year Diwali sari sales and an increase in their PPI scores. Is there a link to an 
additional weak bridging tie being responsible for either? For sari seller S012, there 
is no data to tie the increase in Diwali sales to additional weak bridging ties. 
However, sari seller S045 and an incident while interviewing members of the 
control group in Pondicherry provide case studies that give indications that the 
theory of the strength of weak ties holds for microfinance clients who have low 
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7.23 Case Study 1 ± Pondicherry Sari Sellers 
The incident in Pondicherry occurred while interviewing 15 sari sellers at the 
BWDA branch office there. One of the sari sellers asked the translator why BWDA 
was not buying saris in bulk for all of the sari sellers to obtain a big discount which 
increase the profit margins for the sari sellers. The translator stopped the interview 
and told everyone the question that had been asked. The translator, who was very 
familiar with the research, said that BWDA was working on this suggestion but it 
would take some time. He asked in the meantime did anyone in the room know of 
anyone living in Surat, Gujarat. Surat is now the centre of sari production in India. It 
is over 1,500 kilometres away on the west coast of India on the Arabian Sea. One 
sari seller raised her hand to say that her son lived there. The translator then told 
everyone to give this woman their mobile telephone numbers so that she could 
coordinate a bulk order of saris that her son could purchase. The effect on the room 
was electric. It was obvious no one had thought of this before. This matches what 
Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) said about less powerful people being dependent. The 
sari sellers, being less powerful, were depending on BWDA, being more powerful, 
to solve this problem for them. They had never thought of organising a solution 
themselves. They were so excited about organising a bulk purchase among 
themselves that the translator had to tell them to be quiet so that he could continue 
to conduct the interviews. 
 In this case, the translator provided the mechanism that created weak bridging ties 
among the sari sellers that brought new, non-redundant information to them which 
included identifying a sari seller with a link to Surat and how to combine their 
efforts to buy saris in bulk and increase their profit margins. If the margins are 
increased enough, the sari sellers would start to see real poverty reduction. One can 
imagine what could happen if this scenario is repeated with other BWDA sari seller 
clients. This case shows why microfinance theory needs to take into account social 
networks and the strength of weak ties in microfinance.  
7.24 Case Study 2 ± Sari Seller S045 
While the data does not connect the increase in Diwali sales for sari seller S012 to 
the addition of weak bridging ties to her social network, it is possible to make that 
connection with sari seller S045. Both her PPI score and her Diwali sales were up. 
 233 
 
When asked why her 2011 Diwali sales had increased, she said that she had added a 
new friend to her social network and that new friend introduced her to a lot of new 
customers. It was these new customers that led to a large increase in her sales. 
Figure 25 shows her social network in 2010. Figure 26 shows her social network in 
2011. The new friend is in Figure 26. While she started as a weak link, she is now a 
strong tie. One can imagine the introduction to new customers strengthened the tie 
between the two.  One can imagine what could happen if other BWDA sari seller 
clients could have weak bridging ties that could introduce them to new customers. 
Once again, this case shows why microfinance theory needs to take into account 
social networks and the strength of weak ties in microfinance.  
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Figure 29 ± Sari Seller S045 Target Diagram 2010 
 235 
 
 
Figure 30 ± Sari Seller S045 Target Diagram 2011 
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7.25 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Intervention 
The obvious weakness of the intervention is the low response rate. There may be 
other cases of weak bridging ties improving the low growth, low barrier to entry sari 
selling business but it was not possible to get access to this data. The other 
weakness is that the intervention required the mainly low caste sari sellers to take a 
proactive role in creating additional weak bridging ties in the social networks for 
their businesses. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) point that in countries with a large 
power distance index, such as India, the tendency was for the less powerful to be 
dependent on the more powerful as was seen in the Pondicherry case.  
While the intervention itself did not directly introduce additional weak bridging ties 
to the business social networks for the sari sellers, its strength is that it provided the 
platform discover the power of weak bridging ties in the Pondicherry and sari seller 
S045 cases. The other strength is that it gives an indication that Granovetter (1973) 
strength of weak ties can fill this gap in microfinance theory to produce more 
poverty reduction for microfinance clients who have low growth, low entry barrier 
businesses. 
7.26 Chapter Conclusion  
The key finding in from the second research field trip is that the sari sellers depend 
on strong ties in their ego networks confirming what Granovetter (1983) said. In 
addition, an overwhelming majority of sari sellers were animators most probably 
because this was a business they could fit into their busy lives. The sari sellers were 
not the poorest of the poor but did mostly come from the lower castes such as 
backward castes, other backward castes, most backward castes and scheduled 
castes. The PPI scores indicated that many of the sari sellers had a significant 
possibility of living below the US$2/day poverty line. Analysis also uncovered a 
serious problem with the network data which had mixed connections with 
organisations and persons. The decision was made to collect better network data 
from the sari sellers focusing on persons they knew in the organisation.  
However, this need to collect new network data provided an opportunity to do a 
network intervention. In his seminal paper, The Strength of Weak Ties, Granovetter 
(1973) argues that weak ties that serve as bridges to connect to people outside the 
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existing network would provide information to the sari sellers that would improve 
their businesses. In addition, according to Burt, in his book Brokerage and Closure 
(2005), these weak ties would provide brokerage opportunities that would also 
improve their businesses. However, India is an intensely hierarchical society. So, 
how do the poor establish weak ties in an intensely hierarchical society?    
The opportunity to answer this question could come through a network intervention. 
The idea was to accurately map the ego networks of the sari sellers to establish a 
baseline. Then a network intervention would attempt to introduce weak bridging ties 
LQWRWKHVDULVHOOHU¶VQHWZRUNVDQGWKHQVHHLIWKHLUEXVLQHVVHVLPSURYH 
In order to set the stage for the intervention, both ego network analysis and full 
network analysis has been done on the network data collected. The ego network 
analysis showed that on the whole, the sari sellers have more strong ties than weak 
ties and that their ego networks are small. It was also evident from the ego network 
analysis there was strong closure in all the ego networks studied. However, the data 
shows that shop owners and Brahmins were two groups of sari sellers that were the 
exception where there were more weak ties than strong ties7KHVKRSRZQHU¶VZHDN
ties tend to be to informal financial sources and suppliers. These Brahmin sari 
sellers may have unreported Brahmin network link such as the example of the 
EURWKHU RI RQH %UDKPLQ VDUL VHOOHU¶V EURther using his connections in the lorry 
business to bring her saris from Surat, Gujarat. Both of these groups had have 
higher than average PPI scores (PPI average score = 73.11). Shop owners have an 
average PPI score of 79.56 and the Brahmin sari sellers have an average PPI score 
of 89.00. It may be tempting to infer that the weak ties improved their businesses 
which improved their PPI score but there is no direct evidence of this. It may be that 
the relatively high PPI scores put them into a position to develop more weak ties 
than the other sari sellers.   
The full network analysis showed using the connections with BWDA staff members 
it is possible to build a whole network from the perspective of the sari sellers. The 
sociogram of the resulting networks shows that this whole network is organised 
around branches with the only connection between the branches through the BWDA 
managing director. As a result, shown by using the Girvan-Newman technique, this 
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whole network and most of the network branches are fragmented and fragile. The 
analysis also showed that increasing the network density decreases the 
fragmentation. Therefore, the addition of weak bridging ties to the networks would 
increase the density and make them more stable. The centrality measures 
(betweeness, degree and eigenvector) were used to identify possible anchors for 
weak bridging ties bringing new information to sari sellers. Eigenvector centrality 
was especially useful by identifying those who were most connected to the most 
central players in the networks. These people strategic positions in the networks 
could help increase the velocity of new information on the sari business spreading 
throughout the networks.  
The key task then is to find ways to introduce weak bridging ties into both the ego 
aQG ZKROH QHWZRUNV DQG VHH ZKDW LPSDFW LW KDV RQ WKH VDUL VHOOHUV¶ QHWZRUNV DQG
businesses. The evidence of this chapter shows that there is a clear and 
XQGHUVWDQGDEOHVWURQJEURNHULQJUROHIRU%:'$WRSOD\ZKHQWKHVDULVHOOHUV¶HJR
networks are aggregated. The chapter then described a simple intervention to 
introduce weak bridging ties among the sari sellers by advantage of the brokering 
role BWDA can play by connecting sari sellers who are willing to offer information, 
skills and training other sari sellers want.   
The intervention provides indications that weak bridging ties gives microfinance 
clients who own low growth, low barrier to entry businesses access to non-
redundant information that can help them grow their businesses and in doing so, 
help increase the reduction of poverty they can attain.   It also shows the importance 
of social networks to the businesses of microfinance clients. It demonstrates the key 
role that the social context plays in the formation of social networks. In the 
Pondicherry case, the tendency of the less powerful to depend on the more powerful 
meant the sari sellers did not take a proactive role in adding weak bridging ties to 
their social networks. They expected BWDA to take the lead. This exposes the 
social network gap in micURILQDQFH WKHRU\ DQG UHYHDOV WKH UROH WKDW *UDQRYHWWHU¶V
(1973) strength of weak ties can play in helping to fill that gap.  
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8 Chapter Eight ± Discussion of Results 
8.1 Chapter Introduction 
The intervention gives indications that the addition of weak bridging ties to the 
social networks of microfinance clients who own low growth, low entry barrier 
businesses gives access to non-redundant information needed to grow their 
businesses and help to reduce their poverty. Network theory helps fill the gap in 
microfinance theory in providing a mechanism for getting more poverty reduction 
where microfinance is currently not getting enough.  The theory of the strength of 
weak ties, which has worked in other contexts, has been shown to work in a Tamil 
microfinance context.  
Therefore, the answer to the first research question of how does a MFI help its 
clients bridge the structural holes in their ego networks is through the addition of 
weak bridging ties to their networks.  As was emphasised before, financial 
intermediation cannot achieve this. What is needed is social intermediation by the 
MFIs. This leads to the second research question. This chapter will now focus on 
the answer to the second research question of how can MFIs socially intermediate to 
help their clients establish weak bridging ties.   
8.2 Discussion 
The key problem this research in microfinance this research is helping to solve is 
not getting enough poverty reduction in microfinance. Microfinance has the goal of 
reducing poverty in a financially sustainable way done mostly through credit until 
recently. Rupert Scofield (2012) who is the CEO of FINCA, an international 
microfinance network, describes the excitement of seeing the dramatic positive 
impact of loans on the poverty of the most entrepreneurial of the poor.  However, as 
time went on, Scofield says that the entrepreneurial skills of the additional 
microfinance clients diminished as did the impact of microcredit on poverty. This is 
why the impact of microcredit on poverty is being questioned. This validates 
BDWHPDQ¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHPLFURILQDQFHSLRQHHUVKDYHIDOOHQYLFWLPWRWKH
fallacy of composition where the assumption that if microcredit works for the most 
entrepreneurial of the poor, it will work for most of the poor. This also validates 
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BanerjeH DQG 'XIOR¶V (2011) argument that microfinance practitioners have been 
overpromising. For Banerjee and Duflo (2011) and Bhagavatula and Elfring (2010), 
one of the main problems for microfinance clients is that they tend to start low 
barrier to entry businesses that suffer from low growth which limits the impact of 
financial intermediation. 
This research has been focused on using social network theories as a method of 
social intermediation to get more improvement in reducing poverty through 
microfinance. There are two main social network theories being used. First is 
*UDQRYHWWHU¶V  VWUHQJWK RI ZHDN WLHV ZKLFK LGHQWLILHV WKH LQIRUPDWLRQDO
benefits of weak bridging ties. For Granovetter, this happens by serendipity. 
Second, Burt (1992) extends Granovetter with the concept of structural holes. Burt 
operationalizes Granovetter by showing how weak bridging ties can span structural 
holes in networks. Unlike Granovetter, Burt argues that people can make a strategic 
choice in spanning structural holes. This research shows how adding weak bridging 
ties to the social networks of microfinance clients gives them access to new 
information that can be used to improve their businesses and reduce their poverty.  
+RZHYHUDZHDNQHVVLQ%XUW¶VDUJXPHQWFRPHVIURPWKHIDFW that his research was 
done in an American context and there is an assumption that everyone has the same 
opportunities that his respondents have. This is not true of the poor Indian 
microentrepreneurs who are the subject of this research. This research concludes 
that these people need help from the microfinance institution in order to build weak 
bridging ties to span the structural holes in their social networks to get access to 
non-redundant information. Later in this chapter, five ways of microfinance 
institutions doing social intermediation to achieve this will be identified. In this 
ZD\ WKLV UHVHDUFK PDNHV DQ DGGLWLRQDO FRQWULEXWLRQ E\ VKRZLQJ KRZ %XUW¶V
operationalization of the information benefits of weak ties in a non-American 
context by taking it a few steps in the direction of social intermediation as an 
application in microfinance and in the setting of a hierarchical social structure.  
This study is a qualitative one which interprets a broad range of partial evidence 
rather than seeking to test a formal model. The evidence that supports the central 
claim that addition of weak bridging ties contributes to poverty reduction includes 
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the strong closure evident in all the ego networks studied, little brokerage activity 
by the alters in the ego networks studied with the single, explicable, exception of the 
Brahmin group and the clear and understandable strong brokering role of BWDA 
when the ego networks are aggregated. 
8.3 Examples in the literature of poor people being helped with 
building their social networks 
The Pondicherry case in the intervention shows that for cultures with large power 
distance index, the poor need help in establishing weak bridging ties. The tendency 
for the poor to be dependent on the more powerful leads the poor to be not very 
proactive in establishing weak bridging ties. The poor, like the sari sellers in 
Pondicherry, may not realise that the potential exists for them. This is why social 
intermediation is required. What follows is an exploration of examples from the 
literature on helping the poor build their social networks.  
Nguyen (2010) argues that credit is not enough. Very often, the poor rely on their 
social capital to provide security, access to complementary resources and to higher 
levels of decision-making and economic power. Technical assistance is always 
GHPDQGHG WR HQVXUH WKH VXFFHVV RI WKH ERUURZHUV¶ SURGXFWLRQ DQG EXVLQHVV. The 
reason for this lies in the fact that it helps them catch up with the most up to date 
techniques in order to satisfy the demand of the market.  
Green (2005) reports on the efforts in Chanderi, which is a rural town of 30,000 in 
the state of Madhya Pradesh in India, to improve the income of handloom weavers 
by linking them directly to buyers in order to reduce their dependency on 
intermediaries. To achieve this, seven self-help groups have been formed into an 
apex organization, registered as an NGO. The reason for creating such an 
organization came from the recognition that a group of 10 weavers could not attain 
the critical mass and variety of products required by buyers. Furthermore, quality 
control and marketing efforts were believed to be more effective within a larger 
group. The formation of a cluster of handloom weavers is able to achieve all of this. 
Green argues that the links between cluster weavers and financial institutions may 
have positive externalities which will enhance the contribution of cluster 
development to reduce poverty. While the cluster project works with those poor 
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people whose economic activities are directly related to the cluster and affect its 
production, Green believes that in the mid to long-term, the efforts to improve 
access to financial services for integrated poor cluster actors are also likely to have 
spill-over effects for the poor living in the same geographical area, but whose 
income generating activities are not related to handloom weaving. 
 
Another way to assist the poor in building networks is through mentoring. Edgcomb 
and Malm (2002) define mentoring as counsel, advice and support provided by 
experienced business people to new entrepreneurs in a structured relationship. 
Mentoring offers an ongoing and supportive relationship with an experienced 
business person concerned for his or her success and is able to open doors to 
information and other resources to help the business grow.  This is another way to 
establish weak bridging ties.  
 
Another way to help the poor build social networks is to form cooperatives. Huda et 
al (2005a) quote Krishna (2002): 
 
³3HUVRQVERXQGWRJHWKHULQGHQVHVRFLDOQHWZRUNVLQIXVHGZLWKQRrms of reciprocity 
and trust, are better able to and more inclined to act collectively for mutual benefit 
and social purpose. Compared to persons not so well endowed with norms and 
QHWZRUNV WKRVH SRVVHVVHG RI WKHVH IHDWXUHV µFDQ PRUH HIILFLHQWO\ UHVWUDLQ
RSSRUWXQLVPDQGUHVROYHSUREOHPVRIFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQ¶´ 
 
Bhatt (2000) describes how SEWA, one of the oldest MFIs in India, found that 
employment opportunities are enhanced several-fold when the poor people are 
directly linked with the mainstream markets through cooperatives. SEWA had 
several examples of this. The women in the Santalpur desert area had intermittent 
employment and were earning a pittance when picking gum off trees and selling 
them to traders. But when these women formed their own co-operative and got 
linked with the licensing and selling agent, the Forest Corporation, they had steady 
employment. By forming co-operative village dairies and linking with the marketing 
federation, livestock owners were able to get a steady and fair price for their milk. 
The embroiderers could turn their occasional sale of products into a full-time 
employment earning opportunity when they acquired their own shop in the city. 
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Bamboo workers could buy bamboo at half the price when they went to another 
state and bought in bulk.  
 
Another way to build a cooperative network is to build a sector-based network. 
Nelson (2004) defines a sector based network as a trade association for 
microentrepreneurs. Nelson says that some advocates posit sector-based networking 
as the strategic cornerstone to local economic development. She defines the success 
factors for a sector-based as building trust, being able to build networks in the local 
community, being able to balance autonomy with standards and expectations, 
finding the most appropriate and effective modes of communication and keeping the 
network relevant for mature members.  
 
 Nelson (2004) argues that entrepreneurial networks are about building social capital 
and accessing opportunities linked to trust and reciprocity. The essence of 
networking is how people come together, support each other, learn from each other, 
contract with each other, refer each other and form partnerships. The problem is that 
everyone wants to come to the first meeting but participation is hard to sustain. 
While the social contact and support is great but it is not enough to keep people 
coming when they get busy. Echoing Granovetter (1983), networks need to offer a 
safe haven and compelling substance. In order to solve the above problems, the 
organisers need to plan and budget for the network, create a welcoming atmosphere, 
make network meetings easy to attend, offer incentives to attend and participate, 
invest in network leadership, keep the network relevant and make the network an 
avenue for accessing the broader, mainstream economy and community.  
 
While helping the poor to build their social networks, there are some caveats to keep 
in mind. Huda et al (2005a) found that the lack of horizontal links or solidarity 
contributes to the reinforcing of elite-poor dependency relationships. In effect, the 
poor perpetuate these patronage relationships by acting as individual clients, rather 
than mobilizing as a bloc to demand broader empowerment. This means an MFI 
needs to make sure that the network ties between the poor are dense enough to 
counterbalance the tendency to depend on the more powerful in large power 
distance cultures. Secondly, Eastwood (2004) mentions that the responsibility of 
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family commitments in many cases means that fully exploiting and interacting in 
such networks often comes at too high a price with insufficient time and energy 
being given to the enterprises they manage. Networks therefore have a challenge of 
addressing how best women owned enterprises can be facilitated amidst the 
constraints.  
8.4 How BWDA can introduce weak bridging ties into their sari 
VHOOHUEXVLQHVV¶VVRFLDOQHWZRUNV 
Before getting into the specifics of how BWDA can help their sari seller clients 
build weak bridging ties, it should be mentioned that BWDA has socially 
intermediated before in order to help its clients and their businesses as was 
discussed in chapter 6. Exhibitions for the sari sellers were put on. However fear 
about the damage to its reputation caused by overcharging led BWDA to stop these 
exhibitions (Arora, 2008). But, BWDA is willing to build new social intermediation 
approaches to help the sari sellers. However, it is aware from its past experiences 
that it needs to stay within its means. This will mean that it will need to build 
collaborative relationships in order to achieve this. BWDA has done this several 
times before.   
In answering the second research question, this research has identified five ways for 
a MFI to socially intermediate in order to help their clients establish weak bridging 
ties that will help improve their businesses and reduce their poverty. In this way, 
WKLV UHVHDUFK PDNHV DQ DGGLWLRQDO FRQWULEXWLRQ E\ VKRZLQJ KRZ %XUW¶V
operationalization of the information benefits of weak ties in a non-American 
context by taking it a few steps in the direction of social intermediation as an 
application in microfinance and in the setting of a hierarchical social structure.  
The first way to do this is for the MFI to set up assistance swaps among their 
clients.  This is very similar to what was done during the intervention among the 
sari sellers. Those who have information or skills needed for sari selling can offer 
these to other sari sellers who need the information or the training. Because 
information would be passing over this link between people who may not know 
each well, this has the potential to become a weak bridging tie. The intervention 
used a simple paper based method to implement this idea. Other methods such as 
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BWDA staff members passing requests and offers for information to and from the 
most central players in each branch network as seen in Figures 8 through 18 in 
chapter 7. More modern technology such as mobile phones can be used to connect 
the sari sellers. This may make it possible for a sari seller in southern Tamil Nadu to 
connect with a sari seller in northern Tamil Nadu. However, the key to make this 
working successfully is BWDA encouraging the sari sellers identify their needs for 
information and skills and be willing to communicate these to each other or a 
BWDA staff member. Effective and efficient communication around the network is 
another key requirement and not relying on the traditional hierarchical pathways 
through the full BWDA network.  
The second way is for the MFI to act as a broker between their clients and the 
mainstream markets. In this case, BWDA can act as a broker between the sari 
sellers and the sari industry and negotiate big discounts on bulk orders of saris for 
all of its sari sellers. However, as the experience of BASIX in Harper (2010b) 
shows, it is important to have someone with industry experience negotiating on 
behalf of the MFI so that neither the MFI nor its clients suffer from the vagaries of 
the industry. The negotiator must not just have industry experience but also 
empathetic with the goals of the MFI. The MFI can take advantage of its position to 
act as broker to help its clients bridge the structural holes in their ego networks but 
LWV FOLHQWV FDQ WDNH DGYDQWDJH RI %XUW¶V  QHWZRUN VSLOORYHU HIIHFW IURP WKH
MFI. In this case, the most connected person at BWDA, its managing director, will 
probably be the one to find the negotiator to deal with the sari industry.  It is not 
known how many sari sellers BWDA has as clients but it could easily reach into the 
thousands giving BWDA a strong negotiating hand with the industry.   
The third way is for the MFI to build a sector based network. There are two benefits 
to the clients. First, is that its clients can build weak bridging ties among other 
clients in the same sector. Second, these clients can obtain closure (Burt, 2005) by 
learning from other clients in the network. BWDA did attempt to start a sector based 
network for the sari sellers. BWDA found that its ability to build and manage a 
sector based network was limited. Therefore, BWDA has applied to its donors for 
funding to build up its capacity in this area. This means that MFIs need to be aware 
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of its ability to build and manage a sector based network and if needs be, approach 
partners to fund and provide the capacity or training.   
The fourth way is for the MFI to provide mentors from the industry to their clients 
most likely from people retired from the industry. The client gets closure again from 
being trained by the mentor. The client can also get benefit from the network 
spillover effect from the status of the mentor allowing the client to establish weak 
bridging ties based on the recommendation of the mentor. In this case, the mentor 
would probably come from a retired sari industry person. Just like finding a 
negotiator from industry, it is important that the mentor be empathetic with the 
goals of the MFI.  
The fifth way a MFI can help its clients establish weak bridging ties is to make its 
clients feel more secure. Granovetter (1983) said that the main reason that the poor 
relied on strong ties was insecurity. Therefore, the more secure a MFI can make its 
clients feel, the more they will feel free to explore establishing weak bridging ties 
for their low growth, low entry barrier businesses. The financial ways to increase 
WKHLU FOLHQW¶V VHFXULW\ LQFOXGH savings and insurance.  The non-financial ways 
include building up the social capital of its clients by building trust and 
communities. Different clients may have different needs which a standardised 
approach may not be appropriate. However, with the self-help groups, BWDA has 
the mechanism that will allow meeting D FOLHQW¶V LQGLYLGXDO QHHGV LI WKH 6+*
members are trained properly to do so. This may be an effective way for BWDA to 
make its clients more secure in a social way that will allow more building of weak 
bridging ties.  
8.5 Comparison to previous work 
As was stated previously, until recently there have been very little theoretical work 
involving social networks in microfinance. However, that has changed in recent 
years. Karlan et al (2008) looked network effects of trust on microfinance 
repayments and confirmed that weak bridging ties give access to information for 
microfinance clients. Morvant-Roux (2009) looked at the effects of access to 
microfinance on indebtedness and liquidity supply within the social network. 
Kannan (2009) investigated brokerage in SHGs in the state of Karnataka in India. 
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Cai et al (2011) studied the diffusion of learning about microinsurance through 
social networks in China.   
Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology are conducting a study investigating the 
diffusion of microfinance take up rates in 75 villages in southern Karnataka in India. 
Several papers have come out of that study in the past year. Banerjee et al (2011) 
have taken a general look at the diffusion rates of microfinance through the social 
networks of these villages. Using the same villages, Chandrasekhar et al (2011a) 
studies insurance, savings and social networks, Chandrasekhar et al (2011b) looks at 
insurance, hidden income, hidden savings and social networks while Chandrasekhar 
et al (2011c) tested models of social learning on these social networks.  
Chandrasekar and Lewis (2011) look at the econometric errors introduced by 
sampling a network of microfinance clients. Finally, Jackson et al (2011) investigate 
the favour exchange networks found in these Karnataka villages.  
As can be seen from the above, none of this research has looked at the role of weak 
bridging ties bringing non-redundant information to microfinance clients who own 
low growth, low barrier to entry businesses that will allow them to improve their 
businesses nor has any of this research identified ways for MFIs to socially 
intermediate to help their clients build weak bridging ties to help their businesses. 
This shows that this research does fill a gap in the microfinance literature.   
8.6 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter answered the second research question of how MFIs can socially 
intermediate to help clients establish weak bridging ties. There were five ways that 
MFIs could achieve this. First is to organise mechanisms that that allow clients to 
swap offers of information and training. Second is to act as a broker between clients 
and industry being careful to hire a negotiator who is knowledgeable about the 
industry and empathetic with the goals of the MFI. Third is to build a sector based 
network. Fourth is to hire a mentor who is knowledgeable of the industry and is 
empathetic to the aspirations of the clients. Fifth is to lessen the insecurity of their 
clients in order to lessen their dependency on strong ties.  
 248 
 
9 Chapter Nine ± Conclusion 
9.1 Chapter Summary 
This concluding chapter will summarise the research including listing the 
accomplishments made by the research. The limitations and the implications of the 
research will be discussed. This will be followed by a discussion on possible further 
research.  
9.2 Summary of Research 
This research has accomplished the following: 
x This research makes a contribution to knowledge by showing how 
*UDQRYHWWHU¶V WKHRU\ RI WKH VWUHQJWK RI ZHDN WLHV FDQ ILOO WKH JDS LQ
microfinance theory on how greater poverty reduction can be achieved 
through social intermediation. 
x This research found indications that the addition of weak bridging ties to the 
social networks of microfinance clients who own low growth, low entry 
barrier businesses actually can improve these businesses and help to reduce 
their poverty. 
x Using social network theories, this research identified ways microfinance 
institutions can socially intermediate to add weak bridging ties to the social 
networks of their clients who own the typical microenterprise started by 
microfinance clients. 
x The results of this research indicates that what works for the sari sellers of 
BWDA will also work for other low growth, low barrier to entry businesses 
started by microfinance clients.  
x 7KLVUHVHDUFKH[WHQGHG%XUW¶VRSHUDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRI*UDQRYHWWHU¶VDUJXPHQW
of the informational benefit of weak ties in the direction of social 
intermediation in the context of social hierarchy with application to 
microfinance.  
 
Microfinance, the delivery of financial services to poor people, initially held out the 
promise of financially sustainable poverty reduction. However, in recent years, this 
promise has been severely challenged. Microfinance has not achieved the reduction 
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of the levels of poverty envisioned by its early promoters. Banerjee and Duflo 
(2011) find in their randomised control trial that microfinance worked but it was not 
transformational. One of the reasons that it is not transformational was that the 
businesses started by microfinance clients are often suffer from low growth and 
very low margins. Bhagavatula and Elfring (2010) added that these businesses 
tended to be low barrier to entry enterprises vulnerable to competition. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that microfinance clients were not able to generate much poverty 
reduction with low growth, low entry barrier businesses.  
 
Microfinance theorists paid little attention to this. Their focus was traditionally on 
how the financial intermediation worked. There was an unspoken assumption that 
financial intermediation alone would bring about the expected reduction in poverty. 
The theory most used to explain how microfinance worked was joint liability which 
said that members of the group, the most popular methodology in microfinance, 
ZHUH OLDEOH IRU HDFK RWKHU¶V ORDQV +RZHYHU LW ZDV IRXQG WKDW HYHQ WKH ELJ
microfinance institutions in Bangladesh were no longer enforcing joint liability 
contracts. The realisation struck that microfinance clients needed both financial and 
social intermediation. Initially, the theoretical focus was on using social 
intermediation as preparation for financial intermediation. Today, social 
intermediation in microfinance is looked at more holistically. But, there is still a gap 
in microfinance theory in how to get more poverty reduction for microfinance 
clients who own low growth, low entry barrier businesses.  
 
The key to filling this gap is the realisation that human beings are ultra-social 
animals (Haidt, 2006). As a result of this, human beings form social networks to 
connect themselves to each other. These network structures provide access to 
resources and information such as how a poor person may improve their low 
growth, low barrier to entry business. The strength of the connections in the network 
does matter. Because those who share a strong tie with each other tend to be similar, 
Granovetter (1973) argued that the way to get new and non-redundant information 
is through weak bridging ties in the network. This is because those we share weak 
ties with are not as similar to those we share strong ties with and therefore travel in 
different circles and have access to different information. This means that if 
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microfinance clients could access weak bridging ties, they could also access the 
information they need to improve their businesses. But, the problem is that 
Granovetter (1983) says that poor people rely on strong ties which have the 
tendency to cut them off from this new information. This is exacerbated by the 
social context that microfinance clients find themselves in Tamil Nadu in India 
where this research was conducted. India is a very hierarchical society which allows 
a considerable degree of inequality. In the Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
perspective, India has a large power distance index. In this context, the less 
powerful tend to have a dependency on the more powerful. Evidence for this was 
found during this research. This complicates the task of the poor building weak 
bridging ties. So, how does a poor person add weak bridging ties to her network?  
 
To answer this question, the research measured and mapped the social networks of 
111 sari sellers whose businesses are typical of the low growth, low entry barrier 
businesses started by microfinance clients. It was found that the sari sellers relied on 
their strong ties confirm Granovetter (1983) and that their social networks for their 
businesses were small and strong closure evident in all the ego networks studied. 
Section 8.6 showed evidence that it was reasonable to assume that there is little 
brokerage activity by the alters in the ego networks measured with the exception of 
the Brahmins. An intervention was done to see if weak bridging ties could be added 
WRWKHVDULVHOOHUV¶ social networks by creating a simple mechanism that allowed sari 
sellers to offer information and training to each other to take advantage of the clear 
and strong brokering role of BWDA when the ego networks are aggregated.  
 
The intervention did not work as planned because of a poor response rate. However, 
WKHUHZDVHYLGHQFHWKDWLQGLFDWHGWKDWDGGLQJZHDNEULGJLQJWLHVWRWKHVDULVHOOHUV¶
social networks allowed them access to non-redundant information to improve their 
businesses. In one instance, sari sellers in Pondicherry, under the prodding of the 
BWDA translator, realised they could connect to one another in order to organise a 
bulk purchase of saris which would considerably lower their costs. In another 
instance, a sari seller in Villupuram had a new contact in her network introduce her 
to a number of new customers which significantly increased her sales for Diwali 
2011 over that of Diwali 2010.  
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$GGLQJZHDNEULGJLQJWLHVWRWKHLUFOLHQW¶VVRFLDOQHWZRUNVUHTXLUHDGLIIHUHQWNLQG
of social intermediation. Five ways were identified for MFIs to socially intermediate 
in order to add weak bridging ties to the social networks of their clients. First is 
organising mechanisms to allow clients to swap offers of information and training. 
Second is to act as a broker between the clients and the industry being careful to 
hire a negotiator who is knowledgeable about the industry and empathetic with the 
goals of the MFI. Third is to build a sector based network. Fourth is to hire a mentor 
who is knowledgeable of the industry and is empathetic to the aspirations of the 
clients. Fifth is to lessen the insecurity their clients feel to lessen their dependency 
on strong ties.  
 
The contribution of this research is to add the theory of the strength of weak ties to 
microfinance in order to help microfinance clients access the information needed to 
improve their low growth, low barrier to entry businesses and help them fend off the 
competition. The more this happens, the more poverty will be reduced. It is the 
potential to achieve more poverty reduction using a structural approach that shows 
the strength of weak ties in microfinance.    
 
9.3 Limitations 
2QHRIWKHPDLQOLPLWDWLRQVRIWKLVUHVHDUFKZDVWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VLQDELOLW\WRVSHDN
and understand Tamil, the language of Tamil Nadu. While the level of translation 
was good, none of the translators were able to do simultaneous translation. This 
meant that some data was literally lost in translation. Language difficulties also 
caused some problems with the data collection as some of the BWDA staff 
misunderstood the instructions. Some of this was later corrected but it turns out not 
all of it. As was stated in chapter 6, BWDA employees were used as translators on 
the last three research field trips. The main translator was a lawyer for BWDA 
assisted by a finance clerk and a new employee running a water project. It should be 
noted that the sari sellers felt free to criticise BWDA to the translators and the 
translators translated these criticisms.  
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Because this research was qualitative, it is unable to prove cause and effect. Even if 
all 47 sari sellers of the treatment group in the intervention had added weak ties that 
had improved their Diwali sales it would not have proven cause and effect. All that 
could be said that it provides an indication that adding weak bridging ties improves 
low growth, low entry barrier businesses. In the Further Research section below, 
thought will be given to how quantitative approach can contribute to this research.   
The researcher tried very hard to look at social networks from the Tamil 
perspective. However, an incomplete understanding of Tamil culture meant that it is 
likely to be some misunderstanding of some of the ties in the social networks 
mapped. 
This research was done in a Tamil context. A different social context may give a 
different answer to the second research question on how MFIs can socially 
intermediate to help their clients build weak bridging ties in the social networks for 
their businesses. In a Tamil context, the challenge was how to build weak bridging 
ties given the large power distance in the culture. In a small power distance culture, 
the MFI may not need to be as heavily involved in building weak bridging ties. In 
small power distance culture, there is much less tendency for the poor to be 
dependent on the more powerful which would make them more proactive in 
building weak bridging ties in their own social networks. However, it should be 
noted that some of the cultures that have large amounts poverty also are large power 
distance cultures.  
Some of the sari sellers did have strong ties to those who are connected to the sari 
industry. While they may have had some benefit from this, it seems not to have been 
very great in general. Of the 28 sari sellers who had these connections, 23 of these 
were to family members who were sari sellers,WDSSHDUVWKDWWKHIDPLO\PHPEHUV¶
social networks were similar to the respondents in that they were small and rely on 
strong ties and therefore were not able to offer non-redundant information. For the 
rest, 4 were employees of sari shops and the main benefit the sari sellers received 
was to be able to buy saris on credit. This explains why it is reasonable to assume 
that there is little brokerage activity by the alters in the ego networks studied with 
the single, explicable, exception of the Brahman group discussed in Chapter 8. They 
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did not seem to be able to offer non-redundant information to their relatives.  One 
sari seller used to be an employee of a sari shop in Trichy in central Tamil Nadu. 
She learned how the sari industry operated and also learned how to negotiate with 
sari shops. Because she was new to the industry, she did gain a lot non-redundant 
information about saris from this relationship.  She is able to take advantage of this 
with her current business. If weak bridging ties could be established with the other 
BWDA sari sellers, her knowledge would become very useful non-redundant 
information to them. 
9.4 Implications 
 
The main implication of this research is that if adding weak bridging ties to the 
business social networks of sari sellers and MFIs can socially intermediate to help 
sari sellers build these weak bridging ties then this theoretical contribution should 
work for other low growth, low barriers to entry businesses started by microfinance 
clients. Therefore, MFIs should look to measuring and understanding the social 
networks of their clients and then designing the appropriate network interventions.  
9.5 Further research 
To investigate further the strength of weak ties in microfinance, the methodology 
used in this research can be enhanced. First, funding is obtained to hire Tamil 
speaking staff. They can coordinate and monitor the financial diaries. They can also 
map and record the changes to the social networks at regular intervals. The 
movement of the alters both closer and farther away from ego can also be recorded. 
The staff can follow up with the respondents to ensure that the financial diaries are 
filled in. This will give quality financial data. It may be possible that the data is 
good enough to use quantitative methods to determine cause and effect. It will also 
EHSRVVLEOHWRPRQLWRUWKHHIIHFWVRI%:'$¶VHIIRUWVWRLPSOHPHQWWKHILYHZD\VWR
socially intermediate to build weak ties among their clients. In addition, the research 
can be extended to clients with other low growth, low barrier to entry businesses 
besides sari selling. Finally, further research could explore the differences, if any, 
between building weak bridging ties in large power distance cultures and small 
power distance cultures. 
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9.6 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter summarised this research. It first described the problem that 
microfinance had at not achieved the amount of poverty reduction envisioned by its 
founders. One key reason for this was the low growth, low barrier to entry 
businesses often started by microfinance clients. While microfinance theorists 
focused on financial intermediation, the contribution to knowledge this research 
made was to XVH*UDQQRYHWWHU¶V OLQHRI UHDVRQLQJ WR show the necessity of social 
intermediation that added weak, bridging ties to the social networks of microfinance 
clients in order to improve their businesses and increase their poverty reduction. 
This research identified five ways MFIs could do this. This research also made a 
contribution WRNQRZOHGJHE\H[WHQGLQJ%XUW¶VRSHUDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRI *UDQRYHWWHU¶V
argument of the informational benefit of weak ties in the context of social hierarchy. 
The main implication of this research is that if this works for sari sellers, this will 
work for other low growth, low entry barrier microenterprises microfinance clients 
start. Ways to further investigate the strength of weak ties in microfinance were 
discussed. Despite the limitations of the research described, this research indicates 
how the strength of weak ties in can help microfinance achieve its goal of increasing 
poverty reduction.  
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10  Appendices 
10.1 Appendix A ± SHG Member Questionnaire 
SHG Member Questionnaire 
(30 May 2009 UOG) 
Identification 
 Organisation Country Y Y M M D D Staff 
Code                
Ex. E D Y F P E R 0 9 0 6 2 6 A M 
Interviewer Visits 
 1 2 3 4 
Date     
Interviewer's 
Name 
    
5HVSRQGHQW¶V
Name 
    
Result     
Next Visit Date     
Next Visit Time     
Results: 
 1 ± Completed 
 2 ± Not Completed to be continued next visit 
 3 ± Respondent absent 
 4 ± Postponed to next visit 
 5 ± Other ________________  (Specify) 
 
Total Number of Visits:  1 
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We are asking you to take part in a survey which seeks to understand important features of 
microfinance and contribute to poverty reduction in your region. This is part of a major research 
project conducted by the University of Greenwich. Your response is very important in enabling 
us to obtain the right picture of microfinance networks which is vital part of the project. All your 
responses will be treated in the strictest confidence. An overview of our project can be found 
via this link: ________________________. 
 1. General background  
 
1.1 What is the name of your organisation?  
1.2 What is the type of your organisation? (You can select more than one option 
from the options list that follows)
1. MFI   
2. MFI 
Association/Federation 
3. MFI Beneficiary 
4. Self-Help Group  
5. Bank  
6. International Financial 
Institution  
7. Donor  
8. Microfinance Investment 
Vehicle  
9. Investor  
10. Money Lender  
11. Insurance Company  
12. Rating Agency  
13. CGAP  
14. Regulator  
15. National Government 
16. Regional/Provincial 
Government  
17. Local Government 
18. Post Office  
19. NGO  
20. Local Business Owner  
21. Retailers acting as a 
Banking Correspondent  
22. Technology Partner 
(including mobile 
technology)  
23. Clean & Renewable 
Energy Firm  
24. Housing Agency  
25. Consultant  
26. University 
27. Health/Sanitation 
28. Social Development 
29. Other (please specify) 
__________________
 
1.3 Which year was your organisation established?  
 
1.4 Where are headquarters located?  
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1.5 At what level of the organisation are decisions made that affect the 
relationship with the MFI?   
                          1.  International            ż 
                          21DWLRQDOż 
3.  /RFDOż 
 
1.6 What level of the organisation implement the decisions made relating to the 
MFI? 
,QWHUQDWLRQDOż 
1DWLRQDOż 
3. /RFDOż 
 
1.7 How many people at this level of the organisation?  
  
          1.8   What is the type of your organisation? 
1. Public    ż 
2. Private for Profit  ż 
3. Private not for Profit  ż 
1.9 What are the main institutional objectives of your organisation?  
3URILWPD[LPL]DWLRQƑ 
3XUHO\ILQDQFLDOVXVWDLQDELOLW\Ƒ 
3ULPDULO\ILQDQFLDOVXVWDLQDELOLW\Ƒ 
4. Both financial sustaiQDELOLW\DQGSRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQƑ 
3ULPDULO\SRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQƑ 
3XUHO\SRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQƑ 3XUHO\SRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQƑ
7. Other (Specify)________________________________________ 
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1.10   How are objectives being achieved? What are the strategic processes in 
place to attain them? Please explain how processes have evolved over time. 
     
    ________________________________________________________________________ 
    _______________________________________________________________________
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 2. Social Networks 
2.1 With which organisations you have financial relationships? 
Relationships 
 
 
List of 
organisations     
[01] 
 
You 
give 
subsidie
d loans 
to 
 
 
 
[02] 
You 
receive 
subsidie
d loans 
from 
 
 
 
[03] 
 
You 
give 
comm
ercial 
loans 
to  
 
 
[04] 
You 
receiv
e 
comm
ercial 
loans 
from  
 
[05] 
 
You 
give 
grants 
to 
 
 
 
 
[06] 
You 
receiv
e 
grants 
from 
 
 
 
[07]  
 
You  
own 
(partly 
or 
totally
)  
 
 
 
 [08] 
You 
are 
owne
d 
(partly 
or 
totally
) by 
[09] 
Comm
ents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[10] 
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
Referrals to other organisations: 
1. 
2. 
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2.2  With which organisations you have service relationships?  
 Relationships 
 
 
List of 
organisations [01] 
 
You 
provide 
technol
ogical 
service 
to 
 
[02] 
You 
receive  
technol
ogical 
service 
from 
 
[03] 
 
You 
provide 
health or 
social  
service to 
 
 
[04] 
You 
receive 
health or 
social  
service 
from 
  
[05] 
 
You 
provide 
training to 
 
 
 
 
[06]  
You 
receive 
training 
from 
 
 
 
 
 
[07] 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[08] 
 
       
        
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
       
Referrals to other organisations: 
1. 
2. 
3.
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2.3   With which organisations you have informational relationships?  
 
 Relationships 
 
 
List of 
organisations [01] 
 
You 
send 
reports 
on 
financial 
sustain
ability 
to: 
[02] 
You 
receive 
reports 
on 
financial 
sustain
ability 
from: 
[03] 
 
You send 
reports  
on 
poverty 
reduction 
to: 
 
 
[04] 
You 
receive 
reports 
on 
poverty 
reduction 
from: 
  
[05] 
 
You 
transfer 
knowledg
e to: 
  
 
 
 
[06] 
You receive 
a transfer of 
knowledge 
from: 
 
 
 
 
[07] 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[08] 
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
       
Referrals to other organisations: 
1. 
2. 
3.
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2.4  Do you have other important relationships impacting microfinance not 
captured above? 
 
 296 
 
            Relationships 
 
 
List of organisations  [01] 
Another important 
relationship  
 
 
 [02] 
Another important 
relationship  
 
 
 [03] 
Another important 
relationship  
 
 
 
 [04] 
Another 
important 
relationship  
 
 
 
 [05] 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
[06] 
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3. Future Collaboration 
 
3.1 How could institutional collaboration with the organisations you have 
mentioned in the previous section be improved? Please elaborate in detail. 
 
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.2 Relationship between which organisations, if established, would contribute to 
poverty reduction in your region? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
3.3 Relationship between which organisations, if established, would improve 
financial sustainability of your region? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time. 
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10.2 Appendix B ± Questions for Sari Seller Interviews  
 (27 October 2010 UOG) 
Identification    SHG =  
 Organisation Country Y Y M M D D Staff 
Code                
Ex. S 0 0 0 I N D 1 0 1 0 0 0 C J 
Interviewer Visits ±  
 1 2 3 4 
Date     
Interviewer's 
Name 
    
Result     
Next Visit Date     
Next Visit Time     
Results: 
 1 ± Completed 
 2 ± Not Completed to be continued next visit 
 3 ± Respondent absent 
 4 ± Postponed to next visit 
 5 ± Other ________________  (Specify) 
 
Total Number of Visits:   
 
 
 
 299 
 
 
1. When did you start your sari selling business? 
 
2. Suppliers 
a. Where do you get your saris from?  
Name Trust Pyr. Jati Spec. BWDA Help 
       
       
       
       
       
 
b. For each one, do you get credit from this supplier?  
c. For each supplier, where on the pyramid of Tamil society is this supplier? 
d. Do you know what jati this person belongs to? 
e. Does this person have special influence in the sari business? 
f. Did BWDA help you contact this person? 
g. Do you go to any supplier for help and advice? 
3. Financial Sources 
Name Trust Pyr. Jati Spec. 
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
a. Who gives you money for your business? 
x Prompt respondent for following if not in response: 
o BWDA 
o SHG 
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o Moneylender 
o Bank 
o Pawnbroker 
o Family 
o Friends & Neighbours 
o Chit Fund 
o Others (including other MFIs) 
b. For each one, can you get a loan without giving jewels in return? 
c. For each person giving you money, where on the pyramid of Tamil 
society is this person? 
d. Do you know what jati this person belongs to? 
e. Do you go to any financial source for help and advice on important 
matters? 
4. Market Information Sources 
Name Trust Pyr. Jati Spec. BWDA Help 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
a. Where do you go to or who do you go to find out information you need 
for marketing? 
b. For each person giving you information, how much do you trust that the 
information given is accurate? 
Totally trusting  ? ? ? ? ?  No Trust  
 
c. For each person giving you information, where on the pyramid of Tamil 
society is this person? 
d. Do you know what jati this person belongs to? 
 301 
 
e. Does this person have special influence in the sari business? 
f. Did BWDA help you contact this person? 
g. Do you go to any person giving you information for help and advice on 
important matters? 
 
5. Customers (100 customers)  
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
 
a. How many customers do you have? Who are your customers?  
b. How much does each customer trust you? 
Totally trusting  ? ? ? ? ?  No Trust  
 
c. For each customer, where on the pyramid of Tamil society is this 
person? 
d. Do you know what jati this person belongs to? 
e. Did BWDA help you contact these people? 
f. Do you go to any customer for help and advice on important matters? 
6. Other Sari Sellers 
a. Do you know any other sari sellers including BWDA SHG members? 
b. How much do these other sari sellers trust you? 
Totally trusting  ? ? ? ? ?  No Trust  
 
c. Does this person have special influence in the sari business? 
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d. For each sari seller, where on the pyramid of Tamil society is this 
person? 
e. Do you know what jati this person belongs to? 
f. Did BWDA help you contact this person? 
g. Do you go to any other sari sellers for help and advice on important 
matters? 
 
 
Name Trust Pyr. Jati Spec. BWDA Help 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
7. Reverse Small World Network  W Market Information Sources 
a. If you wanted to get information on the following, who would you talk to 
first? 
i. People who know about upcoming weddings 
ii. People who know about upcoming religious festivals 
iii. Beauty parlour owners, employees and Professional Aunties 
b. For each person identified, how much do you trust that the information 
given is accurate? 
Totally trusting  ? ? ? ? ?  No Trust  
 
c. For each person identified, where on the pyramid of Tamil society is this 
person? 
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d. Do you know the jati of each person identified? 
e. Does this person have special influence in the sari business? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name Trust Pyr. Jati Spec. Why? 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
 
 
 
8. Reverse Small World Network  W Customers 
Name Trust Pyr. Jati Spec. Why? 
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a. If you want to have more customers, who would you talk to first? 
b. For each person identified, how much do you trust that the information 
given is accurate? 
Totally trusting  ? ? ? ? ?  No Trust  
 
c. For each person identified, where on the pyramid of Tamil society is this 
person? 
d. Do you know the jati of each person identified? 
e. Does this person have special influence in the sari business? 
 
9. Reverse Small World  W Learning from the Best 
Name Trust Pyr. Jati Spec. Why? 
      
      
      
      
 
a. If you want to make your business better, who would you talk to first? 
b. How much do you trust that the information given is accurate? 
Totally trusting  ? ? ? ? ?  No Trust  
 
c. Where on the pyramid of Tamil society is this person? 
d. What jati of is this person in? 
e. Does this person have special influence in the sari business? 
10. Reverse Small World  W Kanchipuram Silk Question  
a. Who would you talk to first to sell a Kanchipuram silk sari worth 25,000 
rupees given to you?  
b. How much would you charge knowing you would need to give the giver 
25,000 rupees? 
11. Sari Seller Personal 
a. What jati does your family belong to? 
b. Where is this jati on a 5 layer pyramid that represents the Tamil social 
structure? 
c. Does jati social network is a help or hindrance to doing business? Why? 
 
12. Sari Seller Financial 
a. For 2008, 2009, 2010 what was the following financial information? 
 305 
 
i. If you sell all your saris for the same price, please answer the 
following questions: 
1. How many saris did you sell in each year?  
2. What price did you sell them at?    
3. What margin did you make on each sari?  
ii. Otherwise answering two of the following questions: 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Revenues   
Amount 2008 2009 2010 
0  W 5000 rupees/year    
5000  W 10000 rupees/year    
10000  W 15000 rupees/year    
15000  W 20000 rupees/year    
20000  W 25000 rupees/year    
More than 25000 
rupees/year 
   
 
2. Costs 
Amount 2008 2009 2010 
0  W 5000 rupees/year    
5000  W 10000 rupees/year    
10000  W 15000 rupees/year    
15000  W 20000 rupees/year    
20000  W 25000 rupees/year    
More than 25000 
rupees/year 
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3. Profits   
Amount 2008 2009 2010 
0  W 5000 rupees/year    
5000  W 10000 rupees/year    
10000  W 15000 rupees/year    
15000  W 20000 rupees/year    
20000  W 25000 rupees/year    
More than 25000 
rupees/year 
   
 
13. YƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƐĂƌŝƐĞůůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽǀĞƌƚǇůĞǀĞůďĂƐĞĚŽŶ'ƌĂŵĞĞŶ ?ƐWƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŽƵƚŽĨ
Poverty Index for India: 
a. How many people aged 0 to 18 were in the household? 
i. Five or more 
ii. Four 
iii. Three  
iv. Two  
v. One  
vi. None  
b. WhaƚǁĂƐƚŚĞŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚ ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶ ?
i. Labourers (agricultural, plantation, other farm) hunters, tobacco 
preparers and tobacco product makers, and other labourers  
ii. Others  
iii. Professionals, technicians, clerks, administrators, managers, 
executives, directors, supervisors, and teachers  
c. Was the residence all pucca (burnt bricks, stone, cement, concrete, 
jackboard/cement- plastered reeds, timber, tiles, galvanised tin or 
asbestos cement sheets)? 
i. No  
ii. Yes  
d. tŚĂƚǁĂƐƚŚĞŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨĞŶĞƌŐǇĨŽƌ cooking? 
i. Firewood and chips, charcoal, or none  
ii. Others  
iii. LPG  
e. Did the household own a television? 
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i. No  
ii. Yes  
f. Did the household own a bicycle, scooter, or motor cycle? 
i. No  
ii. Yes  
g. Did the household own an almirah/dressing table? 
i. No  
ii. Yes  
h. Did the household own a sewing machine? 
i. No  
ii. Yes  
i. How many pressure cookers or pressure pans did the household own? 
i. None  
ii. One  
iii. Two or more  
j. How many electric fans did the household own? 
i. None  
ii. One  
iii. Two or more  
14. Is there anyone else that we should talk to about your sari business? 
 
Notes: 
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10.3 Appendix C ± Sari Seller Questionnaire II 
(27 October 2010 UOG) 
Identification    SHG =  
 Organisation Country Y Y M M D D Staff 
Code                
Ex. S 0 0 0 I N D 1 0 1 0 0 0 C J 
Interviewer Visits ±  
 1 2 3 4 
Date     
Interviewer's 
Name 
    
Result     
Next Visit Date     
Next Visit Time     
Results: 
 1 ± Completed 
 2 ± Not Completed to be continued next visit 
 3 ± Respondent absent 
 4 ± Postponed to next visit 
 5 ± Other ________________  (Specify) 
 
Total Number of Visits:   
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dŚĂŶŬǇŽƵĨŽƌƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶ ?dŚŝƐǁŝůůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŶĂŝƌĞǁŝůůďĞƐŚŽƌƚĞƌƚŚĂŶůĂƐƚǇĞĂƌ ?Ɛ ?tĞ
will be doing three things: 
A.  Last year you gave a list of organisations you were connected to get supplies, finance, 
market information and customers. Can you give the name of the person or persons you work 
with in these organisations such as banks, sari shops, pawnbrokers, moneylenders, etc?  
B.  You see a target diagram in front of you. The little white circle in the centre is you. We want 
to place all of the individuals you named today and last year on the diagram around you. Could 
you indicate how close to you each individual is to you on this diagram?  
C. Finally, we need to know which of these individuals know each other. Can you indicate who 
knows each so that we can draw a line between them to indicate this? 
 
Thank you for your help!
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10.4 Appendix D ± Transcript of Interview with Mona Sinniah 
Transcript of Interview with Mona Sinniah 
August 29, 2010 
 
Cornell Jackson (CJ): Hello, this is Cornell Jackson interviewing Mona Sinniah on 
August 29, 2010. Thank you, Mona, for agreeing to this interview. Let me start with the 
questions that you have in front of you. When you are in India, where do you normally 
buy your saris? 
Mona Sinniah (MS): I usually go and buy them from very big sari shops. The reason 
being is that you get a better choice.  
CJ: OK 
MS: Buying saris is quite an art. We women are quite particular about the saris we wear 
and the colours and the designs. And, of course, we buy them sometimes for weddings 
and sometimes for other special occasions. Sometimes I am buying gifts for my 
relatives: my sisters, my sister-in-laws. So, in that way we go to have a different choice. 
If I were buying for my auntie, I would buy her a cotton sari. If I buy a sari for myself, I 
would buy myself a silk sari because cotton saris are worn by younger women, we do 
not wear them all the time. Maybe to a temple. Maybe for a funeral.  
CJ: Right. 
MS: We will never wear a silk sari, only a cotton sari to a funeral. So, I will have one or 
two cotton saris but basically no. Because I wear my saris few and far in between, to 
temples, for special occasions, for weddings. So, I like to have nice silk saris.  
&-2.-XVWRQHRWKHUTXHVWLRQZKLOH,¶PWKLQNLQJDERXWLW,QWKHSDVt 10 to 15 years, I 
NQRZWKHUHKDYHEHHQ,GRQ¶WZDQWWRXVHWKHZRUGSRO\HVWHUFRPELQLQJRIFRWWRQDQG
other fabrics. Can you buy those or do you stick to the traditional cotton and silk? 
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MS: No, I have had other type of saris but not polyester. Because in our minds is for the 
FKHDS,W¶VFKHDSHU 
CJ: Yeah. Wrong brand image! 
MS:  Yes, wrong brand image! Also, the polyester saris come in terrible colours, 
horrible designs! And if you ask a woman like me to wear such saris, I would never! 
CJ: OK. 
MS: But, saying that, I do have a Georgette polyester sari and most of the Georgette 
polyester saris were made in Japan. And, I have one that I have had for about 20 odd 
\HDUVDQG,VWLOOZHDULWDQGLW¶VEHDXWLIXOO\GHVLJQHG 
CJ: Was this sold in India this Georgette or was this bought in Malaysia? 
MS: Bought in Malaysia. 
CJ: OK 
06,KDYHRQHRUWZROLNHWKDWWKDWFDPHRXWLQWKHODWH¶VHDUO\¶VZKHUH-DSDQ
realised that there were women of higher educated class and taste who wanted nicer 
looking polyester Georgette saris. So, they brought out a lot of Georgette saris and I 
have actually three. For my 21st birthday, my mother took me to the shop in Malaysia 
and she said, I said I wanted a sari. I chose myself a Georgette polyester and I still have 
it.  
CJ: OK 
06$QGWKH\¶UHJRRGTXDOLW\WRR7KH\¶UHYHU\H[SHQVLYHEXWJRRGTXDOLW\ 
CJ: OK. You already mentioned on the next question what you look for. You look for 
colour. You look for design. Silk for certain functions, cotton for others. Is there 
anything HOVHWKDW\RXKDYHQ¶WPHQWLRQHGWKDW\RXORRNIRUZKHQ\RXJREX\LQJVDULV" 
MS: We also look at the sequin work that is on it.  
CJ: Is that the ziti thread that they use to put the gold on? 
MS: Yes. Some of them are very elaborately done and usually they are worn for parties, 
receptions, wedding reception parties but in my traditional family we only wear silk for 
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weddings. If you want to wear one of these elaborately sequined, beaded saris, you wear 
it for the reception. So, we do look at clothes, saris that way but I find wearing them 
very uncomfortable because they tend to a braise your skin under your arms if you have 
a short blouse. 
CJ: Is that because it is also put on the inside. 
06<HVWKDW¶VULJKW6R,ILQGLWYHU\XQFRPIRUWDEOHDQGYHU\KHDY\Dnd me being very 
VNLQQ\QRWDQRUPDOIDW,QGLDQSHUVRQ ,W MXVWGRHVQ¶WVWD\RQ ,W¶V OLNH,¶PZHDULQJDQ
DUPRXUHG VXLW 6R , VWD\ FOHDU RI DQ\ VHTXLQHG VDULV , GRQ¶W HYHQ KDYH RQH DW WKH
moment.  
CJ: OK. OK. For someone selling you the sari, what is, for you, the most important 
skills and characteristics that you need? 
MS: I like customer service and someone who will show me as many saris as possible. 
Because saris are folded beautifully and they are not draped. A few saris are draped 
around a mannequin. Most of them are not hung. They are all beautifully folded in 
showcases. So, you have to have them opened out. And because the pallu, you know the 
pallu? 
CJ: Yes. 
MS: The pallu that goes over one side of your shoulder. Usually, the colour and the 
pattern varies. So, we need someone who would take it out, open it up and let us drape it 
on ourselves. Usually most big shops allow that. So, we drape it and if it suits us, we 
take it. And that is what we want from a salesperson.  
CJ: OK. Uh... 
MS: Who taught me to tie a sari? 
CJ: Yes, who taught you to tie a sari? 
MS: My mother and my sisters. You see how your mother ties and when you have older 
sisters and when they have to tie saris, my mother will teach us how to tie saris and then 
\RXZDWFK7KDW¶VKRZ,OHarned to tie saris. Basically seeing my mother put on her sari 
every morning. 
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CJ: So, you just watched her and copied it. 
06<HV\RXFRSLHGLWDQGWKHQZKHQVKH¶VWHDFKLQJP\VLVWHUV,used to listen to all the 
little tips. You know how you do the pleats? 
CJ: Right. 
MS: Then you learn. You practice! You take a piece of long cloth and practice and say 
P\PRWKHUGLGWKHSOHDWVWKLVZD\6R\RXGLGWKDW/DWHURQ\RXGRKDYHDXQWVZKR¶OO
come and give you extra little tips here and there. So, you follow. 
CJ: OK. OK. Do you remember, not how many saris you have but the history of and 
who bought it and particular emotions that come along with each sari? 
MS: Yes. Absolutely! Every sari tells a story to me. I have had, as I said, for my 21st 
birthday my mother gave me a sari. I still have it. It is very precious. I think I must have 
worn it twice or thrice my whole life and I keep it. The other day I took it out and smelt 
it and OK, I need a new blouse for it. So, I would wear it. And because it is a Georgette, 
LW¶VDYHU\VHHWKURXJKVDUL6R\RXFDQ¶WZKHUHLWWRWHPSOHEHFDXVH\RXGRQ¶WZDQWPHQ
to be ..... 
CJ: Yeah. 
066R,ZRXOGZHDULWWRPD\EHIRUDIULHQG¶VELUWKGD\SDUW\DIXQFWLRQRUDHYHQLQJ
out somewhere where everyone is wearing a sari. So, yes. And then I have saris my 
mother has bought for me from India given me for Diwali 
CJ: Right 
062U,PD\KDYHZDQWHGRQHDQG,VD\WRKHU³<RXNQRZZKHQ\RXJRWR,QGLDJHW
PHDFRORXULQWKDW´,KDYHKDGDXQWLHVZKRKDYHJLYHQPH0\VLVWHUVKDYHJLYHQ me 
saris that I have. Yes, everyone of them has got something. 
CJ: OK. 
066RVDULVDUHOLNHWUHDVXUHVIRUDQ,QGLDQZRPDQ:HQHYHUZHDUDVDULLIZHGRQ¶W
like it.  
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&-6RLW¶VDOPRVWOLNHDQHWZRUNRIHPRWLRQVRUFRQQHFWLRQVWKDW\RXKDYHZLWKYDULRXs 
members of your family and friends. 
06<HV7KDW¶VULJKW 
CJ: OK. It reminded me, when you were talking about your almost see-through sari, 
WKHUHZDVDSKUDVHRU WHUP,FDPHDFURVVGXULQJP\UHVHDUFKVD\LQJWKDWZRPHQGRQ¶W
want to be too austere like a QXQRUGRQ¶WZDQWWREHWRR³ILOP\´ 
MS: Yes, so that in-between.  
CJ: Yes, you want to be in-between 
MS: But, we girls love the idea that we can seduce with a see-through sari too. Because 
when I was much younger I would wear my sari so low on my hips, my mother would 
VD\³:KRDUH\RXWU\LQJWRVHGXFH"´<RXNQRZ,WKRXJKW³2KP\*RG,VWKLVZKDW,
DPVXEFRQVFLRXVO\GRLQJ"´$FWXDOO\WKHIDFWZDV,ZDV\RXQJ,KDGWKHILJXUHIRULWDQG
because my sisters use to do it, I thought I could do it too, never realising the 
consequences of it. 
CJ: Right. 
MS: But we did do that when we were much younger. Even now if you had the body and 
\RXDVNHGPHWRGRLW,¶OOVD\QR,¶OOUDWKHUOHDYHLWWRWKHLPDJLQDWLRQ 
CJ: OK. OK. I think you have already answered the next question. Yes, you do 
remember the history of each of your saris. And you also answered the other one about 
them bringing up a web of emotions and relationships.  
MS: Yes. 
CJ: Now onto the next section about possession. The question I have here is for the 
women your cousin sold the sari to, did she know if the saris remained in the control of 
the mother-in-laws of the women? 
MS: No. Where they grew up and where she was selling, it was a very open community. 
I the sense that the daughter-in-laws lived with their mother-in-laws, they had the right 
to buy saris. But, I have heard of homes where the mother-in-law buys and keeps the sari 
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and dishes it out as and when she thinks they should have one. But this village I have 
gone to ... 
&-7KDW¶VQRWWKHFDVH 
MS: No. Where she got married and went, the mother-in-law does not do that.  
CJ: OK. 
MS: But, saris are seen as possessions because they are expensive. Like you said, they 
DUHNHSWXQGHUORFNDQGNH\,W¶VDOPRVWDVJRRGDVJROGIRUDZRPDQDQ,QGLDQZRPan. 
,JHWYHU\XSVHWZKHQDQ\RQHZDQWVWRERUURZP\VDULDQGGRHVQ¶WORRNDIWHULWSURSHUO\
,GRQ¶WNQRZZKDWLWLV$IWHUUHDGLQJ\RXUTXHVWLRQQDLUHLWPDGHPHWKLQNZKDWLVLW",
WKLQN LW¶V WR GR ZLWK WUDGLWLRQ DQG FXVWRPV 7KDW LI \RX ZHDU D VDUL \RX¶UH D ZRPDQ
<RX¶UHVXSSRVHGWRDFWOLNHDZRPDQ<RX¶UHVXSSRVHGWRDFWOLNHDJRGGHVV7KHPRUH,
JRWRWHPSOHDQG,\HDUQIRUWKHJRGGHVV¶VVDUL,PXVWWHOO\RXVRPHWKLQJ,Q,QGLDWKH\
do it too but here in London they do it a lot. What they do is like me, I say prayers for 
P\PRWKHU,ZRXOGEX\DVDULDEHDXWLIXOVLONVDULWDNHLWWRWKHWHPSOHDQGVD\WRGD\¶V
P\PRWKHU¶VSUD\HUDQGXVH WKLV VDUL IRU WKHJRGGHVV6R WKH\ZLOO WLH WKHVDUL IRU WKH
JRGGHVVDQGWKH\¶OOXVHLWWZRRUWKUHHWLPHVDQGWKen I will say to them, I want it back. I 
want to wear it because the goddess has worn it in honour of my mother. And before 
they give it to me, they ask me to put in a donation to the donation box at the temple. So, 
like that, I have one or two saris. SomeWLPHV,¶OOJLYHLWDZD\$FWXDOO\,KDYHWKUHHVXFK
saris and those saris mean a lot to me.  
CJ: A lot of sentimental attachment to those saris. 
MS: Because we believe that when we tie our saris, we become like the goddess. We 
adorn ourselves and we are pure. Our soles have to be pure and clean and beautiful. And 
ZKHQ\RXVHHKRZWKHJRGGHVVHVDUHDGRUQHGDWWKHWHPSOHLW¶VDPD]LQJ,KDYHWRVKRZ
DSKRWR,µYHJRWLWRQP\FDPHUD,W¶VDPD]LQJ6R,WKLQNWKDWLVZKDWWKH\WU\WRLQVWLO
in us. So this sari is something that makes an Indian woman sort of like a goddess.  
CJ: OK 
MS: I think that is why the poorer people yearn for silk saris because the goddess is 
never, ever ... 
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CJ: In a cotton,  
MS: In a cotton, in a polyester or even a Benares silk. It is always Kanchipuram. See if 
you buy for the temple it has to be.  
CJ: Is Kanchipuram just for Tamil women? If you go to Kerala or Karnataka or Andhra 
Pradesh, would it be the same? 
MS: Andhra Pradesh would be the same because my mother is from Andhra. Tamil 
Nadu would be the same. Kerala I cannot tell you. Kerala is very poor and they always 
live in cotton saris. So, if you, silk saris may be very expensive for them. And so they 
only do cotton loom industry there. So, I think they get married there, as you know, in 
ZKLWHVDULV<RXNQRZWKDWGRQ¶W\RX" 
&-,SUREDEO\UHDGLWEXWFDQ¶WUHPHPEHULW 
MS: In the Hindu religion, white is used for mourning and for 
CJ: Widows.  
06:LGRZV\HV6R,GRQ¶WNQRZZKHUHWKDWFRPHVIURPIRU.HUVDOLWHV6R,FDQQRW
tell you within Kerala. A lot of Keralan women do wear Kancipuram silk, beautiful silk. 
I got good friends.  
&-,NQHZWKDW.DQFKLSXUDPZDVUHQRZQHGIRU LWVVLONVDULVEXW,ZDVQ¶WVXUHKRZIDU
widespread those saris went in South India.  
MS: Central and South India. Kanchipuram also, where the silk saris are made, has got 
the famous Kanchipuram Meenakshi Temple.  
CJ: OK. 
MS: I believe that these looms were initially initiated for silk for the goddess.  
CJ: OK 
MS: It then became a huge industry and I have two saris from Kanchipuram. I went to 
Kanchipuram a few years ago in 2003 or 2004 and I went there and bought two to three 
saris there. 
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CJ: OK.  
MS: And for me, it was like my mother used to come to buy it here. For me it was to 
come to see how it was done.  
CJ: Your family is from Trichy so it is not a short trip from Trichy to Kanchipuram.  
061RLW¶VQRW 
CJ: Cause Kanchipuram is just west of Chennai if I remember right. 
MS: Yes. We went to Kanchipuram. We were going to Bangalore by car so we stopped 
in Kanchipuram.  
&-2.1RZ\RXUFRXVLQ,GLGQ¶WUHDOLVH\RXUFRXVLQPDUULHGWKHSUHVLGHQWRIDQRWKHU
village. 
MS: Yes. 
CJ: So, she would have had access to, because of her status, the wives of the important 
men of the village. 
MS: Yes.  
CJ: It would have been relatively simple to sell to those women. 
069HU\VLPSOH7KDW¶VULJKW 
CJ: I know that you talked about this before in our previous conversation but could you 
remind me of the common festivals where saris would be given? 
MS: The first time a girl wears a sari is when a girl comes of age. You know that in the 
Hindu tradition. And usually after that, it depends on wealthy the family is, she might 
get a sari for the New Year which is the Hindu Tamil New Year. I have the calendar 
KHUH DQG ,¶OO VKRZ \RX. Then you get Pongal. I told you Pongal, a whole month of 
harvest festivals. Every day is in honour of something or other. Then Dewali and then 
weddings. These are the five times I can think of giving and maybe birthdays too. Six I 
would say. 
CJ: OK. 
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MS: It depends on whether a girl wants a sari. But, I do not know what it is like in the 
village. Cause sometimes in time after you come of age and before the time you get 
married, you may not wear a sari. You still wear the skirt, the blouse and the little cloth. 
3DYDUDWKDOLPLLW¶VFDOOHG 
CJ: I have also seen described something called a shalwar kamiz. 
MS: A shalwar kamiz is Punjabi where there a trousers and the blouse comes down to 
the knees and then you have the sash. But, in the village, girls wear a long skirt and they 
wear a blouse and that is a Pavarathalimi. That is more Tamilian.  
CJ: OK. I have actually seen a shalwar kamiz worn by some of the young women in 
Villupuram who were not married yet. And, also as a school uniform in some schools. 
MS: Yes. 7KDW¶VULJKWWKH\GR%XWLQ,QGLDLW¶VOLNHWKLV,Q,QGLDLW¶VFXWOLNHWKDWDQGLW
usually has a skirt. (Showing a picture of Pavarathalimi).  
CJ: OK 
MS: And it goes with a sash. 
CJ: Right.  
06,W¶VOLNHDOLWWOHPLQLVDUL,KDYHRQH$OWKRXJK,¶PD grown woman, I love it! So I 
KDYHVWLWFKHGRQHIRUP\VHOI ,KDGLWGRQHDQG,ERXJKW WKHPDWHULDO LQ,QGLD 6R LW¶V
OLNHWKDW$QGLW¶VWXFNHGLQKHUHUHWUHDWHGDQGWDNHQDURXQGMXVWOLNHDVDUL 
CJ: You put it over your right shoulder. Most saris are worn in the Nivi style which the 
pallu is over the left shoulder. 
061RLW¶VDFWXDOO\WKHULJKWVKRXOGHU,¶YHDOZD\VZRUQPLQHRYHUWKHULJKWVKRXOGHU
(Starts pantomiming putting sari on and putting pallu over the shoulder) Oh, left 
shoulder! Yes, sorry! Yes, of course! It comes this way and goes over the left shoulder. 
Yes. 
CJ: OK.  
06,W¶VRYHUWKHOHIWVKRXOGHUVRUU\ 
&-7KDW¶V2. 
 319 
 
MS: Forgive me, I forgot.  
&-7KDW¶V2.+RZFRPPRQLVLWIRUZHDOWK\ZRPHQWRJLYHDZD\VDULV" 
MS: It is very comPRQ,W¶VIRUWHPSOHFHOHEUDWLRQVXVXDOO\ 
CJ: Connected with a festival? 
MS:  It is usually connected with a festival. Or, if something good has happened in their 
family, they want to give thanks and say we give this to the poor.  
CJ: OK. OK. 
MS: Those are the two reasons.  
CJ: OK. And how one find out about these women who wanted to do this?  
MS: Usually they would send word by word-of-PRXWKVD\LQJ³,¶PJRLQJWRGRWKLVRQ
VXFKDQGVXFKDGD\´DQGXVXDOO\LWZRXOGEHZLWKDWHPSOHFHOHEUDWLRQ 
CJ: OK 
MS6RSHRSOHZLOONQRZDQGSHRSOHZLOOWXUQXS$QGWKDW¶VKRZWKH\GRLW 
CJ: So, you would have to be somehow connected to her network in order to get her 
word-of-mouth, to be able to get the word that this is going to happen in the temple on a 
certain day. 
MS: Yes. Recently someone had a festival in the temple. I think it was earlier this year 
but she only gave out to married women.  
CJ: OK. 
066R LI \RXZHUHVLQJOHRU LI \RXZHUHGLYRUFHGRUZKDWHYHU VKHGLGQ¶WGR LW6KH
GLGQ¶WJLYHLWWR\RX6Rshe brought, I think, 36 saris or something. And all the women 
there who were married, got a sari each.  
CJ: OK. OK. Sometimes saris are given as an act of religious piety. Again, how often 
does this happen and how would you find out about this? 
MS: Usually there are certain times of the year when you have certain celebrations 
ZKHUHLW¶VJLYHQRXW$QGLI\RXJRRQWKDWGD\6D\\RXZHUHP\IULHQGDQG\RXZHUH
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JRLQJWRJLYHLWRXW\RX¶GVD\´0RQD,¶PGRLQJWKLVRQVXFKDQGVXFKDGD\FRPHXS
come in anGJHWLWEHFDXVHLWLVJRRGIRUP\VRXODQGJRRGIRU\RXUVRXOWRUHFHLYHRQH´
%XW,ZHQWWRWHPSOHUHFHQWO\,ZDVQRW,¶PVLQJOHWKH\GLGQ¶WWHOOPH6RZKHQ,ZHQW
there the prayers were going on and she was handing out to those who were ... 
CJ: married? 
MS: Married. So, all the married women got it.  
CJ: OK.  
MS: So that how it is. It is usually word of mouth.  
CJ: Are there any concern about the saris being given away being ritually polluted or 
that is not a worry because no one would do that? 
MS: When you say ritually polluted, I should have asked you that question earlier on.  
&-7KHUHZDVVRPHUHDGLQJ,¶YHGRQHWKDWLQGLFDWHGDQGWKLVZDVIRUDVSHFLILFVLWXDWLRQ
of a peddler selling second-hand saris, and the women were worried that if they bought 
it, maybe it was .... 
MS: Given? 
CJ: Yes 
MS: Ah! OK. I think I have never come across such things before.  
CJ: OK 
060D\EHEHFDXVH,GRQ¶WEX\VHFRQG-hand saris apart from the saris we have donated 
to the temple.  
CJ: Right. 
MS: to the goddess. The goddess has worn it. I clean it. 
&-7KHUH¶VQRLVVXHZLWKWKDW 
MS: Yes. That is no issue but I would never go and buy second-hand saris from 
anybody. It is something that we are not brought up to do.  
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CJ: OK 
MS: So, maybe there are peddlers doing it in India because people are poor and they 
have to sell their saris. You know, expensive saris. I have no experience of that.  
CJ: OK. One other question I forgot to ask you is who do you go to normally when you 
are buying saris for yourself for help and advice? 
MS: No one. 
CJ: OK 
MS: I decide. 
CJ: You have enough experience by now to know 
MS: Yes! I never had to ask anyone apart from my mother because she in the beginning, 
ZKHQ ZH XVHG WR JR WR EX\ VDULV RU ZHQW WR ,QGLD VKH XVHG WR WHOO XV ³,W ORRNV OLNH
KanFKLSXUDPLW¶VQRW.DQFKLSXUDP,W¶VJRWFKHDSHUWKUHDGZRYHQLQWRLW,WLVQRWSXUH
VLON´6RVKHZRXOGWHOOXVKRZWRWRXFKLWWRIHHOLWDQGWRIHHOKRZJRRG.DQFKLSXUDP
silk is. So, that we have. But, now we go and we sort of know. And we know big shop 
owners now. You come to buy and they are not going to cheat you.  
CJ: If you establish a trust with these people... 
06<HVLW¶VDWUXVWDQGLI\RXGRQ¶WOLNHLW\RXJREDFNDQGWKURZLWLQWKHLUIDFH7KH\
will accept it too because they know that RQFHWKH\VHOO\RXWKH\¶OOKDYH\RXUFXVWRP
\RX¶OOFRPHEDFNDQGEDFNDQGEDFN6RQRZZKHQ,JR5DGKD6LONLQ&KHQQDLZRZ,
JHW WHDV DQG FRIIHHV DQG HYHU\WKLQJ 0HQ VLW GRZQ 7KH\¶OO DVVLJQ RQH PDQ ZKR ZLOO
VKRZVDUL DIWHU VDUL DIWHU VDUL XQWLO ,¶P WLUHG DQG ,¶OO VD\ ´,¶P WLUHG´%XW WKH\¶OO VD\
³1R\RXKDYHWRORRNDWWKLVRQHWRR´ 
&-<RXGRQ¶WJRWR,QGLDWKDWRIWHQEXW LI\RXOLYHGWKHUH\RXZRXOGJRRIWHQHQRXJK
that they will know your taste and when you return they would show everything that fits 
your taste.  
067KDW¶VULJKW 
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CJ: All of the reading I have done talks about the sari shops, the emporiums and the men 
ZKRVHOOLQLW'RQ¶WZRPHQVHOOVDULV" 
MS: Yes they do.  
CJ: OK. 
06%XW LW¶V MXVW DV , VDLG WR \RXEHIRUH WKHEXVLQHVVHVZere all established by men. 
Women never worked in India before. And, somehow the sari shops were always run by 
men. Now if you go to some of the sari shops in Trichy and Chennai, there are young 
JLUOV ZKR DUH VHOOLQJ EXW \RX ILQG WKH\¶UH QRW LQ WKH VDUL VHFWLRQ 7KH\¶UH PRUH LQ WKH
VHFWLRQWKDWVHOOVKDOZDUNDPL]DQGPRGHUQFORWKHVIRUFKLOGUHQ,WKLQNLW¶VEHFDXVH\RX
have to open up. The stamina. The men have the stamina to open up and saris are heavy. 
And folding them back 
CJ: OK 
MS: And the other reason is mulam. Mulam means from their nose to the tip of their 
hand is a yard.  
&-2.<RX¶OOKDYHWRWHOOPHKRZWRVSHOOWKDW 
MS: M-U-L-A-0,W¶VOLNHD\DUG7KDWLVKRZWKH\ZLOOVKRZ$VDULLV\DUGV7KH\
ZLOOGRWKDWDQGVD\³6HH´$FWVRXWVHOOHUmeasuring out mulams) Some of us will ask, 
³,V WKH VDUL  \DUGV" 'RHV LW KDYH D EORXVH"´ DQG WKH\¶OO VD\ ³<HV WKLV RQH KDV D
EORXVH´ 
CJ: Yes, my reading indicates that most saris are six yards but the more expensive kind 
tend to be nine yards. 
MS: Nine yards? No. They are for a special part of India where the women are very tall. 
So, they need more. Also, the blouse is woven. The blouse is already weaved in to the 
saris. Yes, there are nine yard saris.  
CJ: OK. The next section, you already answered the first question, saying that puberty is 
when a girl first wears a sari.  
MS: Yes, coming of age. 
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CJ: Not the school farewell.  On the phone, we did talk about the young man who buys 
his mother a sari with his first paycheque. If you can just go back and say who he would 
get help and advice from to buy that first sari.  
MS: OK. He might ask his aunt or his sisters but I think he will know what his mother is 
ZHDULQJGD\ LQ DQGGD\ RXW ,W¶V OLNH \RXZRXOG NQRZZKDW \RXUPRWKHUZHDUVZKDW
colours she would like in a skirt or a blouse. Or, did she like to wear trousers or a dress. 
So, he would know. He could ask an aunt. He could also go to the shops where they buy 
and say my mother is this age. He may not have enough money to buy a silk sari so he 
may buy a ... 
CJ: a cotton 
MS: cotton. Or she may be a widow so he may buy her a nice ... 
CJ: white 
MS: White one. Now days all the white saris are a bit untraditional.  They come with 
green borders and yellow borders.  
CJ: Is it traditionally white with red borders if I remember right? 
MS: No. Just white. 
CJ: OK. In your experience do young women sometimes go to traditional aunties to 
learn how to tie saris? 
MS: Yes, they do. More and more women are professionally fashioning themselves as 
women who know how to tie the VDULDQGJRDURXQGDQGWHDFKZRPHQDQG\RXQJJLUOV´
,W¶VPXFKVH[LHUEODKEODKEODK´DQGHDUQPRQH\$QGDOVRZHIRXQGWKDWORQJDJR
when my sisters were getting married, no one came and tied the sari. We did it. The 
sisters would help each other. The mother would help the daughter. As I have grown up, 
ZKHQ , JRWPDUULHG ,¶PGLYRUFHGP\ DXQW RQHRIP\ DXQWLHV WKURXJK PDUULDJH VKH
came and did it. She did all the makeup and the sari and she charged me. I think it was 
250 Malaysian dollars. I didQ¶WPLQGWKDW 
CJ: Right.  
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MS: I thought, yeah, come and do it. I know my older sister, she tied her own sari. My 
PRWKHUKHOSHGKHU7KHPDNHXSZDVGRQHE\P\VLVWHUVVRVKHGLGQ¶WKDYHDQ\ERG\GR
LW%XW,WKLQNLW¶VEHFRPLQJDIDVKLRQDEOHWUDLWQRZQRW long ago.  
CJ: OK. Would the go to the point of asking for help and advice from such women in 
buying a sari? 
06,WKLQNLWGHSHQGVRQZKHWKHUWKHJLUOLVQRWFRQILGHQWHQRXJKRUVKHGRHVQ¶WKDYHD
mother or whatever. Yes, she would ask. But, most women make up their mind on what 
they like on what they see and things like that. Like, I know. Throughout the age, there 
ZHUHFHUWDLQWKLQJVRIP\PRWKHU¶VVDULV,OLNHGDQG,ZDQWHGVLPLODUVDULVOLNHWKDW 
CJ: OK. 
MS: Which is strange. 
CJ: No, not necessarily. No. I read one story where a professional auntie would... 
Interviewed interrupted by dog barking. Interview resumes after a short while. 
CJ: Where was I? Yes.... 
MS: About advising purchasing a sari.  
CJ: You said  ... 
MS: Depending on the girl  ... 
CJ: Right. I hear or read a story about one professional auntie who if a girl saw a woman 
on a TV soap or movie and they wanted her sari tied like that, she (the auntie) could tie it 
like the TV soap star or the movie star and that is how she got her fame.  
MS: It is very easy to learn how to tie a sari because there is only one basic technique in 
W\LQJD VDUL%XW LW¶VKRZ\RX ILQH WXQH ,W¶VKRZ\RXJHW WKHSOHDWVEHDXWLIXOO\ LQ WKH
middle and how, you know, some women do not cover their belly because they want to 
seduce and they bring up the pallu in a much smaller way. 
CJ: Right. 
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MS:  This is all.  Yes, if you see, yes. There are some women who are very clever 
because women in the village are not thinking of seducing any men. They tie to cover 
their modesty. 
CJ: Right. 
067KDW¶VWKHZD\WKH\DUHEURXJKWXS7KLVLVVRPHWKLQJQHZIRUWKHP<HV/RWVRI
women go about and teach that. But, if you go and show me something, I would tie it 
exactly the same. Whether I can hold it with my confidence is a different matter.  
CJ: OK. OK. We talked about weddings in our phone conversation. If you could 
generally say, I know that the parents have a role in buying the saris for the bride and 
saris for the significant female relatives of the bride and groom. What are the rules? Who 
buys what for whom? 
06,IRXQGWKDWLQZHGGLQJVLW¶VXVXDOO\WKHEULGHJURRP¶VVLGHWKDWEX\VVDULVIRUDOOWKH
sisters.  
CJ: Not the bride? 
MS: No. 
CJ: Oh, the bride and groom? 
061R7KHEULGHJURRPDOZD\VEX\VWKHEULGH¶VVDUL 
CJ: OK 
MS: Both the engagement sari and the wedding sari is bought by the bridegroom for the 
EULGH$W WKHZHGGLQJ WKHEULGHJURRP WKHEULGHJURRP¶V IDPLO\ZLOOEX\VDULV IRUKLV
PRWKHUKLVVLVWHUVDQGLIKHKDVWKHPKLVDXQWV%XWWKHIHPDOHVLGHWKHEULGH¶VVLGHI 
GRQ¶WNQRZ,KDYHQHYHUJRWWHQDVDULZKHQP\VLVWHUVJRWPDUULHG0D\EHLW¶VEHFDXVH,
ZDVIDUWRR\RXQJWRZHDUDVDUL,ZRUHDORQJ,QGLDQGUHVV6R,DPQRWVXUH,FDQ¶WWHOO
you that.  
CJ: OK 
 
MS: I think I have said that before.  
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CJ: Who would these people normally go to for help and advice in buying these saris? 
067KH\ZRXOGJRWKHEULGHJURRP¶VPRWKHUDQGWKHEULGH¶VPRWKHUZLOOJRWREX\WKH
EULGH¶VVDULWRJHWKHU8VXDOO\WKDW¶VZKDWWKH\GR%XW,KDYHKHDUGLQWKHYLOODJHVWKDW
the bridegroom will just go with his mother, his father and maybe his aunt. Because 
when they buy the sari, they look at the time. Because the time has to be correct, The 
day has to be correct. And they will never buy it on a bad day. If they feel that the day is 
a EDGGD\WKH\ZRQ¶WEX\LW7KH\ZLOOJRDQGFKRRVHWKHVDUL8VXDOO\WKH\ZLOOWKLQN
WKHJLUOLVGDUNZH¶OOJHWDOLJKWHUFRORXU7KHJLUOLVIDLUZH¶OOJHWDGDUNHUFRORXU%XW
usually, as you know, saris are always red. Red, then blue and sometimes green.  But, 
they never use any other colours. 
CJ: OK. 
06%DVLFDOO\LW¶VUHG,IWKH\DUHJRLQJWREX\VDULVIRUWKHPRWKHUDQGVLVWHUVDQGDOO
WKH\¶OOMXVWJRWRWKHVKRSWRJHWKHU 
CJ: OK 
06,W¶VWKHPHQLQWKHVKRSZKRVD\³:RZWKDW¶VDZHGGLQJGHlegation that has come 
WRWKHVKRS2.LW¶VDJRRGRFFDVLRQ\RX¶YHFRPHWREX\VDULVDQGVKRHV´ 
CJ: OK. OK. Do friends and work colleagues join together to buy a sari for the bride? 
MS: In our Indian tradition in Malaysia, no.  
CJ: No. 
MS: Maybe in India yes.  
CJ: OK. We have already talked about widows... 
MS: Yes, it is usually white.  
&-'RZLGRZVEX\WKHLURZQZLGRZ¶VVDULVRULVLWJLYHQWRWKHP" 
06 1R :KHQ WKH\ EHFRPH D ZLGRZ LW LV XVXDOO\ JLYHQ WR WKHP ,W¶V XVXDOO\ WKH
KXVEDQG¶VVLGHWKDWZLOOEULQJLWWRWKHPWKHNROLWNRGL.RGLPHDQVJLIW,W¶VOLNHVKHKDV
EHHQDSDUWRI WKH IDPLO\1RZ WKH\ZLOO JLYH WKHZKLWH VDUL8VXDOO\ZLGRZV , GRQ¶W
WKLQNZLOOJRRXWDQGEX\WKHLURZQ,¶PVXUHWKH\KDYHFKLOGUHQ(DFK\HDUWKH\¶OOJHW
 327 
 
one for DiwalLDQG3RQJDO,NQRZP\DXQWP\PRWKHU¶VVLVWHUEHFDXVHVKHGLGQ¶WKDYH
children, she used to buy her own. She used to wear light brown. And now I have seen a 
ORWRIWKHPRQP\PRWKHU¶VVLGHZKRDUH$QGKUDSHRSOHZKRZHDUEHWZHHQZKLWHDQG
brown.  
CJ: OK, OK. 
060D\EHEHFDXVHZKLWHJHWVGLUW\7KH\¶UHJRLQJWRZRUNRQWKHLU IDUP7KH\ZHDU
brown.  
CJ: OK. Does your cousin have maids? 
MS: Yes, she has. 
CJ: Has she ever given them saris? 
MS: She has given away saris to her maids. You asked me what importance? Very! 
Because they are all poor and they work and toil on the land. So, that any sari given to 
them is very important to them.  
CJ: OK. Does your cousin ever consider the taste of the maid when giving away saris?  
061R,GRQ¶WWKLQNVR 
CJ: OK.  
MS1RZKDWHYHUVKHZDQWHGWRJLYHVKHZRXOGJLYH%XWWKHQVKH¶OOWKLQNLW¶VDVLON
DQGRKP\*RGLW¶VYHU\H[SHQVLYH8VXDOO\WKH\¶OOJHWFRWWRQVDULV6RPHVLONVDULVDUH
given. 
CJ: OK. Where would the maids buy their saris when not given them? 
MS: In the village, I have seen peddlers come on motorbikes. Where my uncle lived, two 
YLOODJHVDZD\ WKHUHLVD OLWWOHYLOODJHZKLFKLVTXLWHELJ ,W¶VFDOOHG&KLWWLNROODP7KH\
have one or two sari shops. There is enough for him to carry stock and make a little bit 
RISURILWVRKHGRHVQ¶WKDYHDELJWXUQRYHU6RWKH\GRJRWKHUH 
CJ: OK. OK. So where would they get help and advice? From their mothers? From their 
sisters? 
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MS: Yeah, maybe in the material type. As I said, they have a mind of their own from 
seeing movies. They see someone having a sari or they see a picture and think they want 
something similar.  
CJ: Right. 
MS: But, they may not get everything that they see.  
CJ: OK. Next section. I ask about an individual woman selling a sari. What advantages 
do they have? What disadvantages do they have in selling a sari? 
MS: I think advantage is that the woman wants to be independent of their husbands and 
make some money on her own. The disadvantage I feel is, one, her husband may not.... 
CJ: Appreciate? 
MS: Appreciate her spending her time going out shopping, bringing it back and selling 
it.  He may feel that she is the housewife and he is the president like in the case with my 
cousin. She can stay at home and look after the children, cook and clean but why does 
VKHKDYHWRGRLW7KHVHFRQGGLVDGYDQWDJHLVWKDWLIWKH\GRQ¶WFDUU\HQRXJKVWRFNWKHQ
the villagers may not go to her. And sometimes she will go and have only cotton saris. 
One year when I went, I said I have to give gifts for the aunties. She said I have saris. I 
RQO\KDYHFRWWRQVDULV,VDLGQR,GRQ¶WZDQWDOOFRWWRQ,ZDQWVRPHVLON,ORRNHGDWWKH
cotton saris and they were not to my choice. If I were going to give them away, I would 
buy beautiful ones.  
CJ: OK. 
066RWKDW¶VPH 
CJ: The last question in this section is on skills and characteristics a woman sari seller 
you feel they would need to be able to be successful doing that? 
MS: I think one is, she should be wearing saris in a nice way. Showing off.... 
CJ: Herself? 
MS: Showing off herself and being a role model and two is the quality of the saris. 
$OWKRXJKWKH\PD\EHSRRUWKH\DUHDOZD\VORRNLQJWRVHHLIWKHTXDOLW\LVJRRG7KDW¶V
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VRPHWKLQJZLWK ,QGLDQV ,GRQ¶WNQRZ LI \RX UHDOLVH WKDW(YHU\WKLQJ WKHUH LV DTXDOLW\
attached to it. I think these are the two things. Of course, the third one is whether they 
can afford it. Whether she is bringing saris and bringing an exorbitant rate or is she 
putting a small margin and selling more saris to make a profit. So I think these will be 
the three things.  
&-2.1RZRQSURGXFHUVDQGGHVLJQHUV,GRQ¶WNQRZ 
06,GRQ¶WIROORZDQ\GHVLJQHUVOHWPHWHOO\RXWKDWEHFDXVH,WKLQN,¶PVKUHZG,NQRZ
with designers you have to pay a premium for their name, all right? I have not come 
across many designer saris that I have liked because they are far too outrageous. Or they 
are too conservative. OK? Because I buy conservative saris to wear to temple, I like 
sometimes the middle of the range saris. So, no, I do not follow them. 
CJ: OK.   
MS: Though ,OLNHWRORRNDWWKHP7KDW¶VLW+DV.ROO\ZRRGHYHULQIOXHQFHGPHEX\LQJ
my sari? Never! 
CJ: OK. 
MS: Never. Are you aware of Tamil TV soaps? No. I hardly ever watch Tamil TV 
VRDSV,GRQ¶WKDYHWLPHIRUWKHP7KRXJK,GRZDWFKWKHPZKHQ,JRWRVHHDIUiend.  
&-2.7KDW¶VILQH:KLFKRIWKHVRXUFHV ,KDYHOLVWHGZKHQ\RXUFRXVLQZDVVHOOLQJ
saris, did she use and how strong was the relationship with them? 
MS: OK. There was more about giving the saris away for religious reasons. I know she 
did go for handlooms but I do not know what type of relationship she had with Co-op-
7H[ , FDQ¶W WHOO \RX WKDW $V IDU DV FRRSHUDWLYHV , GRQ¶W WKLQN VKH ZDV D SDUW RI DQ\
cooperatives.  
CJ: Did she go to the cooperatives to buy saris? 
MS: Yes she did. She went to handlooms.  
CJ: Any particular style? 
 330 
 
MS: I think it was Kanchipuram and Coimbatore because we wear a lot of Coimbatore 
cotton.  
&-,W¶VQRWWKDWIDUDZD\IURP7ULFK\ 
061RLW¶VQRW WKDWIDU , WKLQNLW¶VDERXW WKUHH WRIRXUKRXUV ,WZDVPRUHWKHVDUL ,t 
ZDV &RLPEDWRUH FRWWRQ ,I SHRSOH ZHUHQ¶W WDONLQJ DERXW &RLPEDWRUH FRWWRQ LW ZDV LQ
Madurai. Madurai cotton was very important. Because I told you that is where my father 
LV IURP , KDYH EURXJKW EDFN VDULV IURP WKDW DUHD , FDQ¶W WHOO \RX DERXW 6DOHP RU
7UDQYDSRUH,GRQ¶WNQRZZKHUH7UDQYDSRUHLV" 
CJ: I think it is somewhere in southern Tamil Nadu. 
06,WKLQNLW¶V.HUHOD,VLW" 
&-,GLGORRNLWXSRQ*RRJOH0DSVEXW,FDQ¶WUHPHPEHU 
MS: The other thing is sari shops. She went to sari shops, I know. ,GRQ¶WWKLQNVKHZHQW
WR DQ\ ZHDYLQJ PLOOV EHFDXVH WKHUH ZHUHQ¶W DQ\ ZHDYLQJ PLOOV DURXQG WKHUH , GRQ¶W
think she went to sari middlemen. Maybe entrepreneurs but what do you mean by 
entrepreneurs? Because sari entrepreneurs and sari shops are the same for me.  
CJ: The way they described it in the literature is people who sort of built the network up 
between the weavers, the handlooms, the mills, the shops, emporiums.... 
MS: She only went to sari shops. 
CJ: Did she go to a particular sari shop? 
MS: She went to a few different sari shops in Trichy.  
CJ: Do you know if she had a strong relationship with these people?  
MS: She would come in and say she was coming in to but in order to sell. She would 
EX\WKHPLQEXON6KHGLGQ¶WKDYHDYHU\JRRGFKRLFH,ZRXOGQ¶WEX\WKHP 
CJ: OK. In her negotiations with them, do you feel she had a strong relationship with 
them? 
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MS: Yes. She was going back to them for quite a few years. She was going to the same 
shops.  
CJ: And the handloom weavers like Kanchipuram, Coimbatore and Madurai, did she 
have a strong relationship with them? 
061R,GRQ¶WWKLQNVR 
&-2.<RXVDLG\RXZHUHQ¶WVXUHVKHZHQWWR&R-opTex at all. 
061R,GRQ¶WWKLQNVR,IVKHGLGVKHZRXOGKDYHWROGPH%HFDXVH,DVNHGKHUZKHUH
VKH¶GJRWREX\ them and she told me.  
CJ: You said that women giving saris away for a religious reason was a source. I assume 
it was a strong relationship with those women.  
MS: Yeah. They will know that she has the saris and they would not have to buy it and 
she would bring it and they would just pick it up. Being older women, they do give away 
a lot of cotton saris.  
CJ: Who financed your cousins business? 
MS: Her whole family.  
CJ: Her family did. 
MS: Money from herself. So, she did not get money from anybody. 
CJ: OK. OK. Where did she get her information from on customers and ... 
MS: It was networking actually.  
CJ: Networking. And who did she network with? 
MS: All the people. The friends and relatives of the wives of important men.  
CJ: OK. 
MS: There were professionals. Professional aunties? No. I think it was upcoming 
ZHGGLQJV 5HOLJLRXV )RU ³H´XSFRPLQJ ZHGGLQJV ³I´ XSFRPLQJ ORFDO UHOLJLRXV
IHVWLYDOV ³J´XSFRPLQJ VFKRRO IDUHZHOOV ³K´ )ULHQGV DQG UHODWLYHV RI WKH ZLYHV RI
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important men). There were no profesVLRQDODXQWLHV³Q´:RPHQWKDWRWKHUZRPHQWXUQ
WRIRUDGYLFHDERXWVDULVDQGWKDW¶VDERXWLW 
CJ: OK 
MS: It was a very small village. It was a very small village. 
CJ: She would network among all these and because of her status..... 
MS: Everybody would say Nimi had it. Go to Nimi. And she was a very slender girl like 
me. Pretty and dressed and tied her sari beautifully. She wore beautiful gold earrings and 
always looked neat and tidy.  
CJ: OK. Just curious. This is another section, 13.  
MS: The first one is who did your cousin socialise with? All the villagers. There was 
nobody else.  
CJ: Who did she go to anyone particular for, I am thinking specifically in two ways?  
One, help and advice generally. Also, help and advice in her sari business. 
MS: I think the local headmen. That would be her husband and father-in-law who was 
the president before.  
CJ: OK.  
MS: And anybody who would finance her. I know she was talking to a few insurance 
people.  
CJ: OK. 
06,GRQ¶WWKLQNLQWKHHQGVKHGLGWKDW&DXVHVKHZDs also selling insurance. And she 
ZRXOG DVN DGYLFH IURP IULHQGV DQG UHODWLYHV DQG VD\ ³,¶P VHOOLQJ DQG GR \RX NQRZ
DQ\RQHZKRZDQWVWREX\"´6RWKDW¶VKRZVKHGLGLW 
&-<RXVDLGLI,UHPHPEHUULJKWWKDW\RXUFRXVLQZDVGRLQJ2.EXWLWZDVQ¶WDZLOGOy 
successful business.  
MS: No 
CJ: But, it was not unsuccessful either.  
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MS: No. It was neither successful nor unsuccessful. 
CJ: OK. Obviously being married to one of the local headmen gives her an advantage. 
MS: Yes, because she was at the top. She was thHZLIHRIWKHSUHVLGHQW6KH¶VULJKWDWWKH
top. 
CJ: Most of her customers, where did they fall in the pyramid? 
MS: Below.  
CJ: Below. 
MS: Some on the same level some below.  
&-,I,ZHUHWRGUDZDS\UDPLG,¶OOPDNHLWUHODWLYHO\VLPSOHZHKDYHILYHOHYels here. I 
put your cousin here at the top. Where? 
MS: All levels. 
CJ: Her customers straddled all levels of society. 
MS: I know that all different kinds of people used to buy from her.  
CJ: OK. And the shop owners who supplied her, were they.... 
MS: They were big powerful sari shop owners 
CJ: Would they be in the top two levels? 
MS: I think they would be at the top.  
CJ: Top. OK. What jati did the family belong to?  
MS:  My cousin belonged to?  Right at the top because they are Reddiars.  
CJ: I have a list. This list comes from Pulicat which is, of course, north of Chennai. I 
GRQ¶WNQRZLI\RXUHFRJQLVHDOOWKHVHMDWLV 
MS: I recognise all the names here. No, they do not come under these. They come under 
Reddiars. 
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CJ: Originally most jatis had an occupational or craft basis. What did the Reddiars do 
back in the past? 
MS: Reddiars were land owners and collectors. 
CJ: What did they collect? 
MS: Money for the land owners. They were known as land collectors.  
CJ: OK.  
MS: Do you have them on there? 
&-,GRQ¶Whave Reddiars on the list. 
MS: This is very interesting. 
CJ: This is from a different area of Tamil Nadu 
MS: Yes. 
CJ: I think that Pulicat is very near the border of Andrha Pradesh. 
06 %XW LW GRHVQ¶W PDWWHU , UHFRJQLVH DOO WKH .DPPDOUV 6DOLHUV 9DQQLDUs, Tailors. 
Vanniars were also adobe men.  
CJ: OK. Did your cousin consider herself an outsider or insider in the sari business.  
MS: I think inside.  
CJ: You think inside. OK.  
MS: Because everyone came to her for saris.  
CJ: This set of questions is to see, not now, but when she was selling saris.  
067KHILUVWRQHLV³D´ILYHRUPRUH 
CJ: So that was how many people aged 0 to 17 were in the house. And the principal 
occupation of the household? 
 06,W¶VWKHILUVWRQHDJULFXOWXUDO7KH\RZQHGODQG 
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CJ: They owned land OK.  
067KH\ZHUHODQGRZQHUV6RZRXOG\RXSXWLWXQGHU³2WKHUV´" 
&-,WKLQN,ZLOOSXWLWXQGHU³2WKHUV´EHFDXVHKHUKXVEDQGZDVQRWDODERXUHU 
061RKHZDVQ¶W 
CJ: OK. Now the house they were living in, was it all pucca? 
MS: Yes. It was all bricks.  
CJ: Primary source of energy for cooking? 
MS: They had firewood and they had LPG. 
CJ: Did your cousin have a television? 
MS: Yes, they did. 
CJ: Bicycle, scooter or motorcycle? 
MS: Motorcycle. 
CJ: Did they have an almirah? 
MS: Yes they had an almirah. 
CJ: A sewing machine? 
MS: Yes, they did. 
CJ: Pressure cookers, any? 
06,WKLQNWKH\KDGRQHRUWZR,FDQ¶WWHOO\RXEXW,WKLQNLWLVDWOHDVWRQH 
CJ: At least one. 
MS: Every Indian house seems to have at least a pressure cooker.   
CJ: Electric fans? 
MS: Electric fans, yes. They had two or more.  
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CJ: OK. The last question is who I should talk to about the Tamil sari trade? 
MS: The priest. 
CJ: The priest. At any particular temple?  
MS: There is an Indian priest at an Indian temple in Stoneleigh. He can tell you a lot.  
CJ: I know the big one in Neasden.  
MS: No, no not Neasden. This is Tamil. Neasden will not know anything about the 
Tamil sari trade.  
CJ: I remember Neasden having every god and goddess for every Indian from all over 
the subcontinent.  
06,GRQ¶WILQGWKDWD WHPSOH:KHQ,JRWKHUH ,ILQGWKDW WKHUHLVQRVSLULW ,W¶VEXLOW
KXJHDVDVKRZEXW$O0DQGLU LVYHU\VPDOOEXW WKDWGRHVQ¶WPDWWHU7KHUH LVQRKRZ
shall I say this, me being a Tamil. When people come to my altar, WKH\VD\³2KP\:H
FDQ IHHO WKH HQHUJ\´ /LNH WKDW LQ D WHPSOH \RXKDYH WR LQVWLO WKH VSLULWE\ VD\LQJ WKH
SUD\HUV UDLVLQJ WKHHQHUJ\:KHQ ,ZHQW WR1HDVGHQ WHPSOH , GLGQ¶W IHHO DQ\WKLQJ ,W
ZDVOLNHWKDW¶VLW,WZDVOLNHDVKRZ\RXNQRZZKDW,PHDQ"7KDW¶VKRZWKH*XMDUDWLV
DUH(YHQWKHLUIXQHUDOV ,¶YHEHHQWR*XMDUDWLIXQHUDOV ,WKLQNRKP\*RGWKDQN*RG
,¶YHQRWEHHQERUQD*XMDUDWL,ZDQWP\SUD\HUVVRWKDWZKHQ,GLH,JRZKHUH,VKRXOG
JR7KH\GRQ¶WKDYHDSURSHUSULHVW WRGR WKHSUD\Hrs. I know because I have lost my 
parents and to know what had to be done and why they do it, etcetera. But the cycle of 
karma, I think I must really wanted to be born a Tamil. We tend to follow our Vedas, the 
vedic culture, the scripture must more closely. There is a reason for each one of that 
ZD\7KDW¶VZK\,ZDQW\RXWRVHHWKHSULHVWLQ6WRQHOHLJK7KHWURXEOHLVWKDWKHLVVR
EXV\%XW,¶OODVNKLP+H¶OOEHDUHDOO\JRRGRQHEHFDXVHKHUHFHQWO\JRWKLVVRQPDUULHG
as well. And he lives in Chennai as well. Although, he is formerly from Pondicherry. I 
GRQ¶WNQRZRIDQ\RQHHOVH 
&-:HOOLI\RXGRWKLQNRIDQ\RQHHOVH\RX¶OOOHWPHNQRZ 
MS: I will. 
CJ: Thank you very much for your time. I really appreciate it. 
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(Stopped at 14:44 into the 2nd interview file.) 
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10.5 Appendix E ± PPI Probability Tables for India 
PPI 
Score 
Total 
Below 
National 
Poverty 
Line 
(about 
$0.31/Day) 
Total Below 
USAID 
Extreme 
Poverty 
Line 
(about 
$0.26/Day) 
Total 
Below 
$0.75/Day 
Poverty 
Line 
Total 
Below 
$1.00/Day 
Poverty 
Line 
Total 
Below 
$1.25/Day 
Poverty 
Line 
Total 
Below 
$1.50/Day 
Poverty 
Line 
Total 
Below 
$2.00/Day 
Poverty 
Line 
20  W 
24  
28.7% 14.0% 18.0% 53.3% 78.7% 90.2% 98.0% 
45  W 
49 
4.5% 1.3% 1.0% 5.8% 24.0% 48.0% 79.0% 
55  W 
59 
5.7% 1.3% 1.0% 3.0% 16.0% 38.7% 69.9% 
60  W 
64 
6.1% 2.2% 1.2% 3.3% 12.2% 22.7% 55.2% 
70  W 
74  
1.5% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 6.4% 16.3% 42.9% 
75  W 
79  
1.6% 0.4% 0.0% 1.1% 2.1% 7.9% 27.3% 
80  W 
84  
0.7% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 3.6% 15.5% 
85  W 
89  
1.2% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 4.0% 12.9% 
90  W 
94  
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 1.7% 8.3% 
95 - 
100 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 4.4% 
Table 3 (Schreiner, 2008) 
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10.6 Appendix F ± Sari Seller SHG Member Questionnaire 
 (27 October 2010 UOG) 
Identification    SHG =  
 Organisation Country Y Y M M D D Staff 
Code 
               Ex. S 0 0 0 I N D 1 0 1 0 0 0 C J 
Interviewer Visits ±  
 1 2 3 4 
Date     
Interviewer's 
Name 
    
Result     
Next Visit Date     
Next Visit Time     
Results: 
 1 ± Completed 
 2 ± Not Completed to be continued next visit 
 3 ± Respondent absent 
 4 ± Postponed to next visit 
 5 ± Other ________________  (Specify) 
 
Total Number of Visits:   
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15. What percentage of the time do you socialise with each member of the SHG? 
 
Name Percentage 
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16. Who in the SHG do you go to for help and advice on important matters?  
Name Name 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
17. Recommendations 
Name Trust Pyr. Jati Spec. Help 
      
      
      
      
      
 
a. Have ever recommended the sari seller to your friends, family and neighbours? 
a. If yes, For each person identified: 
i.  How much do they trust your recommendation? Did they buy a 
sari? 
Totally trusting  ? ? ? ? ?  No Trust  
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ii. For each person identified, where on the pyramid of Tamil 
society is this person? 
iii. Do you know the jati of each person identified? 
iv. Does this person normally come to you for help and advice on 
important matters? 
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10.7 Appendix G ± Network Intervention Questionnaire 
 (27 October 2010 UOG) 
Identification    SHG =  
 Organisation Country Y Y M M D D Staff 
Code                
Ex. S 0 0 0 I N D 1 0 1 0 0 0 C J 
Interviewer Visits ±  
 1 2 3 4 
Date     
Interviewer's 
Name 
    
Result     
Next Visit Date     
Next Visit Time     
Results: 
 1 ± Completed 
 2 ± Not Completed to be continued next visit 
 3 ± Respondent absent 
 4 ± Postponed to next visit 
 5 ± Other ________________  (Specify) 
 
Total Number of Visits:   
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18. Here are the people you named in May that you were connected to for your sari 
selling business. Has anyone new come in or has anyone no longer there? 
 
19. Are your sari sales for Diwali 2011 higher, lower or the same as the sari sales for 
Diwali 2010? 
 
20. What percentage of household income comes from sari selling? 
 
21. How do you feel about the future of your sari business?  
 
a. Very Optimistic 
b. Optimistic 
c. Neither Optimistic or Pessimistic 
d. Pessimistic 
e. Very Pessimistic 
 
22. YƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƐĂƌŝƐĞůůĞƌ ?ƐƉŽǀĞƌƚǇůĞǀĞůďĂƐĞĚŽŶ'ƌĂŵĞĞŶ ?ƐWƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŽƵƚŽĨ 
Poverty Index for India,. We want to see if anything has changed since last year: 
a. How many people aged 0 to 18 were in the household? 
i. Five or more 
ii. Four 
iii. Three  
iv. Two  
v. One  
vi. None  
b. tŚĂƚǁĂƐƚŚĞŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚ ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶ ?
i. Labourers (agricultural, plantation, other farm) hunters, tobacco 
preparers and tobacco product makers, and other labourers  
ii. Others  
iii. Professionals, technicians, clerks, administrators, managers, 
executives, directors, supervisors, and teachers  
c. Was the residence all pucca (burnt bricks, stone, cement, concrete, 
jackboard/cement- plastered reeds, timber, tiles, galvanised tin or 
asbestos cement sheets)? 
i. No  
ii. Yes  
d. tŚĂƚǁĂƐƚŚĞŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨĞŶĞƌŐǇĨŽƌĐŽŽŬŝŶŐ ? 
i. Firewood and chips, charcoal, or none  
ii. Others 
iii. LPG  
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e. Did the household own a television? 
i. No  
ii. Yes  
f. Did the household own a bicycle, scooter, or motor cycle? 
i. No  
ii. Yes  
g. Did the household own an almirah/dressing table? 
i. No  
ii. Yes  
h. Did the household own a sewing machine? 
i. No  
ii. Yes  
i. How many pressure cookers or pressure pans did the household own? 
i. None  
ii. One   
iii. Two or more  
j. How many electric fans did the household own? 
i. None  
ii. One  
iii. Two or more  
23. Do you have your financial diary? 
24. The sari sellers were asked if they are willing to train other BWDA sari sellers on 
any of the skills below: 
a. How to successfully negotiate with sari shops 
b. How to buy saris in bulk with other sari sellers and still be competitors 
c. How to set up your own sari shop 
d. How to be successful in running a sari shop 
e. How to get customers into your sari shop 
f. How to price saris to maximise your profit 
g. How to use embroidery to increase your profits 
h. How to create a successful business strategy 
i. How to develop the business 
j. How to do marketing 
k. How hire and manage employees 
l. How to successfully get credit from sari shops 
m. Accountancy training 
 346 
 
n. General sari seller training 
o. How to sell silk saris 
p. How to do sari painting and sari embroidery 
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10.8 Appendix H ± Sari Seller Data from the 4th Research Field Trip 
Sari 
Seller 
Prev
PPI 
 PPI Diwali 
Sales 
% 
Income 
Optimi
sm 
Reason 
Diwali 
Sales 
Reason 
PPI Change 
S005 48 48 љ 50 1 Elections N/A 
S008 93 93 љ 20 2 Sari Design N/A 
S011 86 86 ј 50 1 Customers N/A 
S012 73 77 ј 50 1 Customers +Fan 
S017 68 63 ў 90 3 'RQ¶W.QRZ -Scooter 
S025 80 80 ў 100 1 'RQ¶W.QRZ N/A 
S032 72 72 ў 30 3 Competitors N/A 
S045 77 80 ј 40 2 Weak Link +Cooker 
S051 44 44 ў 100 1 'RQ¶W.QRZ N/A 
S052 86 86 ў 20 2 'RQ¶W.QRZ N/A 
S053 74 74 ў 25 2 'RQ¶W.QRZ N/A 
S055 100 100 ў 25 2 'RQ¶W.QRZ N/A 
S056 91 91 ў 35 1 'RQ¶W.QRZ N/A 
S057 94 94 ў 25 2 'RQ¶W.QRZ N/A 
S058 62 66 ў 25 2 Cattle +House Pucca 
S062 28 33 ў 40 1 'RQ¶W.QRZ -Child 
S063 72 72 ў 50 1 'RQ¶W.QRZ N/A 
S064 88 88 ў 25 2 -Partner N/A 
S065 75 75 ў 50 1 'RQ¶W.QRZ N/A 
S066 78 78 ў 70 1 'RQ¶W.QRZ N/A 
S067 71 71 ў 30 2 'RQ¶W.QRZ N/A 
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S068 60 60 ў 40 1 'RQ¶W.QRZ N/A 
S069 91 91 ў 30 2 'RQ¶W.QRZ N/A 
S071 75 80 ў 30 2 'RQ¶W.QRZ +Scooter 
S072 76 76 ў 100 1 'RQ¶W.QRZ N/A 
S073 88 100 ў 60 1 'RQ¶W.QRZ +Sewing 
+Professional 
S079 77 77 ў 90 1 'RQ¶W.QRZ N/A 
S083 79 71 ў 80 2 'RQ¶W.QRZ -LPG 
+Cooker 
S085 81 73 ў 70 2 'RQ¶W.QRZ -Others 
S087 78 71 ў 70 1 'RQ¶W.QRZ +Child 
 
For Optimism Level: 
1. Very optimistic about future of sari business 
2. Optimistic about future of sari business 
3. Neither optimistic nor pessimistic about future of sari business 
4. Pessimistic about future of sari business 
5. Very pessimistic about future of sari business 
For Diwali Sales: 
ј - Diwali sari sales in 2011 > Diwali sari sales in 2010 
љ - Diwali sari sales in 2011 < Diwali sari sales in 2010 
ў - Diwali VDULVDOHVLQ§'LZDOLVDULVDOHVLQ 
 
 
 
 
 349 
 
10.9 Appendix I ± Sari Seller Network Shapes Comparison and 
Examples 
Network 
Shape 
Value 
Type PPI 
Ego 
#Strong 
Ego 
#Weak 
Total 
#Strong 
Total 
#Weak 
Stars 
Minimum 41 6 0 3 1 
Maximum 94 6 3 6 5 
Average 79.55556 4.666667 1.555556 4.666667 3.555556 
Simple 
Modified 
Stars 
Minimum 23 3 0 3 3 
Maximum 89 6 6 7 11 
Average 63.09091 4.772727 2.863636 5 6.045455 
Complex 
Modified 
Stars 
Minimum 24 4 0 4 4 
Maximum 100 8 5 10 11 
Average 73.59375 6.59375 2.34375 7.34375 7.625 
Two Stars 
Minimum 62 6 4 6 18 
Maximum 62 6 4 6 18 
Average 62 6 4 6 18 
Diamonds 
Minimum 40 1 0 2 4 
Maximum 100 7 6 7 12 
Average 72 4.5 2.3 4.65 7.65 
Boxes 
Minimum 56 2 0 2 4 
Maximum 100 5 2 6 10 
Average 80.33333 4.083333 1.166667 4.25 6.666667 
Cliques 
Minimum 56 7 2 9 5 
Maximum 80 9 3 25 6 
Average 72.5 7.5 2.25 13 5.75 
Others 
Minimum 40 3 0 4 4 
Maximum 100 6 6 7 14 
Average 71.09091 4.181818 1.909091 5.090909 7.818182 
 
Table 38 ± Sari Seller Network Shape Analysis Part I 
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Network 
Shape 
Value 
Type Density 
Strong 
Ties 
Density nEgoBet EffSize  Size  
Stars 
Minimum 0.0818 0.0455 0 5 5 
Maximum 0.1429 0.119 0 8 8 
Average 0.1031 0.060467 0 6.222222 6.222222 
Simple 
Modified 
Stars 
Minimum 0.0769 0.0769 0 4.933 5 
Maximum 0.125 0.125 12.5 11.867 12 
Average 0.1016 0.048832 3.648636 7.585545 7.636364 
Complex 
Modified 
Stars 
Minimum 0.0662 0.0208 0 4.92 5 
Maximum 0.1389 0.985 23.81 13.963 14 
Average 0.105838 0.053403 5.48625 8.7605 8.9375 
Two Stars 
Minimum 0.0494 0.0119 0 9.841 10 
Maximum 0.0494 0.0119 0 9.841 10 
Average 0.0494 0.0119 0 9.841 10 
Diamonds 
Minimum 0.0824 0.0273 0 4.541 5 
Maximum 0.1607 0.0778 0 9.933 10 
Average 0.115775 0.04361 0 6.7014 6.8 
Boxes 
Minimum 0.0909 0.0273 0 3.567 4 
Maximum 0.1964 0.0833 14.2900 7.0000 7.0000 
Average 0.140225 0.0541 1.190833 5.226667 5.333333 
Cliques 
Minimum 0.0879 0.0549 0.0000 8.3410 9.0000 
Maximum 0.2125 0.1917 27.27 9.684 12 
Average 0.1264 0.0937 6.8175 8.74925 10 
Others 
Minimum 0.0833 0.0303 0 4 4 
Maximum 0.1806 0.0778 75 8.712 9 
Average 0.135009 0.052764 15.02545 5.940909 6.090909 
 
Table 39 ± Sari Seller Network Shape Analysis Part II 
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Figure 31 ± Star Shaped Network Example 
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Figure 32 ± Simple Modified Star Shaped Network Example 
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Figure 33 ± Complex Modified Star Shaped Network Example  
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Figure 34 ± Two Stars Shaped Network Example 
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Figure 35 ± Diamond Shaped Network Example 
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Figure 36 ± Box Shaped Network Example  
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Figure 37 ± Network Containing Clique Example 
 
 
 358 
 
 
 
Figure 38 ± Other Shaped Network Example  
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10.10 Appendix J ± Information Sheet for Microfinance Beneficiaries 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR  
MICROFINANCE BENEFICIARIES 
 
(If you have problems in reading this, the content will be read to you in your own 
language) 
You are cordially invited to take part in a research project conducted by the University of 
Greenwich, as the microfinance institution that you belong to is part of our research project. 
 
What is the project all about? 
 
Title P “KƉƚŝŵŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƵĂů'ŽĂůƐŽĨDŝĐƌŽĨŝŶĂŶĐĞ P^ŽĐŝĂůEĞƚǁŽƌŬŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂŶĚ^ŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
 
Purpose: To investigate how different actors in the microfinance industry collaborate in order 
to help microfinance institutions to achieve their social and financial goals. Once this is 
understood, the research proposes to identify areas in which collaboration can be improved so 
that every actor in the industry benefits. 
 
Duration: Feb 2009-January 2012. Visits to participating group members will be held once a 
year. 
 
What is required from your participation? 
 
In order to get a good understanding of the research issues, we plan to conduct interviews with 
beneficiaries of microfinance institutions like you. In this regard, details are: 
 
Your time commitment for each interview: about one hour.  
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Number of interviews: one or two per visit. 
  
We would like to reassure you that all information you provide will be treated in the strictest 
confidence. We will also ensure the anonymity of all participants.  
 
In turn, the research team will make available the research findings to all participating 
individuals which will also be invited to take part in events when scheduled. 
 
We would like to stress that any data which is collected during the course of the research 
project will be used for academic research or statistical analysis. The data may be held 
indefinitely, and may only be made public in a form which identifies individuals with the 
consent of the individual. It will be held securely according to the principles of the UK Data 
Protection Act of 1998. 
 
We thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this research project. 
 
If you have any question or comments, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Dr. Ana Marr BSc MSc PhD 
Principal Investigator and Project Leader 
International Business Department 
University of Greenwich Business School 
Old Royal Naval College, Park Row 
London SE10 9LS 
Tel: +44(0)20-8331 9783 (Direct Line) 
a.marr@greenwich.ac.uk 
